Missouri Law Review
Volume 59
Issue 3 Summer 1994

Article 2

Summer 1994

Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations: Towards
Intermediate Scrutiny for a Quasi-suspect Classification
Hartwin Bungert

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hartwin Bungert, Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations: Towards Intermediate Scrutiny for a
Quasi-suspect Classification, 59 MO. L. REV. (1994)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Protection for Foreign and Alien
Equal
Bungert: Bungert: Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations
Corporations: Towards Intermediate
Scrutiny for a Quasi-suspect Classification
Hartwin Bungert*
572
Introduction .....................................
577
Current Equal Protection Doctrine .....................
577
Test
.............................
A. Rational Basis
579
B. Strict Scrutiny ................................
582
C. Differences Between the Two Fundamental Tests ........
583
D. Intermediate Scrutiny ...........................
585
III. Equal Protection of Alien Natural Persons ................
585
A. Discrimination by the States .......................
585
1. The Pre-Burger Court ........................
586
2. The Burger Court ...........................
588
3. Reasons for Applying Strict Scrutiny ..............
Strict
4. The Political Function Exemption From the
590
Scrutiny Test ..............................
5. The Illegal Aliens Exemption From the Strict
592
Scrutiny Test ..............................
593
B. Discrimination by the Federal Government .............
593
1. The Doctrine of the Supreme Court ...............
595
2. Different Concepts ..........................
3. Critique .................................. 595
597
IV. Equal Protection for Alien and Foreign Corporations ........
A. Applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to Foreign and
Alien Corporations on a Conflict of Constitutional
Laws Level .................................. 600
1. First Step: Overcoming the "Artificial Person"
600
Doctrine .................................
2. Applying Equal Protection to Foreign and Alien
601
Corporations ..............................
I.
II.

Lecturer in Law (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter) at the Institute of
International and Comparative Law, Ludwig-Maximilians-University ofMunich, FRG.
Referendar ("J.D.") 1989, Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, FRG; LL.M.
1991, The University of Chicago Law School; Doctor iuris 1993, Faculty of Law,
Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, FRG; Assessor 1994, Munich Court of
Appeals (Oberlandesgericht Mllnchen), FRG. Parts of this article were written while
working as a foreign attorney with the law firm of Shearman & Sterling, New York
office. I wish to thank Shearman & Sterling, in particular Dr. Michael Gruson, M.C.L.,
LL.B., Partner with Shearman & Sterling, New York, for providing me with the
opportunity to write this article as well as granting technical and library assistance. For
comments I am indebted to Jeff Seitzer, M.A., Ph.D., The University of Chicago. For
earlier discussions of questions treated in this article I would like to thank Professors
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, David P. Currie, The University of Chicago Law
Published
University
of Missouri
of Law
Scholarship
Repository,
Dr.1994
Gerhard
and Professor
University,
Columbia
Louis
Henkin, School
Professor
School, by
Casper. President, Stanford University.
*

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

3. Interpretation of "Within its Jurisdiction" ...........
4. Approaching a Subjection Factor? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Constitutional Right to be Admitted to do Business? ...
B. Equal Protection Standard of Review Currently Used .....
1. Traditional Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court ......
2. Supreme Court on the Way Towards a Slight Tightening
of the Standard of Review? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Different Concepts in Constitutional Doctrine ........
C. Strict Scrutiny for Discrimination Against Alien
Corporations? .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Corporate Nationality as Suspect Classification? ......
a. Prejudice Against a Discrete and Insular Minority . .
b. History of Discrimination ...................
c. Lack of Democratic Representation ............
d. Unalterable Trait .........................
e. Parallel to Nonresidency? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f. Parallel to the Political Function Exemption? .....
g. Summary ..............................
2. Parallel to the Right to Travel as a Fundamental

Right? '...........

3.

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

a. The Doctrine of Fundamental Rights
Equal Protection .........................
b. Right to Interstate Migration for Foreign
Corporations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
c. Expansion to Alien Corporations? . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Right of Access to Courts ..................
Significance of Qualification for Doing Business
Under the Equal Protection Doctrine ..............
a. Requirements and Consequences of Qualification...
b. Significance of Qualification According
to the Traditional Concept ..................
c. Significance of Qualification Under a
Modem Concept .........................
Unconstitutional Unequal Treatment of Alien
Natural and Alien Juridical Persons Under the
Equal Protection Clause Itself? ..................
Different Standard of Review for Federal
and State Differentiations ......................
Distinguishing Other-Country Corporations and
Other-State Corporations ......................
Domestic Corporations Controlled by Aliens ........
Reverse Discrimination Under the Equal
Protection Clause ...........................
Summary .................................

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2

602
605
606
609
609
611
612
613
613
613
615
616
618
619
619
620

620
620
622
624
626
627
627
628
629
630
632
633
633
634
635
2

1994]

Bungert: Bungert: Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations
FOREIGNAND ALIEN CORPORATIONS

V. Privileges and Immunities Clause ......................
VI. Impairment of Obligations of Contract Clause ..............
VII. Commerce Clause .................................
VIII.Summary of the New Standard of Review ................
IX. Exemplary Application of the Standard of Review Proposed ....
A. Review of Typical Justifications for Discriminations Against

Foreign/Alien Corporations .......................

X.

636
638
639
640
641

641

641
1. National Security ...........................
2. Protection of Domestic Employees
645
Against Unemployment .......................
646
3. Lack of Consent to U.S. Economic Policy ..........
647
4. General Protection Against Alien Control ...........
648
5. Protection of the Local Economy ................
650
6. Protection of Domestic Legal Relations ............
651
7. Protection of Certain Key Industries ..............
651
a. Example: Banking Industry ..................
653
b. Example: Radio Communications .............
654
c. Example: Insurance Industry .................
655
8. "Bounty" Theory ...........................
656
9. Requirement of Reciprocity ....................
10. Formal Disclosure, Report and Permit Requirements ... 658
B. Review of Exemplary Statutory Provisions Restricting
659
Foreign or Alien Corporations .....................
659
1. Restrictions on Land Transfer ...................
662
2. Qualification Statutes .........................
662
a. Commerce Clause ........................
662
b. Equal Protection Clause ....................
663
3. State Pseudo-Foreign Corporations Statutes .........
663
a. Commerce Clause ........................
665
b. Full Faith and Credit Clause .................
666
c. Equal Protection Clause ....................
667
4. Domestication Statutes ........................
668
5. State Taxation of Foreign Corporations ............
668
a. Equal Protection Clause ....................
670
b. Due Process Clause .......................
671
c. Commerce Clause ........................
672
Conclusion ......................................
672
A. Standard of Review .............................

B. Practical Application of the Standard of Review .........

675

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 2
MISSOURILAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

I. INTRODUCTION
State statutory legislation and, to a lesser extent, federal statutory
legislation often discriminates against foreign and alien corporations.' So far,
this kind of discrimination against corporations is not accorded much attention
in U.S. equal protection doctrine, although the discrimination of alien, natural
persons has been topic of much debate and of some well-known Supreme
Court cases. This article argues for application of at least an intermediate
level of scrutiny, if not strict scrutiny, for classifications on the ground of
"corporate nationality" under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
In detail, there will be four main lines of thought. First, equal
protection doctrine of discrimination against alien natural persons should be
applied analogously to discrimination against alien and foreign corporations.
Second, using a four factor test, "foreign and alien corporate nationality"
should be considered as a semi-suspect, if not a suspect classification,
triggering at least intermediate scrutiny, if not strict scrutiny. Third,
classifications based upon alien and foreign corporate nationality also touch
upon the fundamental right of interstate migration. Fourth, granting an
intermediate level of constitutional scrutiny to discrimination against alien and
foreign corporations under the Equal Protection Clause would harmonize the
levels of scrutiny among the somewhat structurally related constitutional
guarantees for foreign or alien corporations by the interstate and foreign
Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Impairment
of Obligations of Contracts Clause, even if the latter is no longer applied in
practice. Furthermore, discrimination against foreign (out-of-state) corporations should be reviewed under the same level of scrutiny as discrimination
against alien (out-of-country) corporations.
The argumentative line of this article also touches upon the theories of
corporate personality,2 which itself is linked to the premier question of
whether any of the fundamental rights of the U.S. Constitution are applicable
1. Several examples will be discussed infra at part X.A-B.
2. See, e.g., PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO
CORPORATION LAW-THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1993);
Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Personalityin American Law, 38 AM. J. COMP. L.
SUPPL. 49 (1990); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of
CorporateTheory in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY-POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 13

(Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S.Miller eds., 1987) [hereinafter Horwitz, Santa Clara];
Note, ConstitutionalRights of the Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641 (1982);
Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1441 (1987) [hereinafter Comment,
Personification]. For a historical overview of the different concepts see Arthur W.
Machen, CorporatePersonality,24 HARV. L. REv. 253 (I) and 347 (II) (1911).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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to foreign or alien corporations in the first place and how nationality of
corporations is to be defined for constitutional law purposes. This area of law
could be described as conflict of constitutional laws. It is structurally
comparable to the conflict of laws questions in, for instance, contracts or torts
law. In this context CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America' and the
question whether the incorporation rule has been implanted constitutional
ranking by this decision could play a leading role.
Relying especially on holdings of the Supreme Court, it was initially
denied that the notion of "national" could be used for a corporation. This
notion was seen as insoluble, connected to the connotation of personal
allegiance towards the sovereign state which only a person of flesh and blood
could have.' But in modem U.S. law the notion of corporate nationality is
used unhesitatingly.' Professor Vagts was probably the first to speak of the
"corporate alien" and "corporate alienage," even using the expression
"corporate citizenship."6 Inclining toward that expression this article will use
the expressions "corporate alien nationality" and "corporate foreign
nationality."
In many states "foreign corporations" are not defined by case law, but
by statutory law. For instance, for corporate law and the question of doing
3. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). Cf Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
4. Vgl. Herman Walker, Provisions on Companies in UnitedStates Commercial
Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 377-78 (1956) and references therein.
5. See, e.g., PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE
GROUPS-PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS 407 etpassim (1983 & Supp.); Yitzhak Hadari, The Choice ofNational
Law Applicable to the Multinational Enterprise and the Nationality of Such
Enterprises,1974 DUKE L.J. 1, 3; Heinrich Kronstein, The NationalityofInternational
Enterprises, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1952); E. Hilton Young, The Nationality of a
Juristic Person, 22 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1909); Comment, The "Nationality" of
International Corporations under Civil Law and Treaty, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1429
(1961). See also ERNST RABEL, 2 THE CONFLICT OF LAWS-A COMPARATIVE STUDY
17-27 (2d ed. 1960); I.F.G. Baxter, The Recognition of Foreign Corporations-A
Proposalfor Simplification, 40 CAN. B. REV. 165 (1962); George A. Van Hecke,
Nationality of CompaniesAnalysed, 8 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT INT. R. 223 (1961);

Vaughan Williams & Matthew Chrussachi, The Nationality of Corporations,49 L.Q.
REv. 334 (1933). In Spanish law the notion of"nacionalidad de las personasjuridicas"
is used without hesitation. See, e.g., ADOLFO MIAJA DE LA MUELA, 2 DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO (PARTE ESPECIAL) 112-15 (10th ed. 1987).
The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 213 (1986), under

the heading of "Nationality of Corporations," defines nationality of corporations: "For
purposes of international law, a corporation has the nationality of the state under the
laws of which the corporation is organized." Id.
6. Detlev F. Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal
Restraints on ForeignEnterprise, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1524-26 (1961).
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in-state business the Revised Model Business Corporation Act defines a
foreign corporation as "a corporation for profit incorporated under a law other
than the law of this state."7 Most commonly "foreign" corporations are
contrasted with "domestic" corporations, as for instance in Fletcher
Cyclopedia: "With respect to a particular state or country a corporation created
by or under the laws of that state or country is a 'domestic corporation', and

any corporation that owes its existence to the laws of another state, government or country is a 'foreign corporation."' 8 Sometimes nationality of a
corporation is used in a wider sense including the related, but more narrowly
drafted concepts of corporate "domicile," "citizenship," and "residence." The
term is understood as the relationship between corporation and state that
enables the legislative, judicial, and executive powers to connect that state for
a specific legal purpose with the corporation."
Courts often circumscribe the relation of a corporation towards its
incorporation as corporate domicile.' But this unfortunate wording is rightly
criticized: The functions the notion of domicile fulfills for natural
persons-particularly in family law-cannot be transferred to corporations.
The expression is tailored to appearances of family life and does not fit a
corporate structure and the business world. The objective factor of the notion
of domicile, i.e., physical presence,' cannot be defined for a corporation,
because a corporation is "present" in every state it is doing business in. 2

7. REV. MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT § 1.40(10) (1984).
8. 17 FLETCHER Cyc. § 8290 (1987).

9. Hadari, supra note 5, at 4; 19 C.J.S. Corporations§ 886 (1990).
10. See, e.g., Ohio & Mississippi R.R. v. Wheeler, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 286 (1862);
Johnson & Johnson v. Picard, 282 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1960); Gay v. Bessemer

Properties, Inc., 32 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1947); State v. Riss & Co., 335 S.W.2d 118 (Mo.
1960); In re Roche's Estate, 109 A.2d 655 (N.J. 1954). See also HARRY G. HENN &
JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES

§ 81 (3d ed. 1983 & 1986 Supp.); Roberta Romano, Law as Product:Some Piecesof
the IncorporationPuzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGAN. 225, 280 (1985).
11. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 16 (1969);
ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 20-22 (4th ed. 1986); EUGENE
F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 182-84 (2d ed. 1992).
12. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 cmt. 1(1969);
HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 10, at 153; SCOLES & HAY, supranote 11, at 21314; Joseph F. Francis, Domicile of a Corporation,38 YALE L.J. 335, 343-58 (1929);
Jack L. Goldsmith, Note, InterestAnalysisApplied to Corporations: The Unprincipled
Use of A Choice of Lav Method, 98 YALE L.J. 597, 602-03 (1989). For a restricted
use of the expression of "corporate domicile" with contents changing according to the
respective context see LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 11, at 29-30. See also Rabel, supra
note 5, at 27-30.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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Also, under the subjective element of domicile, the so-called animus
manendi,3 a juricidal person unable to form its own will cannot have and
does not appear realistic, in view of the economic practice. The incorporation
state serves as "residence" of a corporation, even if the corporation does no
business there and none of its shareholders, directors, officers or agents have
their residence there. 4 Corporate residence and nationality are most often
equated, 5 as is "domicile," if in the respective context the law of the state
of incorporation rules.'s
In principle, "other-state corporations," also referred to as "out-of-state
corporations" or "foreign corporations," are distinguished from "other-country
corporations," known also as "out-of-country corporations" or "alien
corporations."' 7 However, the term "foreign corporations," particularly in
statutes, sometimes is used as a category for corporations from other countries

as well as from other states.'s Goodman demonstrates that for purposes of
regulating foreign corporations' doing business practically all states extend by
statutory 9 or even constitutional' precept provisions applicable to foreign
corporations to alien corporations also.' However, most of the writings on

13. See, e.g., LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 11, at 20-22; SCOLES & HAY, supra
note 11, at 185-86; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18
(1969).
14. McKendrick v. Western Zinc Min. Co., 130 P. 865, 867-68 (Cal. 1913);
Home Savings & Loans Ass'n v. Iowa City Inn, Inc., 152 N.W.2d 588 (Iowa 1967);
Ireland v. Globe Milling & Reduction Co., 32 A. 921 (R.I. 1895); 17 FLETCHER CYC.
CORP. § 8298 (1987).
15. See, e.g., M. Tedeschi, The Determination of Corporate Nationality, 50

AUSTL. L.J. 521 (1976).
16. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supranote 10, at 154-55; Tedeschi, supranote 15,
at 521.

17. See, e.g., National Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118 (1882);
Baumgarten v. Alliance Assurance Co., Ltd., of London, England, 153 F. 301 (N.D.
Cal. 1907); 17 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 8290 (1987).
18. See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 371(a), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371(a)
(1993); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 883 (1990); DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL
BUSINESS PROBLEMS 103 (1986). In Nebraska, for instance, according to statutory
definition "foreign corporations" means foreign and alien corporations, insofar as in
the individual context this use would not violate the U.S. Constitution, NEB. REV.

§ 21-10, 132 (1991).
19. E.g., California: CAL. CORP. CODE § 171 (West 1993).
20. E.g., in Idaho: IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 10 (Michie 1992) and IDAHO CODE

STAT.

§ 30-1-2(b) (1992).
21. See the state synopsis in Gary A. Goodman, Federaland State Disclosure
Requirements and Restrictions in Connection with U.S. Acquisitions by Foreign

Purchasers,21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 623, 635-71 (1986).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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foreign corporations, in the context of doing business, or conflict of laws
probably implicitly refer only to out-of-state corporations. 22 In this Article,
in principle, the term foreign corporations will be juxtaposed to alien
corporations.
This Article will first provide an overview of current equal protection
doctrine (Part II) and elaborate on equal treatment of alien natural persons in
particular (Part III). It will then discuss traditional equal protection doctrine
relating to foreign and alien corporations (Part IV B) and develop a new
approach, also dealing with special questions such as distinctions between
other-country and other-state corporations or domestic corporations controlled
by alien persons (Part IV C). In this context, two categorical levels are
distinguished, a primary so-called conflict of constitutional laws level (Part IV
A) and the level of substantive constitutional law (Part IV B and C). Next,
a comparison of the Privileges and Immunities Clause (Part V), the Impair-

ment of Obligations of Contract Clause (Part VI), and the Commerce Clause
(Part VII) will follow. This overview will be used to claim that there is a
similar standard of intensified constitutional review under these constitutional
provisions protecting against discriminatory structures. After a summary of
the discussion (Part VIII), the new standard of review for discriminations
against foreign and alien corporations will be applied-as a test of its practical
implications-to typical justifications advanced for discriminations against
foreign or alien corporations (Part IX A) and to exemplary statutory provisions
restricting foreign or alien corporations (Part IX B).' The Conclusion (Part
X) will sum up the discussion and establish the results.

22. See also Leo M. Drachsler, The Status of Alien Corporationsin the Law of
the UnitedStates, 23 FORDHAM L. REv. 49 (1954).

23. Legal reality of treatment of alien corporations is immensely complicated by
several nets of bilateral and multilateral international treaties which contain general
and/or specific (designed for certain areas of law) most favored nation clauses,
nondiscrimination clauses and, particularly, national treatment clauses. The most
important category is that of treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation (FCNtreaties). This topic cannot be dealt with in this article. For an intensive treatment see,
instead, my treatise HARTwIN BUNGERT, DAS RECHT AUSLANDISCHER
KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN AUF GLEICHBEHANDLUNG IM DEUTSCHEN UND USAMERIKANISCHEN RECHT-ZUGLEICH EIN BEITRAG ZU EINEM INTERNATIONALEN

GRUNDRECHTSKOLLISIONSRECHT [Equal Protection for Alien Corporations under
German and American Law-A Contribution to a Concept of Conflict of Constitutional
Rights] (1994) [hereinafter BUNGERT, ALIEN CORPORATIONS].
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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II. CURRENT EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
Discriminative acts and omissions by the states are controlled by the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 For discriminative
acts by the federal government, the Supreme Court 5 considered the Equal
Protection Clause as implicitly comprised in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment2 6 addressed to the federal government.27 This interpretative step of the Court is part of the concept of substantive due process.28

A. Rational Basis Test
The Supreme Court's current equal protection doctrine transcends the
simple constitutional wording of the Equal Protection Clause.29

In the

beginning, the Supreme Court in reviewing a state regulation classifying two
groups demanded only reasonableness of the criterion of differentiation in

24. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
25. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
26. "nor shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. 2 CORwIN ON THE CONSTITUTION § 123 et seq. (Richard Loss ed., 1987);
Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guaranteeof Equal Protection,55 N.C. L.
REV. 541 (1977); as to the incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment see generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992). For a critique see Ira C. Lupu, Untangling
the Strands of the FourteenthAmendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 995-96 (1979).
28. See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 343-44 (1989); Karst, supra note 27, at 542-44; see also Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process,JudicialReview, and Constitutional
Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309 (1993).
29. For fundamental readings on equal protection doctrine see Owen Fiss, Groups
and the Equal ProtectionClause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); Peter Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality,95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982); Stephen J. Burton, Comment,
"EmptyIdeas": LogicalPositivistAnalyses ofEquality andRules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136
(1982); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense ofEquality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81
MICH. L. REv. 575 (1983); Anthony D'Amato, Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 81
MICH. L. REv. 600 (1983); Peter Westen, On "Confusing Ideas:" Reply, 91 YALE L.J.
1153 (1982) and Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and
Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REv. 604 (1983); summarizing PETER WESTEN,
SPEAKING OF EQUALITY (1990).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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relation to the goal of differentiation." The legislature possesses a wide
range of discretion which is only surpassed by an "irrational" or "arbitrary"
classification.' This very lenient review by the Court became known as
"rational basis test" or "low level test."3 2 It dominates in the area of
economic and social legislation. 3 The criterion of review under the rational
basis test has been formulated in different ways.34
30. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,191 (1964) ("The courts must reach and
determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in
light of its purpose."). See also Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION, ANNOTATIONS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES TO JULY 2, 1982 at 1697-1702 (Congressional Research Service ed,

1987 & 1988 Supp.) [hereinafter Congressional Research Service]; Michael W.
Dowdle, Note, The Descent of Antidiscrimination:On the Intellectual Origins of the
CurrentEqual ProtectionJurisprudence,66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1169-90 (1991).
31. See JACK GREENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL PROCESS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 373 (1987); Hartwin Bungert,
Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau im amerikanischen und deutschen

Verfassungsrecht [Equal Protection for Men and Women in US and German
Constitutional Law], 89 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT

[ZVglRWiss; German Journal of Comparative Jurisprudence] 441,450 (1990); Michael
J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection:A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM.

L. REV. 1023, 1068 et seq. (1979); James A. Hughes, Comment, Equal Protection
and Due Process: Contrasting Methods of Review under Fourteenth Amendment

Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 534-35 (1979) [hereinafter Comment,
ContrastingMethods].

32. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
18.3 (1986) [hereinafter ROTUNDA ET AL.];
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1439-45 (2d ed. 1988)
LAW-SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §

[hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroeck,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 344-53 (1949).
33. See JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION-RECLAIMING
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 260 (1983) [hereinafter BAER, EQUALITY]; Mercado

v. Kingsley Area Sch., 727 F.Supp. 335, 344 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
34. See, e.g., F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920), where
the Court stated the test as, "the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and

must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike." Id.at 415. In New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), the Court devised
a more generous formulation that a classification is justified if it is "rationally related
to a legitimate state interest." Id.at 303. The least the Court seems to demand is:
[tihe constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.

State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional
power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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B. Strict Scrutiny
The famous Footnote 4 of United States v. CaroleneProductsCo. staged
a new epoch. There, Justice Stone introduced his view that:
legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, [might] be
subjected to more exactingjudicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation.... [S]imilar considerations [may] enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious ....
or national, . . . or racial
minorities .... prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."

This turned out to be the beginning of the second tier of judicial review of
legislative
acts, the evolution of the so-called two-tier-theory36 by the Warren
37
Court.

inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). For an extensive covering of
the different standards under the rational basis test see Note, Legislative Purpose,
Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1973); Note, Developments in
the Law-EqualProtection,82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1077-87 (1969) [hereinafter Note,
Developments].
35. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(Stone, J., concurring). For a critique of the Carolene Products theory see Lea Brilmayer, "Carolene",Conflicts, And the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider",134 U. PA. L.
REV. 1291 (1986).
36. The expression was coined by Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971
Term, Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrineon a ChangingCourt: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 17 (1972) [hereinafter Gunther,
Evolving Doctrine].
37. See BAER, EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 118; J. Skelly Wright, Judicial
Review and the Equal Protection Clause, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1980);
Michael W. Dowdle, Note, The Descent of Antidiscrimination: On the Intellectual
Origins of the Current Equal Protection Jurisprudence,66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165,
1198-1229 (1991).
Strict scrutiny was first applied in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), a decision reviewing legislative regulations providing for camp imprisonment
of all persons of Japanese descent living on the West Coast, whether they were U.S.
citizens or not, in order to counter Japanese espionage and sabotage acts appearing
probable at that time. Although the Supreme Court assumed a suspect classification
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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Strict scrutiny is applied, first, when the legislature uses a suspect
classification, i.e. a classification suggesting discriminatory intent. Second, it
will be applied when fundamental rights or fundamental interests like the right
to vote or the right of access to courts are impaired by the legislative act.38
The latter so-called "fundamental rights branch of equal protection" was
initiated in 1942 by the Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson case.39

Under strict scrutiny a state or government classification will only pass,
if it (1) is necessary (2) for the realization of a compelling governmental
interest. 4 A classification is necessary, if no other means are less intrusive
for the achievement of the governmental interest. Therefore, one could speak
of a proportionality test, a device often used in German constitutional
doctrine. 4'

and applied strict scrutiny, it did not strike down the regulations at issue applying the
strict preconditions for the governmental goal and the means-end-relation. National
security was held to be a compelling interest of the government, and the Court was not
to question the military commander's evaluation of national security needs. Id.at 21623.
38. See BAER, EQUALITY, supra note 33, at 260-61; CRAIG R. DUCAT & HAROLD
W. CHASE, CONSTITUTONAL INTERPRETATION 68 (4th ed. 1988); TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

supra note 32, at 1454 et seq.; Congressional Research

Service, supranote 30, at 1702-13; Tussman & tenBroeck, supra note 32, at 353-61;

Comment, ContrastingMethods, supra note 31, at 535-41; Note, Developments,supra
note 34, at 1087-1104 and 1120-32.
39. Skinner v. Oklahoma exrel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Compare
also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 245-46 n.38 (1980); Gerald L.
Neuman, TerritorialDiscrimination,EqualProtection,andSelf-Determination,135 U.
PA. L. REv. 261, 272-73 (1987); Tussman & tenBroeck, supra note 32, at 361-65.

40. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993); Regents of the Univ. of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) ("a judicial determination that the

burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest"); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) ("will be
upheld only if it is necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment

of a permissible state policy").
41. See WINFRIED BRUGGER, GRUNDRECHTE UND VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKErr IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERiKA [Basic Constitutional Rights
and Constitutional Jurisprudence in the United States of America] 173 (1987); Ulrich
Beyerlin, "Umgekehrte Rassendiskriminierung"und Gleichbehandlungsgebotin der
amerikanischen Verfassungsrechtsprechung [Reverse Discrimination and Equal

Treatment in U.S. Constitutional Jurisprudence],

39 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR

AUSLXNDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [ZadRV,

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW] 496, 525-26
(1979); Bungert, supra note 31, at 450-51 (1990). For a more detailed treatment of

the proportionality standard see infra note 66.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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There are four indicia or factors that may render a criterion of
classification used by the state or federal government suspect, thus triggering
strict scrutiny:
(1) prejudice against discrete and insular minorities;"
43
(2) use of irrational group stereotypes;
of society; and,'
(3) stigmatization of a politically powerless 4segment
5
(4) reference to an unalterable personal trait.
Because of their character as factors or indicia, one of these factors will
contribute to the suspectness of a certain criterion of differentiation, however,
it will not alone decide upon the status as suspect classification. Perhaps one
can state that application of strict scrutiny will be the more certain the more
factors that are fulfilled.46
Rosberg argues that the relationship between two factors varying in their
intensity decides the qualification of a classification as suspect: A function of
the intensity of the infringement by the classification, and the integrity of the
political process by which the specific classification has been chosen among
others which would have had the same results. 47 Therefore, the more
systematically a certain group is excluded from political participation, e.g., the
greater the majority neglects the interests of the minority, the more likely it
is that the Court would deem it a suspect classification. 8

42. CaroleneProducts, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (Stone, J., concurring).
43. ELY, supra note 39, at 158-159. The notion "stereotype" is used by Justice
Blackmun in his opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 402, 405 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
44. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324, 360 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 49394 (1954); Tussman & tenBroeck, supranote 32, at 358; Note, Developments, supra
note 34, at 1127. Similarly Fiss, supranote 29, at 154-56, views the Equal Protection
Clause as a protective right for minority groups and emphasizes the group criterion of
a group's lack of political influence hand in hand with lengthy and simultaneous
suppression, stereotyped in the Blacks.
45. ELY, supra note 39, at 154-55; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 360-61; Note,

Developments,supra note 34, at 1126-27.
46. See BRUGGER, GRUNDRECHTE, supranote 41, at 202; Bungert, supranote 31,
at 451.
47. Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protectionof Aliens from DiscriminatoryTreatment
by the National Government, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 275, 299-304; see also Note,
Developments,supra note 34, at 1125-27.
48. Rosberg, supra note 47, at 301; Note, Developments,supranote 34, at 1125.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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C. Differences Between the Two Fundamental Tests
In looking for a reasonable governmental interest under the rational basis
test, the legislative materials or the explicitly stated arguments of the
respective state or federal government are of primary importance. If those are
missing or insufficient, the Supreme Court will consider the implicit purpose

of the respective legislative act or will apply its own reflections as to a
possible justification of the act.
However, under the standards of strict scrutiny or intermediate

scrutiny,49 the Supreme Court does not demonstrate such generosity.50
Relying on the precondition that in principle only a de jure discrimination, i.e.
only a willful and intended discrimination activates strict scrutiny,5 not
every de facto discrimination, the Supreme Court requires proof of discriminative intent, although also admitting objective factors for the proof. If the
petitioner established prima facie evidence of discrimination,52 the burden of
proof shifts to the state as the originator of the discriminatory act. The state
has to prove the lack of discriminative intent, or demonstrate hypothetically
that an identical substantive
decision would have been made without the
53
discriminative intent.
When applying strict scrutiny the Supreme Court usually reaches the
"verdict" of unconstitutionality of the governmental act. The application of
rational basis review, by contrast, regularly turns out as a defeat for the
petitioner, since in most cases a rational governmental goal can be found due
to the wide formulation of the criterion of justification.54 This explains the
struggle for placing a certain criterion of differentiation under the strict
scrutiny formula: The allocation of suspect or non-suspect status to a criterion
of classification rules upon the intensity of review and consequently indirectly

49. See infra section D.
50. See Note, A DualStandardforState DiscriminationAgainst Aliens, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 1516, 1519 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Dual Standard]; see also DUCAT &
CHASE, supra note 38 at 69.
51. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT-THE SECOND CENTURY (1888-1986)

[hereinafter D.P. CURRIE, THE SECOND CENTURY] 488-93 (1990).
52. Although the respective decisions of the Supreme Court concerned the area
of race discrimination, the holdings may possibly be extended to other suspect criteria
of differentiation.

53. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977). As to questions of burden of proof or burden ofjustification, respectively, see
also John Hart Ely, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw,
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1223-81 (1970).
54. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 552-53 (2d ed.

1991); Bungert, supra note 31, at 451.
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upon the probability of a finding of unconstitutionality by the Supreme
Court."
D. Intermediate Scrutiny
More recently another level of scrutiny evolved, usually referred to as
"intermediate scrutiny." It is located between the two other tests. This
standard of review was first applied in Craig v. Boren, 6 a gender discrimination case. Intermediate scrutiny is used in situations of quasi-suspect

classifications and when quasi-fundamental rights are infringed upon. Quasisuspect status has been awarded to classifications on account of gender or

illegitimacy. Under intermediate scrutiny a differentiating governmental act
is justified if (1) it serves an important governmental objective, and (2) it is
substantially related to achievement of this objective. 7
As an alternative to the three tiers of review, or, more exactly, the two-

tier-and-a-mezzanine-theory 8 a sliding scale approach has been proposed by
Justice Marshall.5 9 According to this test, there are not three fixed levels.
Instead, the degree of importance of the governmental goal striven for and the
intensity of the relation between means and goal is dependent upon the
invidiousness of the classification established."
Thus, a sort of interest
balancing comes into play, which is already applied by the courts in several
areas."' However, this sliding scale approach could extinguish an important

55. See also Bungert, supra note 31, at 451. As to the development see also
Note, Dual Standard,supra note 50, at 1519.
56. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See Bungert, supra note 31, at 452-54; Comment,
ContrastingMethods, supra note 31, at 541-42.
57. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576-79 (4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter NOWAK &
ROTUNDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra
note 32, at 326-28; TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 1601-25;

Comment, ContrastingMethods, supra note 31, at 541-45.
58. See BAER, EQUALITY supra note 33, at 264. She bases this notion on the socalled two-tier-theory,which refers to the traditional review on two levels and was first
used by Gunther, Evolving Doctrine, supra note 36, at 17.
59. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. See also Comment, ContrastingMethods, supra note 31, at 545-47.
61. It is, for instance, used in determining legislative jurisdiction (jurisdiction to
prescribe) according to the so-called rule of reason of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1986), first coined in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir.
1976) [hereinafter Timberlane 1] in the context of antitrust law. Second, under the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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doctrinal difference between the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause in its variant of substantive due process. 2
In this respect, it is argued that the Equal Protection Clause structurally
aims at the protection of members of politically vulnerable groups against
discrimination by the government, whereas substantive due process aims at
protecting specific fundamental interests of the individual, not at protecting
certain groups or members of groups.63 This perspective seems to indicate
a basic separation of equal protection rights' and substantive fundamental
constitutional rights. Some, however, argue that modem Supreme Court
jurisprudence mixes the structural differences between these rights of equality
and rights of liberty and thus creates, alluding to the notion of substantive due
process, a sort of "substantive equal protection."66

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, minimum
contacts are required for establishing (international) jurisdiction. See International
Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207
(1977); Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 606 (1990); see, e.g.,

LEFLAR ET AL., supranote 11, at 49-58; ScOLEs & HAY, supra note 11, at 78-88. For
the reasonableness criterion additionally required for (international) jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court has recently favored an interest balancing approach. See World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421 (1986); GARY B. BORN & DAVID
WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 72-79 and 92-

95 (2d ed. 1992); Peter Hay, Flexibility Versus Predictabilityand Uniformityin Choice
of Law--Reflections on CurrentEuropeanand UnitedStates Conflicts of Law, 1 REC.
DES CouRs 281 (1991). To compare the approach of (governmental) interest analysis,
see particularly, DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 88 et seq. (1965);
Brainerd Currie, Comment on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM.L.REV. 1233, 1241-43
(1963); Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958), reprintedin BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 77 (1963); Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods
and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, reprintedin CURRIE,
supra at 177.
62. See Comment, ContrastingMethods, supra note 31, at 547, 571-74.
63. See Comment, ContrastingMethods, supra note 31, at 530-31 and 573-74;
Fiss, supra note 29, at 147-70.

64. In German constitutional doctrine: "Gleichheitsrechte."
65. In German constitutional doctrine: "Freiheitsrechte."
66. See Lupu, supra note 27, at 1000, 1031.

The distinction of different levels of scrutiny in U.S. equal protection doctrine
bears strong structural parallels to the German constitutional concept of the principle
of proportionality ("VerhaltnismBigkeitsgrundsatz) with its three elements of fitness
("Geeignetheit"), necessity ("Erforderlichkeit"), i.e. the measure undertaken must be
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Before dwelling upon equal protection for alien and foreign corporations,
i.e. alien juridical persons, current doctrine of equal protection for alien
natural persons will be summarized and analyzed. This turns out to be
particularly helpful, not only because equal protection for foreign or alien
corporations is much less frequently discussed in U.S. court decisions and
legal commentaries than equal protection for aliens, but also because important
argumentative lines will be transferred. "Alienage" is commonly understood
as "non-U.S.-citizenship," only referring to natural persons. Thus, it does not
equal the notion of "national origin," but may intersect with it in some
cases.

67

III. EQUAL PROTECTION OF ALIEN NATURAL PERSONS
In regard to equal protection of alien natural persons, classifications of
the states and of the Federal government have to be distinguished.
,4.Discriminationby the States
1. The Pre-Burger Court
The jurisprudence of the pre-Burger Court does not reflect a consistent
line on the question of equal protection of aliens. No specific standard of
constitutional review evolved.68 In Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, for

instance, a city of Cincinnati ordinance which excluded aliens from licenses
for operating billiard halls was held constitutional. The possibility of a

rational basis for the legislature's evaluation that experiences with and interests
of particular members of the class disqualify the class as a whole from
the least restrictive means, and appropriateness ("Angemessenheit"). For an English
description see Matthias Herdegen, The Relation Between the Principles of Equality
and Proportionality,22 COMMON MARKET L. REv. 683 (1985). See also Bungert,
supra note 31, at 464-65; David P. Currie, LochnerAbroad: Substantive Due Process
and Equal Protection in the FederalRepublic of Germany, 1989 SuP. CT. REv. 333,
353-54.
67. See TRiBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supranote 32, at 1544 n.2. Classifications

on the basis of national origin are, however, considered as the prototype of a suspect
classification triggering off strict scrutiny, as is the criterion of race. See Hemandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944).
68. See ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 478, 481-84;
Earl M. Maltz, The Burger Court and.Alienage Classification,31 OKLA. L. REv. 671,

671-74 (1978). As to the work restrictions for aliens held to be constitutional, see
Note, ConstitutionalityofRestrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 COLUM. L. REv.
1012 (1957).
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operating a potentially harmful business could not be waived away. 9 On the
other hand, in Truax v. Raich" and in Takahashi v. Fish & Game

Commission,7 the Court established that a state regulation depriving aliens
of the possibility of earning their living by completely denying a work permit,
or issuing it merely under absolute restrictions, violates the Equal Protection
Clause. The restriction would in essence establish a denial of residence
permit. The residence permit, however, the Court argued, was already issued
by the government. In this line of thought the Supreme Court relied heavily
on Congress' power to regulate immigration and naturalization, the so-called
plenary power,72 which would be circumvented by permitting a discrimination by the states.7 Thus, equal protection doctrine was linked to the
notion of preemption as used in the Interstate Commerce Clause doctrine. 4
2. The Burger Court
In its well-known 1971 decision, Graham v. Richardson," the Burger
Court76 placed the question of equal protection of aliens into the modem

structure of two-tier equal protection analysis. This case challenged the
constitutionality of Arizona and Pennsylvania statutes which denied resident

69. Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392,397 (1927); see also Terrace
v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
70. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
71. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
72. Compare Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation,100 YALE L.J.
545 (1990) [hereinafter Motomura, Century]. Despite Congress's power in this field,

state regulations are permitted if they do not stand in conflict with federal legislation.
See Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 722 reporters' note 2 (1986). State regulation of aliens

in conflict with federal law is inapplicable due to the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2; see Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66
(1941). Not only federal laws, but also regulation of aliens in provisions of
international treaties of the government preside; see id.; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 722 reporters' note 9 (1986).
73. Takahashi,334 U.S. at 418-19; Truax, 239 U.S. at 42. For a comment see
Rosberg, supra note 47, at 295-97.
74. Compare David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption

or EqualProtection?,31 STAN. L. REv. 1069, 1072 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Equal
Treatment]. For an extensive treatment of the preemption question under the
Commerce Clause see TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 479-501.

75. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
76. For details see the analysis by Maltz, supra note 68, at 671.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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aliens participation in a state-financed welfare program. 7 In his opinion,
Justice Blackmun repeated that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment is not only applicable to citizens, but to all persons.7" Justice
Blackmun argued that aliens are prototypes of a "discrete and insular minority"
in the understanding of Footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products
Co.," i.e. an inherently suspect classification triggering strict scrutiny.
Accordingly, the challenged regulations could only be upheld if they were
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.' ° The Court rejected the
states' argument: The special public interest in preferred treatment of their
own state citizens over aliens when allocating rare resources. For once, the
underlying special public interest doctrine had become inapplicable with the
abandonment of the right/privilege distinction 8-a privilege as a voluntary
grant of benefits of the government had been held revocable and, in particular,
could be made dependent on nationality-due to the close fusing of the two
categories in modem legislation. 2 Second, the Court held that fiscal
considerations do not establish a compelling state interest."
Commentators emphasize that in the specific situation of Graham v.
Richardson it was superfluous to award alienage the status of a suspect
classification, because the case could have been argued-as the Supreme Court
admitted itself 84 -under the preemption doctrine as well, as the earlier
decision of Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission"5 had been. 6

77. Graham, 403 U.S. at 366-68, 371.
78. Id. at 371. See Truax, 239 U.S. at 39; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369 (1886).
79. See supra part II.B.
80. Graham, 403 U.S. at 371-72.
81. In the areas of public service and of governmental granting of goods and
services, individual "rights," (which stem from constitutional law or from common law
and may only be restricted in a limited sense) were distinguished from "privileges,"
(which were granted by the government and thus could be revoked at its discretion).
See TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 680-82.
82. Graham, 403 U.S. at 374. In Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 420-21, the special
public interest doctrine received a blow in the context of discriminations against aliens.
As to the development, see William W. van Alstyne, The Demise ofthe Right-Privilege
Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439, particularly at 1454-57
(1968); Steven F. Dobson, Comment, ConstitutionalProtectionof.Aliens, 40 TENN. L.
REv. 235, 236-37 (1973) [hereinafter Comment, Protection of Aliens].
83. Graham, 403 U.S. at 374-75. This had been already held in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
84. Graham, 403 U.S. at 380-83. In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642
(1973), the Supreme Court for the first time based the application of strict scrutiny
exclusively on the categorization of "alienage" as a suspect distinction.
85. 334 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1948). See also supra part III.A.1.
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Granting suspect classification status to classifications on account of
nationality had to be considered a great victory." Since under strict scrutiny,
hardly any discriminatory legislative act can withstand; in the following years
almost every state regulation challenged for different treatment of aliens was
invalidated by the Court.88 Strict scrutiny was applied, for instance, to state
regulations distinguishing on grounds of nationality concerning employment

for simple tasks in civil service,89 admission to the bar,' permits for
practice as a civil engineer,9 and financial subsidies in the area of university
education. 2
3. Reasons for Applying Strict Scrutiny
If one analyzes the criterion "alienage" under the four definitional factors
for a suspect classification laid out previously,93 several arguments can be
made.
It is doubtful whether alienage can be viewed as an "unalterable trait"
(factor 4) like race or national origin. Although in principle nationality is
acquired automatically by birth in the first place, U.S. citizenship may be
achieved by aliens, certain difficulties pending,94 so that the nationality of a
person is not unalterable, but dependent upon the person's will in coordinance
with certain other factors.95

86. See, e.g., the argument made in Note, Equal Treatment, supra note 74, at

1072-73.
87. Rosberg, supra note 47, at 298 n.95, notes that, interestingly enough, the
California Supreme Court anticipated this development two years earlier in Purdy &
Fitzpatrick v. State, 456 P.2d 645 (Cal. 1969). For an assessment of Graham v.
Richardson, compare Stephen F. Dobson Comment, Protectionof Aliens, supra note
82, at 241-44; D. P. CURRIE, THE SECOND CENTURY, supra note 51, at 500-01.

88. See also Rosberg, supra note 47, at 275-76.
89. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
90. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
91. Examining Bd. of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
92. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). Similar questions were posed in Toll
v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (nonimmigrant aliens are treated unequally as to tuition
at state universities).
93. See supra part II.B.
94. See generally Motomura, Century, supra note 72.
95. Compare TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 1545; Rosberg,
supra note 47, at 301-02. But see Note, Dual Standard,supra note 50, at 1525,

arguing that due to the five year U.S. residence requirement (8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1993
Supp.)) for awarding U.S. citizenship, alienage is a trait the individual, at least
temporarily, has no influence upon.
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Factor 1, prejudice against an identifiable and discrete minority, on the
other hand, holds true for the group of aliens. Aliens are easily distinguished
from U.S. citizens. They form, despite their differing origin, a relatively
homogenous group. They present a small minority. This evaluation holds
particularly true for nonresident aliens. Aliens as a class of persons suffered
from prejudices and disadvantages in the past, have been victims of discrimination and, therefore, lived through a history of prejudice, particularly
because of their insufficient command of the English language and their
differing customs and traditions.96
Furthermore, it is persuasively argued that the factor of stigmatization
(factor 3) is fulfilled, since the classification of citizens and aliens bears
connotations of the popular and official perception that aliens are inferior in
certain aspects.97 Similarly, one could find the use of an irrational group
stereotype (factor 2) in different treatment on grounds of "alienage." Rosberg,
particularly, points to the possibility of characterizinga classification based on
alienage as suspect because of the lack of political influence of the aliens.9"
Taking these factors into account, it is consistent for commentators to
emphasize that discrimination against aliens, at least against resident aliens,
should always be reviewed under strict scrutiny.' Some, however, oppose
an unrestricted application of strict scrutiny.'
They fear that suspect and
quasi-suspect classifications would overflow all boundaries, and eventually

courts would be forced to reevaluate reasonable decisions of the legislature in
numerous areas of law.

Differentiations according to IQ or physical

The weight of this frequently made argument is elucidated by the facts of
Ambach v. Nowick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), where the alien petitioners explicitly had

refused to apply for U.S. citizenship, although they personally fulfilled all
preconditions, so that they themselves prevented the alteration of the trait.
96. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976); TRIBE,
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 1545-46; Rosberg, supra note 47, at 306;
Note, Dual Standard,supra note 50, at 1525-26.
97. Rosberg, supranote 47, at 303; Note, DualStandard,supranote 50, at 1516.
98. Rosberg, supra note 47, at 304-05. This corresponds with his concept
outlined previously, that the suspectness is construed as a function of "intensity of the
impairment provoked by the discrimination" and "intensity of the powerlessness in the
political participation process, which led to this discrimination," see supra text
accompanying note 47.
99. See, e.g., Rosberg, supra note 47, at 299-315. John E. Nowak, Realigning
the Standardsof Revieiv Under the Equal ProtectionGuarantee-Prohibited,
Neutral,
and PermissiveClassifications,62 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1099 andpassim (1974), however,
argues for an intermediate standard.
100. See Note, Dual Standard,supra note 50, at 1526-28. See also Archibald
Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term-Foreword:ConstitutionalAdjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

numerous areas of law. Differentiations according to IQ or physical
disabilities, for example, could also be qualified as suspect classifications,
since they also are stigmatizing and unalterable traits.' Therefore, several
prefer to maintain a dual standard in the area of differentiations between aliens
and citizens. The rational basis test is proposed, (1) if the justification for
strict scrutiny would be circular, i.e., if it is the very goal of differentiation
which is used for the suspect classification for applying strict scrutiny
review;"° (2) if the Constitution itself justifies the practice challenged, e.g.
denial of suffrage to aliens; or (3) if aliens may evade the impairments of the
regulation without any difficulties. 3
On the other hand, the application of strict scrutiny for differentiations
on account of nationality was completely rejected. Justice Rehnquist had
already refused to classify nationality as a suspect criterion in his dissent in
Sugarman v. Dougall'" not only, because he saw no indications that aliens
could be regarded as a discrete and insular minority. Alienage could not be
considered as a suspect criterion, he said, because the Constitution itself
already contained no fewer than eleven provisions that distinguish between
Final the validity of the starting point that infringecitizens and aliens.'
ment upon a discrete and insular minority automatically indicates a suspect
classification is put into question, because it originates, as previously
mentioned, from Footnote 4 of Carolene Products.'6
4. The Political Function Exemption From
the Strict Scrutiny Test
The standard of review of Graham v. Richardson does not apply to all
state acts. In the situation of state acts that concern the political representation
of the people of the state, differentiations between state citizens and aliens will
only be reviewed under the rational basis test. 7 As very often happens

101. Note, Dual Standard,supra note 50, at 526-27.
102. See also the formulation in TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32,
at 1545 ("[A]t least if it is alien disenfranchisement that is being challenged, it would
seem oddly circular to rely on the very practice challenged to establish the propriety
of so strictly scrutinizing it as to make very probable its invalidation.").
103. See Note, Dual Standard,supra note 50, at 1523-31 and 1537.

104. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
dissenting).
at 649-57 (Rehnquist, J.,
105. Id.
106. Justice Frankfurter put it precisely and to the point: "A footnote hardly seems
to be an appropriate way of announcing a new constitutional doctrine..." Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1949).
107. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) and John A. Ragosta,
Aliens Abroad: Principlesfor the Application of ConstitutionalLimitations to Federal
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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under the rational basis standard of review, state legislation was upheld, for
example, for regulations excluding aliens from the right to vote,'0 3 from the
eligibility as jurors,0 9 from occupation as teachers in public schools,"0 or
occupation as probation officers."'

Bernal v. Fainter"' fits into this

context, where the Court unanimously held the citizenship requirement for
notaries public unconstitutional, because they do not exert public functions.
This dual standard for discrimination against aliens was initiated in
Sugarman v. Dougall."' The atypical decision". considered a blank
exclusion of aliens from all employment in New York public service to violate
the Equal Protection Clause, but noted that the power to pass laws necessary
to preserve the basic conception of a political community is still attributed to
the states."' Later this exemption from strict scrutiny for state regulations
which distinguish on account of alienage was called the "political function

exception.""' 6 Under close consideration two types of provisions fall into
this exception category: (1) participation in the administration of political
autonomy of the state and (2) filling positions in public service of a certain
degree of political importance.
Foley v. Connelie, which applied the rational basis test to employment
of state troopers," 7 is seen as going too far. It is argued that policemen are

Action, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 287, 296 (1985).
108. Foley, 435 U.S. at 295-96; Sugarman, 413 at 648; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 722 reporter's note 7 (1986); Ragosta, supra
note 107, at 296. As to the lack of an express guaranty of the active and passive right
to vote for aliens in the U.S. Constitution see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 2; § 3
para. 3; art. II, § 1, para. 5; amend. XV, § 1.
109. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974); aff'dsummarily426 U.S.
913 (1976).
110. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); discussed in Note, Equal
Treatment,supra note 74, at 1077-79.
111. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982). See also decisions cited in
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 722 reporter's note 5 (1986).
112. 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
113. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
114. Not typical, because the Court held the discriminatory provision
unconstitutional by applying strict scrutiny, although one could have argued
convincingly that the filling of public offices was at stake, which should trigger
rational basis review, and under that standard, the provision could have passed.
115. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647.
116. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 57, at 709-132;
ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supranote 32, at 487. See also the wording
in Cabell, 454 U.S. at 437-39.
117. Foley, 435 U.S. at 295 commented upon in Note€Equal Treatment, supra

note 74, at 1076-77.
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not elected into office and do not decide policy issues. Therefore, there
should not have been room for the political function exception, but strict
scrutiny should have been applied." 8
The political function exemption has often been criticized. It is
particularly pointed to a specific lack of consistency:" 9 The exclusion of a
certain class, whether or not it is a suspect class, from the right to vote
requires that this discrimination is necessary for achieving a compelling state
goal, because strict scrutiny is applicable, the right to vote is considered a
fundamental right. Similarly, the use of nationality as a criterion of distinction
triggers strict scrutiny, even if no fundamental right is concerned, since
alienage is a suspect classification. Despite this, merely weak rational basis
review is applied for constitutional review of a regulation which excludes
a regulation cumulating two of the criteria
aliens from the right to 2vote,
0
triggering strict scrutiny.
5. The Illegal Aliens Exemption From the Strict Scrutiny Test
The Supreme Court seems to make yet another exemption from the strict
scrutiny test. Toll v. Moreno and Elkins v. Moreno held that for illegal aliens
and nonimmigrant aliens-unlike the situation of resident aliens, which were
concerned in the cases discussed supra,Part III.A.2-4, strict scrutiny does not
kick in, but rather a weaker standard of review does. It is, however, unclear
whether the Court simply referred to the rational basis test, or whether a new
area for intermediate scrutiny crystalizes.''

118. Note, Dual Standard,supra note 50, at 1533.
119. See Maltz, supra note 68, at 680.
120. Skafte v. Rorex, 553 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1976); appeal dismissed for want of
substantial federal question, 430 U.S. 961 (1977).
121. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982), and also De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S.
351 (1976) (illegal aliens); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978) (nonimmigrant
aliens). These cases seem to apply a kind of rational basis test. See also the comment
in Note, Equal Treatment,supra note 74, at 1080-84. On the other hand, the highly
debated case of Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), held that a state may not withdraw
financial subsidies for school attendance of illegal aliens. Here, something close to
strict scrutiny was used. However, the decision was special in that it concerned
education which is considered a quasi-fundamental right or interest by the Supreme
Court and thus suggests applying strict scrutiny. For a comment on this hybrid
decision see D. P. CURRIE, THE SECOND CENTURY, supra note 51, at 504; TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 1551-53; Dennis Y. Hutchinson, More
Substantive Equal Protection?A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 167. For
the complete problem see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note
57, at 716-182; ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 497-500.
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To sum up, it is established that discriminatory state regulations towards
natural alien persons basically have to withstand strict scrutiny review. If
these provisions concern political functions in the states or restrictions for
illegal aliens or nonimmigrant aliens, a weaker constitutional review is
applied, probably rational basis review."
B. Discriminationby the Federal Government
1. The Doctrine of the Supreme Court
After Graham v. Richardson," the answer to the question whether
federal legislation classifying on grounds of nationality would also be viewed
as inherently suspect and, thus, had to pass strict scrutiny was awaited with
suspense. Two features distinguish federal laws from state laws in the area
of alien legislation. First, in federal law, there is a tremendous number of
Second, the
provisions that differentiate between citizens and aliens.2
federal government was seen as having unrestricted powers for the control of
admission and expulsion of aliens as well as for regulations of the residence
of aliens.'25 As previously noted,'26 for review of federal legislative acts
the content of the Equal Protection Clause has been read into the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment in its branch of substantive due process, which
is necessitated, because the Fourteenth Amendment is addressed solely to the
states. There are no differences as to the substance.
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong the Supreme Court stated that for acts
of the federal government in the District of Columbia or on insular possessions the Due Process Clause has the same significance as the Equal Protection

122. See also Note, Equal Treatment, supra note 74, at 1075.
123. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
124. In the annex to its brief in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976),
the U.S. Government lined up 243 federal provisions from 31 different titles of the
United States Code which distinguish citizens and resident aliens, Brief for the
Petitioner,Appendix S. la - 25a. Additionally, there is Title 8 U.S.C. (Aliens and
Nationality) where almost every provision treats aliens differently.
125. See Rosberg, supra note 47, at 276, and T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF,
ForeignAffairs and the U.S. Constitution,FEDERAL REGULATION OF ALIENS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 157-166 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990). For the constitutional
entrenchment of immigration law, particularly under the perspective of developing
procedural due process, which by now tends to protect material legal positions in
immigration law, see Hiroshi Motomura, The CuriousEvolution of ImmigrationLaw:
ProceduralSurrogatesfor SubstantiveConstitutionalRights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625

(1992).
126. Supra part II (initial paragraph).
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Clause,' 27 but it refused to exactly pin down the standard of review. On the
other hand, the Court said that a discrimination of aliens by the federal
government may be justified by a special national interest.'
The Court
reviewed the case as a procedural due process problem and not as an equal
protection case." 9
In Mathews v. Diaz decided on the same day, Congress was granted a
wide discretion for the question whether particular government benefits
granted to citizens were to be extended to aliens. 3 ° The essential question
of the case was, however, whether a differential treatment of different classes
of aliens is permissible, or whether all aliens had to be treated as a group
prohibiting different treatment within classes of aliens.'
The Court noted
that under equal protection analysis very different considerations are necessary
for reviewing federal action as opposed to state action.'
Ultimately, the
decision has to be regarded has a denial of strict scrutiny for federal acts.'
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong already emphasized that the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendment not only differ in wording, but also that particularly
under the Fifth Amendment predominant national interests have to be
respected as a justification, which cannot be put forward in the context of state
legislation. 34
The dichotomy of review standards between state and federal legislation
becomes clear in Nyquist v. Mauclet 3 There, the Court expressly points
out that only classifying state provisions for natural persons will be reviewed

127. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 100.
128. Id. at 100-101. For a case analysis see Maltz, supra note 68, at 681-85.
129. See Maltz, supra note 68, at 683-84. See also the dissenting opinion of
Justice Rehnquist, who accuses the Court of intermingling the concepts of procedural
due process and substantive due process, Hampton, 426 U.S. at 119-20 (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting).
130. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). At least it is certain, as Rosberg,

supranote 47, at 283, correctly points out, that a congruent differentiating state statute
could not have been upheld under then applicable strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment. For a comment on the case see Note, Equal Treatment,supranote 74,
at 1085-86.
131. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80-85; see also Maltz, supra note 68, at 684-85.
132. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84-85.
133. 3 SAMUEL R. BERGER & MARK S. MCCONNELL, LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY
THE CONSTITUTION AND TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE REGULATION OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT INMANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

11 (J. Eugene Marans et al., eds., 1984 & Supp.); Maltz, supra note 68, at 685.
134. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 100. See also Karst, supra note 27, at 553-60.
135. 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
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under strict scrutiny, whereas for federal legislation rational basis review
applies.' 36
2. Different Concepts
According to Maltz,'37 the Supreme Court applies three different
standards for reviewing the constitutionality of federal acts, which are
dependent upon the nature of the discriminatory act and the federal branch
involved. If the act is applied only to a restricted territory, such as the District
of Columbia or an insular possession, and cumulatively no special national
interest is concerned, strict scrutiny will be used.' If the discrimination is
in effect on the complete U.S. territory and results from the actions of an
administrative agency, middle level scrutiny is applied: The government
carries the burden of proof that the discrimination is justified by rational
considerations which keep within the power of the respective agency.'39 If,
finally, the differing treatment is in effect in the whole U.S. and results from
an act of Congress, a sort of rational basis test is used: It is not enough for
the petitioner to proffer an alternate way of fulfilling the standard chosen by
Congress. The Supreme Court will not compare the relative reasonableness
of the standards but will leave Congress' decision unhampered as long as the
This differentiated categorization of
differentiation is not unreasonable.'
the Court's jurisprudence on federal classifications seems too daring in its
present shape. The theoretical basis is rather thin: Maltz builds his
differentiated view merely on the three cases cited as examples.
3. Critique
a. If one compares the preconditions asked of federal legislation relying
upon alienage with the preconditions asked of state legislation, the system
seems to be inconsistent.'' Why should aliens present a discrete and insular
minority on the state level, but not on the federal level? Even the fact that
discrimination of aliens is widely spread on the federal level, cannot count as
a justification. Such practice must either cause that on the state level also
merely ordinary rational basis review is applied homogeneously, or one must
keep to the general principle that a uniform violation of provisions cannot flip

136.
137.
138.
(1976).
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 7. See also BERGER & MCCONNELL, supra note 133, at 11.
See Maltz, supra note 68, at 685.
See, e.g., Examining Bd. of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
The prototype case is Hampton, 426 U.S. at 103.
For an example see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
See also Maltz, supra note 68, at 685-86.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

27

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

the sides of legality and illegality. Furthermore, it seems inappropriate to
draw conclusions from lower-ranking statutory law to constitutional law, a
methodology which is the core of the line of those arguments. This would
reverse the hierarchical order foreseen in the Constitution.
Considerations of distribution of powers between the nation as a whole,
i.e., the federation, and the member states, on which the special treatment of
acts of Congress and federal government is founded, ultimately stem
doctrinally from a different level than the notion of equal protection and
should not be intermingled. Leaving aside the consideration of distribution of
power, no phenomenological or constitutional reason is left why aliens, or
differentiations based upon alienage, should or could be treated differently on
federal and state level.
Therefore, it appears persuasive to follow the proposal to apply
intermediate scrutiny for all classifications on grounds of nationality or
alienage.142 This would lead to consistency of the different lines of
precedents and would comply with the importance of the criterion of
nationality, besides its greater practicability and clarity.
b. The discussion on the intensity of constitutional review for
classifications based upon alienage has presented in a microcosm what has
been intensely debated in U.S. constitutional doctrine during the last twenty
years as to the question of differentiations under the Equal Protection Clause
as a whole: The black-and-white painting of two extreme tiers of
constitutional review, which either amount to a very intensive or to a very lax
control, is no longer able to correspond to the complexity of legislative
differentiations. Therefore, the necessity of a three-tier-model is generally
acknowledged. 43 For the formulation of the third tier, which is designed
to form a sort of intermediate level, diverse proposals have been made that
cannot all be described within the precise boundaries of this Article.
Only in passing, a model proposed by Nowak shall be noted that was
carved out for classifications on account of alienage. Nowak suggests to
distinguish (1) suspect-prohibited classifications, (2) neutral classifications, and
(3) permissive classifications. When coming across a suspect-prohibited
classification, particularly a classification based on race, the Supreme Court

142. See, e.g., 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 496;

Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee-Prohibited,
Neutral, and Permissive Classifications,61 GEO. L.J. 1071,
1099 passim (1974).
143. See, for some examples out of a multitude, particularly Nowak, supra note
142 at 1092-97; Gunther, Evolving Doctrine, supra note 36, at 18-24; Note,
Developments, supranote 34, at 1076-1132. See also Fiss, supra note 29, at 147-77;
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 32, at 343-80.
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should void the legislative act, if the legislator cannot prove that the regulation
is necessary for the achievement of a compelling governmental interest. Such
a justification should be almost impossible. Consequently, this type of
classification is referred to as a "prohibited classification." A classification is
considered neutral, if it uses a factor or status inherent in human nature, with
the exception of race, or restricts the exertion of a fundamental right of a class
of persons. Such a classification can only be upheld if it bears an actually
demonstrable rational relation to a legitimate governmental interest. All
remaining classifications are considered "permissive." Permissive classifications are constitutional as long as there is a conceivable basis for them, a socalled conceivable basis standard, under which the classification could stand

in a rational relation to a governmental interest."

Here, the Court will not

review the actual basis of the goal pursued by the legislator or the means
used.' 45 Nowak wants to fit "alienage" into his system as a neutral
classification, since discrimination against aliens runs counter to the constitutional principle to attribute burdens according to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing.'46 Consequently, the intermediate level of review, the so-called
demonstrable basis standard, applies.'47
148
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION FOR ALIEN AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

144. As examples for this group, Nowak puts forward Jefferson v. Hackney, 406
U.S. 535, 546-47, 549 (1972) and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26
(1961).
145. For a comprehensive treatment see Nowak, supra note 142, at 1092-94.
146. See the formulation in Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972) ("legal burdens shall bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing").
147. Nowak, supra note 142, at 1099.

148. State equal treatment clauses may be divided into general and specific (i.e.
those specifically referring to corporations) equal treatment clauses.
Specific state equal treatment clauses of constitutional rank include IDAHO
CONST. art. XI § 10 (Michie 1992) which states:
"[N]o company or corporation formed under the laws of any other
country, state, or territory, shall have or be allowed to exercise or enjoy,
within this state any greater rights or privileges than those possessed or
enjoyed by corporations of the same or similar character created under the
laws of this state;"
OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 44 (1991) which reads:
"No foreign corporation shall be authorized to carry on in this State
any business which a domestic corporation is prohibited from doing, or
be relieved from compliance with any of the requirements made of a
similar corporation by the Constitution or laws of the State. Nothing in
this article, however, shall restrict or limit the power of the Legislature
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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to impose conditions under which foreign corporations may be licensed
to do business in this State;"
and UTAH CONST. art. XII, § 6 (1992) which formulates it in a negative manner:
"No corporation organized outside of this State, shall be allowed to
transact business within the State, on conditions more favorable than
those prescribed by law to similar corporations, organized under the laws
of this State."
According to 1992 Utah Laws S.J.R. 7, § 6, however, after completion of a
referendum repeal of the provision is intended. Thus far, such a referendum has yet
to occur.

See also the somewhat more neutrally worded IOWA CONST. art. I, § 22 (1991):
"Foreigners who are, or may hereafter become residents of this state, shall enjoy the
same rights in respect to the possession, enjoyment and descent of property as native
born citizens."
These clauses, in principle, not only refer to out-of-state (foreign) corporations,
but also to out-of-country (alien) corporations. A large-scale examination of the
standard of review used under these state equal treatment clauses exceeds the
boundaries of this article. However, it should be emphasized that the mere formulation
of these provisions elucidates that primarily a protectionist perspective predominates.
Domestic corporations are sought to be protected against the situation that foreign and

alien corporations are or will be granted more rights and, generally speaking, a more
advantageous competitive standing. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 10 (Michie
1992); American Sur. Co. v. Blake, 261 P. 239, 240 (Idaho 1927).
Consequently, these state constitutional specific equal treatment clauses aim at
prevention of discrimination of nationals. Supposedly, a standard of review
comparable to the rational basis test predominates. However, in Weems v. Bruce, 66
F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1933), the equal treatment clause of the Oklahoma Constitution
was held violated, but there were no delineations as to the intensity of the standard of
review. Michigan courts follow the requirements for strict scrutiny established in San
Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), requiring a suspect classification
or potential impairment of fundamental rights under the equal protection clause of the
Michigan Constitution. Mercado v. Kingsley Area Sch., 727 F. Supp. 335, 345 (W.D.
Mich. 1989); Palmer v. Bloomfield Hills Bd. of Ed., 417 N.W.2d 505, 506-07
(Mich.Ct.App. 1987).
The same should hold true for the general equal treatment clauses of state
constitutions. As to the general equal protection clause of the California Constitution,
however, it is assumed that a broader view is taken than under the equal protection
clause of the federal Constitution. But this statement is based upon the fact that suspect classifications generally are more easily accepted in California, particularly gender
and homosexuality. See, e.g., Paul L. Hoffinan, The Application of International
Human Rights Law in State Courts: A View From California, 18 INT'L LAW. 61, 63
(1984) citing cases. An extensive study points out that in most states in the area of
business law a stricter standard of review is used under the general state equal
protection clause than under the U.S. Constitution. See Comment, Developments in
the Law: The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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In discussing the protection of alien and foreign corporations under the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution two structural levels have to
be distinguished: 49 On the primary level one has to decide whether U.S.
constitutional law is applicable at all, an approach which has always to be
taken when contacts to foreign states or countries are involved in the
constellation under review."5 ° Inclining to the notion of "conflict of laws,"
Admittedly,
this level could be called "conflict of constitutional laws."'
however, currently the term "conflict" seems only usable in a restricted
reading. The most common situations will be that of a "false conflict" in its
narrow sense, or that of a disinterested forum, as the (governmental) interest
analysis'52 calls it. This indicates that either the national constitutional law
wants to be applied and there is no "conflict" with another country's
constitutional law or the national constitutional law declares itself inapplicable,
due to sufficient national contacts or due to the lacking of a protective interest,
so that the national judge lacks an applicable provision for his decision.'
On the secondary level, the level of national constitutional law, after
establishing the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to foreign and
alien corporations, one has to ask which standard of equal protection review
should be applied to foreign or alien corporations (Parts B-C).

1472-78 and 1465-72 (1982). Finally, it has to be pointed out that the specific state
equal treatment clauses for corporations only assume applicability for the respective
intrastate commerce.
On the other hand, constitutional and statutory equal treatment clauses may be
distinguished. See also the lists of "pure equal treatment provisions" and "substantial
equal treatment provisions" in Comment, The Status ofForeign Corporations:Effects
Given "Equal Treatment" Statutes, 1961 DuKE L.J. 274, 277 n.17 [hereinafter

Comment, Equal Treatment Statutes]. It has, however, to be kept in mind that in
states without express equal treatment provisions in statutory or constitutional law
equal treatment may be practiced on grounds of comity. As to the statutory state equal
treatment clauses see also Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-ForeignCorporations,65 YALE L.J.
137, 156-58 (1956).
149. These two levels certainly have to be distinguished for alien natural persons
too, but have not been treated at that point in this article for lack of space.
150. See infra part A.
151. A part of this approach is the question of extraterritorial application of the

Constitution, see, e.g., Roszell D. Hunter, IV, Comment, The Extraterritorial
Application of the Constitution-UnalienableRights?, 72 VA. L. REV. 649 (1986).
152. See the citations in note 65 supra.

153. This complex of "conflict of constitutional laws" cannot be dealt with in
adequate length in this article. It will be dealt with in another project of the author's,
and has been treated in German by the author in BUNGERT, ALIEN

CORPORATIONS,

supra note 23, chapters 6-8.
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A. Applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to Foreign and
Alien Corporationson a Conflict of ConstitutionalLaws Level
1. First Step: Overcoming the "Artificial Person" Doctrine
The early Supreme Court cases were based on the "artificial person"
doctrine established by Chief Justice Marshall in Trustees of Dartmouth
5 4 which defined corporations as artificial beings
College v. Woodward,"

created by the state by means of granting a privilege and confined to the
competences granted in the charter.' 5 Thus, the early federal cases held
"equal protection of the laws" due to its clear wording to be restricted to
persons that were born or naturalized or endowed with life and liberty, i.e.,
clearly only natural persons.' 56 Several Supreme Court cases avoided the
question.' 7
In the Railroad Tax Cases,' 8 the Circuit Court held that private coporations could invoke the Equal Protection Clause: "It would be a most
singular result if a constitutional provision intended for the protection of every
person against partial and discriminating legislation by the states, should cease
to exert such protection the moment the person becomes a member of a
corpora-tion.""'
Justice Field formulated that "the courts will look through the ideal
entity and name of the corporation to the persons who compose it, and protect
them, though the process be in its name." 6 According to this "Field

154. "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as
incidental to its very existence." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
155. See Blumberg, Corporate Personalityin American Law, 38 AM. J.CoMP.
L. SUPPL. 49 (1990); Horwitz, Santa Clara,supra note 2; for a historical overview of
the different concepts see Machen, supra note 2, at 253 (I) and 347 (II).
156. Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F.Cas. 67, 68 (No. 7052) (C.C.D. La.
1870) (Woods, C.J.).
157. Richmond R.R. v. City of Richmond, 96 U.S. 521 (1877); Peik v. Chicago
& Northwestern R.R., 94 U.S. 164 (1876); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1876).
158. 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), appealdismissedas moot, San Mateo County
v. Southern Pac. R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
159. Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 744. See also Charles R. O'Kelley Jr., The
ConstitutionalRights of CorporationsRevisited: Social and PoliticalExpression and
the Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1353-56
(1979); Comment, Personification,supra note 2, at 1460.
160. RailroadTax Cases, 13 F. at 748.
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rationale," also called "partnership theory of the corporation," '' the rights
of the corporation must be congruent to the rights the shareholders would
have, if they had chosen an unincorporated form of enterprise.' 62 Then, in
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad,63 Chief Justice Waite
stated that all the Justices had no doubt that the Equal Protection Clause is
applicable to corporations and thus would not discuss the question."6 The
Court later confirmed this holding several times.'

2. Applying Equal Protection to Foreign and Alien Corporations
After applying equal protection to corporations at all, the breakthrough
for the question of applying the Equal Protection Clause to foreign corporations came with Pembina Mining Company v. Pennsylvania.66 According
to this decision and the authorities thereafter, the notion of "person" in the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not only refers to

161. Comment, Personification,supra note 2, at 1455 et seq.
162. O'Kelley, supra note 159, at 1356.
163. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
164. Id. at 396. As to the holding of that case compare JOHN J. FLYNN, The
Jurisprudence of Corporate Personhood: The Misuse of a Legal Concept, in
CORPORATIONS AND SOcIETY-POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 131, 133-46 (Warren J.
Samuels & Arthur S. Miller, eds. 1987); Horwitz, Santa Clara,supra note 2, at 13,
16-18; Congressional Research Service, supra note 30, at 1695-96; HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 43-46 (1991); see also
Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910).
165. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 536 (1933); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry.
v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897); Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S.
181, 188-89 (1888). This concept was widely applauded in commentary literature, see
Louis B. Boudin, Truth and Fictionabout the FourteenthAmendment, 16 N.Y.U. L.Q.
REV. 19 (1938); Brainerd Currie & Herma Hill Schreter, Unconstitutional
Discriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4
(1960); Howard J. Graham, The "ConspiracyTheory" of the FourteenthAmendment,
47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938) and 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1939); Clarence E. Martin, Is a
Corporationa "Person?",44 W. VA. L. REV. 247 (1938); Neuman, supranote 39, at
271; Orvill C. Snyder, The Corporate Person and the FourteenthAmendment, 8
BROOKLYN L. REV. 4 (1939); Robert P. Griffin, Comment, Artificial "Persons"and
the FourteenthAmendment,48 MICH. L. REv. 983 (1950); Willard Hurst, BookReview
of Graham and Boudin, 52 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1939). Most of those law review
articles are reactions to a dissent by Justice Black in Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.
v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83, 85-86 (1938), arguing the Supreme Court's precedents
were unfounded and wrong and corporations were not to be protected by the Equal
Protection Clause.
166. 125 U.S. 181, 188 (1888).
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citizens, but also to aliens and alien juridical persons, i.e. corporations. 167
But alien companies are awarded only rights that corresponding domestic
company forms may invoke. 68 The range of (international) application of
the Equal Protection Clause was characterized by the formula: "These
provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality; ....

169

3. Interpretation of "Within its Jurisdiction"
The clause "within its jurisdiction" contained in the Equal Protection
Clause is a point of great ambivalence and debate. 7 Emphasizing the
wording and the original designation of the constitutional provision for natural
persons one is inclined to think of a physical presence within the territorial
boundaries of the state. Justice Field in Pembina Mining Company v.
Pennsylvania, for instance, understood the notion of a "person within the
jurisdiction" as a "person owning property within the jurisdiction."'
This interpretation appears too narrow. Relying on the then dominant
theory of the corporation, which considered the corporation a mere creature
of (local) law 72 having no legal entity status beyond the territorial boundaries of its incorporation state,' this interpretation would completely

167. See JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, THE LAW OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC 175-77 (1904)
[hereinafter BEALE, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS]; GERALD CARL HENDERSON, THE
POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A
CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF JURISTIC PERSONS IN ANGLOAMERICAN LAW 149 (1918) [hereinafter HENDERSON, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS]; JOHN
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY I, "equal protection of the laws" at 1047 (3d ed. 1914);
B. Currie & Schreter, supra note 164, at 3; see also Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239,
260 (1898); Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 117-18 (1886).
168. Pembina Mining, 125 U.S. at 189.
169. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
170. See, e.g., 36 AM. JUR. 2D ForeignCorporations§ 46 (1968 & 1993 Supp.).
171. Pembina Mining, 125 U.S. at 188.
172. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839).
173. Id. at 588. Bank of Augusta also held that foreign corporations according
to comity had to be principally recognized in the other state, but even that does not
help to do away with the restriction of "within its jurisdiction." Id. For the definition
of"comity" see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 101 cmt. e and
§ 403 cmt. a (1986). The first definition of comity was established in Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895):
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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exclude foreign corporations from the protection of the Equal Protection
Clause, because corporations could never be physically present. 74 Consequently, some commentators hold the Equal Protection Clause applicable to
foreign corporations, if they are licensed to do business in the individual state,
at least in regard to those activities that do not concern the right of the
corporation to continue doing business in the state. 175 This concept builds
upon the understanding that only a foreign corporation that commenced to do
business within the state was subjected to its jurisdiction, since only this doing
business established a connection to the courts of the state. All other
corporations were seen not to be "within the jurisdiction" of the state and
could not ask for equal treatment. 76 From that understanding it is no big
step to the view that only foreign corporations admitted to doing business
within the state were protected by the Equal Protection Clause, since according
to the law of all states, admission ("qualification") is a precondition for "doing
business" within the state.1 77 From this concept it further follows that by
issuing admission certificates with a certain time limit, the state may reserve
a periodical influence on the foreign corporation,7 because at every extension
of the admission it may impose new conditions. 1
The treatment of this question is not extensive in the U.S. literature.

Usually, it is argued, an additional precondition for applying the Equal Pro-

tection Clause to foreign corporations is that they are subject to the jurisdiction of the state in which they asked for equal treatment with domestic
corporations. 79 The scarce treatment of the jurisdiction formula stems in
part from the fact that many situations before the Supreme Court concerned
natural persons. In these cases, the Court simply applies the Privileges and

it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
174. See also B. Currie & Schreter, supranote 165, at 5.
175. See id. at 5-6; 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 46 (1968 & 1993
Supp.).
176. See Congressional Research Service, supra note 30, at 1696 (citing Blake v.
McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 260-61 (1898)). See also BEALE, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS,
supra note 167, at 175-76.
177. See infra part IV.C.3.a.
178. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886); see also
BEALE, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, supra note 167, at 176.
179. See WHYY v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v.
Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S.
394 (1886). All the cases concerned out-of-state corporations. See also EDWARD S.
CORWIN Er AL., THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 415 (13th

ed.

1973).
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Immunities Clause, which guarantees equal treatment for "citizens" of sister
states and does not contain the restrictive textual clause of "within its
jurisdiction," thus rendering the question of "extraterritorial" application of the
Equal Protection Clause negligible. Furthermore, the Due Process Clause
comprised by the same Amendment as the Equal Protection Clause does not
contain the formula.3 0 The interpretation of the within the jurisdictionformula, therefore, is only relevant for foreign (and alien) corporations, for
which the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not applicable.''
In Blake v. McClung, 82 Justice Harlan made clear, without prejudicing
the entire meaning of the "within its jurisdiction" formula, that in any case
corporations not incorporated in the state in question nor having taken up
doing business there, were not in its jurisdiction according to the meaning of
Fourteenth Amendment. ' On the one hand, it is not persuasive to rely on
an incorporation in the respective state, as Justice Harlan seems to require, for
in that case the corporation is no longer foreign, but domestic. On the other
hand, as B. Currie & Schreter point out, Justice Harlan's interpretation reads
the clause as "within the jurisdiction of its courts.""'
This reading,
however, appears unnecessarily and arbitrarily narrow. Particularly if one
reflects on another statement of the Court that the Equal Protection Clause is
addressed to all three branches of government, i.e. executive, legislative and
judicial branch,8 5 it seems too narrow to view "jurisdiction" simply as

180. See also B. Currie & Schreter, supra note 165, at 6.
181. See Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of California,
451 U.S. 648, 656 (1981); Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548-50 (1928); Orient
Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 561 (1899); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,
181 (1869); Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 586-87; BEALE, FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS, supra note 167, at 174-75; RICHARD M. BUXBAUM & KLAUS J. HOPT,
LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE-CORPORATE AND CAPITAL
MARKET LAW HARMONIZATION POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE U.S.A. [Integration
through Law Vol. 4] 36-38 (1988); HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 10, at 170;
ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 649-50; 18A FLETCHER
Cyc. CORP. § 8850 (1987); Frederick Green, Corporations as Persons, Citizens, and
Possessors ofLiberty, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 202, 228-33 (1946); R. Paul Holland, Should
a Corporationbe Considered a Citizen Under the Privilegesand Immunities Clause
of the FederalConstitution?, 36 W. VA. L. Q. 245 (I) and 330 (II) (1930); Comment,
Equal Treatment Statutes, supra note 148, at 275.
182. 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
183. Id. at 260-61. See Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia,119 U.S. at 122-23 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
184. B. Currie & Schreter, supra note 165, at 7; see also John B. Sholley,
CorporateTaxpayers and the Equal ProtectionClause, 31 ILL. L. REV. 463, 477-78
(1937).
185. Blake, 172 U.S. at 260.
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"judicial jurisdiction." On the contrary, a reading as "legislative jurisdiction"
(or "prescriptive jurisdiction") suggests itself,'86 i.e. as the jurisdiction or
power of the state (not only the state legislature, as the wording of the term
might suggest) to make87 applicable its laws to certain constellations with
contacts to other states.'
4. Approaching a Subjection Factor?
Kentucky Finance Corp. v. ParamountAuto Exchange Corp.'88 took
an extensive reading of the "within its jurisdiction" formula. This decision
held that Wisconsin's dismissal of a the well-founded claim of a foreign
corporation because the foreign corporation bringing action did not transport
persons and voluminous documents situated in its home state to the forum for
evidentiary hearings, violated the Equal Protection Clause. Although the
foreign corporation had no business contacts to the forum, it was made to
transport voluminous documents to the forum state, although the evidence
could have been taken in the home state by a commissioned judge, etc. For
domestic corporations or natural persons, Wisconsin did not have similar
provisions.
Some commentators take the view that since Kentucky Finance Corp. v.
ParamountAuto Exchange Corp.'89 the Supreme Court assumes the requirement of "within its jurisdiction," at least for all business transactions the
corporation is permitted to carry out in the state, and for all assets the
corporation has rightfully acquired in the state.' 9 It is pointed out,
however, that in both situations the consent of the state is required. 9'
Nowak & Rotunda and Scoles & Hay, however, interpret this
decision-probably correctly-much more comprehensively, in the sense that
the Supreme Court sees the clause of "within its jurisdiction" now already
fulfilled, when the foreign corporation is not yet admitted in the state and did

186. See also B. Currie & Schreter, supra note 165, at 7-8.
187. For the distinction of "judicialjurisdiction" and "legislative jurisdiction" see,
e.g., BORN & WESTIN, supra note 61, at 541-42; William L. M. Reese, Legislative

Jurisdiction,78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587 (1978). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (1986) ("make its law applicable to the activities,
relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by
legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by
determination of a court.").
188. 262 U.S. 544 (1923).
189. 262 U.S. 544 (1923).
190. Id. at 550; see also Sholley; supra note 184, at 480-81; 16A AM. JUR. 2D
ConstitutionalLaw § 745 (1979 & 1993 Supp.).
191. See Sholley, supra note 184, at 481.
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not yet appoint a registered agent. Simply the act of bringing suit in the state,
they argue, already opens up the applicatory range of the Equal Protection
Clause. Also, every person directly impaired by a state statute, they claim, is
empowered to challenge the Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, they hold

the Equal Protection Clause applicable to each person seeking redress in a
state court."9 This would constitute a subjection factor approach.

93

5. Constitutional Right to be Admitted to do Business?
Consistently, the next question is whether a foreign corporation may also
invoke the Equal Protection Clause, if it is not admitted to doing business,
and, particularly, if it precisely asks for admission or wants to challenge a
denial of admission.
In this context, the "doctrine of conditional consent" or the "doctrine of
conditional entry"'94 dominated initially. According to this doctrine, the
admission of the foreign corporation to doing instate business could be
conditioned upon the consent to being bound by certain state provisions.' 95
Before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Field had, in Paul
v. Virginia,96 held the state to possess the power to differentiate between
domestic and foreign corporations and, in particular, to determine whether and
under which conditions to admit foreign corporations. 97 Still in 1906, even
after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held
that a state may refuse to admit a foreign or alien corporation to doing
business according to its discretion or referring to a rationale contrary to the

192. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 57, at 338; SCOLES
& HAY, supra note 11, at 108. This concept can be backed by the dissenting opinion
of Justices Brandeis and Holmes in Kentucky Finance,262 U.S. at 552-53, in which
they allude to this indirect overruling of Blake v. McClung and refuse it explicitly.
193. Elsewhere I have deduced and comprehensively discussed this approach,
particularly for German conflict of constitutional laws. See BUNGERT, ALIEN
CORPORATIONS, supra note 23, Chapter 7 etpassim.
194. See Sholley, supra note 184, at 481-98; Stanley M. Klem, Comment,
QualificationRequirementsfor ForeignCorporations:The Needfor a New Definition
of "DoingBusiness" Based on In-State Sales Volume, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 86, 98
(1981) [hereinafter Comment, QualificationRequirements];.
195. See Kaplan, Foreign Corporationsand Local CorporatePolicy, 21 VAND.
L. REV. 433, 445 (1968).
196. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
197. Paul, 75 U.S. at 181; see also Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. 410, 415 (1870).
Also compare HENDERSON, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, supra note 167, at 48-49 and

101-11; Sholley, supra note 184, at 463; see also Comment, Qualification
Requirements,supranote 194, at 97-98; Note, UnconstitutionalConditions, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1595, 1605-06 (1960).
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general purpose of the Constitution. A state was said to be able to admit a
corporation under conditions leading to a discrimination between domestic and
foreign corporations, and even to a discrimination between corporations of
different states. After admission under restrictive conditions, a state could
alter or enhance these conditions.'98 In particular, a state could admit a
foreign corporation for a limited period of time, whereby the corporation after
expiration of the time limit automatically was no longer "within its jurisdiction," so that the state was not bound in any way to renew the
admission."' Due to the argumentative figure of "the greater includes the
less" the state was permitted to exert its power to exclude the foreign
corporation completely from doing business within the state, merely partly
exclude the corporation, or admit the corporation to do business while
imposing conditions."x
In a series of decisions from 1910 onwards, the Supreme Court imposed
significant qualifying restrictions to this state power of exclusion and
20
expulsion, which put an end to the extreme protectionism reigning before: '
The admission of foreign or alien corporations may no longer be made
dependent upon "unconstitutional conditions." 2 Particularly, in Blake v.
McClung 3 the state was held to have the power to impose foreign corporations conditions for admission to doing business within the state, but these
conditions may not conflict with the privileges and immunities guaranteed to
citizens or protected by the Constitution.2" However, the literature views

198. National Council of U.A.M. v. State Council of Virginia, 203 U.S. 151
(1906). See also BEALE, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, supra note 167, at 156-59;
HENDERSON, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, supra note 167, at 110-11; Kaplan, supra note

192, at 443-45; Comment, Equal TreatmentStatutes, supranote 148, at 276. See also
Hom Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U.S. 305, 315 (1891) ("Having the absolute

power of excluding the foreign corporation the State may, of course, impose such
conditions upon permitting the corporation to do business within its limits as it may
judge expedient.").
199. See also Sholley, supra note 184, at 483.
200. SeeKaplan,supranote195, at 443-44; 19 C.J.S. Corporations§ 898 (1990).
201. For a comprehensive account of the Supreme Court jurisprudence compare
Robert L. Hale, UnconstitutionalConditionsand ConstitutionalRights, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 321 (1935).
202. See HENDERSON, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, supranote 167, at 111 and 134-

47; Comment, Equal Treatment Statutes, supra note 148, at 276-77. Compare also
Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: UnconstitutionalConditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1989); Hale, supra note 201, at 321; Van
Alstyne, supranote 86, at 1439; Note, UnconstitutionalConditions,supra note 197;
19 C.J.S. Corporations § 898 (1990).
203. 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
204. Id See also BEALE, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, supra note 167, at 167-69.
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the occasional statements of the Supreme Court, usually in form of dicta, as
if the power of the state to exclude foreign and alien corporations from doing
business in the state is still nearly unlimited.0 5
Furthermore, due to the prerogatives of the Commerce Clause, states
cannot deny admission to doing business to those foreign corporations which
seek activities in interstate commerce. 2' These prerogatives of foreign and
interstate commerce must be transferred to alien corporations as well, i.e.,
corporations from other countries may also not be denied admission to
interstate commerce. This can be concluded from two points. First, the
emphasis of the clause does not lie on the actor in commercial transactions,
i.e. out-of-state corporation or out-of-country corporations, but on the
underlying commerce protected: The interstate commerce is to be kept free
of discriminations. 2 7 Second, the non-discrimination part of the Commerce
Clause already according to its wording is not only directed against state
discriminations of interstate commerce, although this is certainly its main
discriminations of commerce with foreign
direction, but also against state
20 8
nations ("foreign commerce").
According to Supreme Court jurisprudence, a constitutional right of
foreign or alien corporations to be admitted to doing business in the state still
cannot be deduced from the Equal Protection Clause. 209 But some critical
voices have been raised. On the one hand, some call the doctrine of

205. See Kaplan, supra note 195, at 444.
206. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918); Note,
Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 197, at 1606-07.
207. See particularly,the famous wording in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
325 (1979):

The few simple words of the Commerce Clause ... reflected a central
concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the
Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the
new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later
among the States under the Articles of Confederation.
208. See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986);
South Central Timber Developmental, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 88 (1984);
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983); Japan Line,
Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47,
61 (1891); Campeau Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 679 F.Supp. 735 (S.D. Ohio
1988).
209. See, particularly,Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 510
(1926). See also Harold Wright Holt, Full Faith and Credit-A SuggestedApproach
to the Problem of Recognition of ForeignCorporations,89 U. PA. L. REV. 453, 464
(1941); Note, UnconstitutionalConditions,supra note 197, at 1608-09; 36 AM. JUR.
2D Foreign Corporations§ 46 (1968 & 1993 Supp.).
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conditional entry an anachronism. This doctrine alone is not considered
sufficient to justify state restrictions for foreign corporations.210 On the
other hand, it was attempted to deduct a constitutional right to admission from
other constitutional provisions. Holt proposes to find a way via the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of Art. IV Sec. 1 of the U.S. Constitution. This provision
is only applicable for foreign corporations, because it is only applied in the
relation between the states. It is seen to require from the sister state the
recognition and enforcement of those parts of the corporate law of the other
state that regulate the legal relations of members of the corporation
incorporated under that law towards third persons. The state is perceived to
be allowed to take measures against individuals to retrain them from acting for
the corporation in the territory of the state, only if the state can put forward
" '
a sufficiently strong governmental interest for that step.21

Neither courts nor authors discuss a corresponding restriction of the
applicability of the Equal Protection Clause (on the conflict of constitutional
laws level) for federal classifications. One might conclude that no
corresponding restrictions exist from this lack of discussion, and also
particularly, because in relation to the federal government the wording of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which the Equal Protection
Clause 2 is read into, does not contain a "within its jurisdiction" formula.
B. Equal ProtectionStandardof Review Currently Used
1. Traditional Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
Whereas the alienage classification is often discussed in jurisprudence
and law literature, hardly any statement on the differentiating criterion of
foreign or alien corporate nationality is to be encountered. A review of
Supreme Court cases that apply the Equal Protection Clause to alien or foreign
corporations evidences constant use of the weakest standard of review, the
rational basis test. Interestingly enough, as far as I can see, the nationality of
corporations has never been discussed under the perspective of suspect or
quasi-suspect criteria of classification in legal literature or court decisions.
Particularly, none of the cases discussed the question of intensity of constitutional review methodologically in an extensive way. This situation differs
This may be so,
strangely from gender classifications, for example." 3

210. See, e.g., Comment, QualificationRequirements,supranote 194, at 98.
211. Holt, supranote 209, at 464-65 and 479-80. See also Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions,supra note 197, at 1609.
212. See supra part II (initial paragraph).
213. Compare,e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supranote 57,
at 733-52; Bungert, supra note 31, at 450-54.
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because corporate alienage does. not stand out as a ready criterion of
classification, as a legal quality, in opposition to, for instance, gender.
In G.D.Searle & Co. v. Cohn,214 for example, a New Jersey tolling
statute for foreign corporations which were not represented in New Jersey by
a registered agent was upheld under the Equal Protection Clause. Explicitly,
merely rational basis review was applied. On the one hand, limitation of
215
actions was not considered a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny.
On the other hand, it is explicitly emphasized that distinctions between
domestic and foreign corporations do not present suspect classifications, so
that rational basis review has to be used.216 In doing so, the petitioner's
argument was left aside that a foreign corporation, especially if appointing an
agent of service was not necessary,217 is left "without a voice" in the forum
state, 2 8' an argument leading to Ely's theory of a lack of democratic
representation. Finally, it was argued, a mere rational basis review is

predicated for a differentiation between unrepresented foreign corporations and
represented foreign corporations, that is corporations with a registered agent
in the forum state and those without. 219 In his dissent Justice Stevens points
out that even under the applicable rational basis test not every distinction
between domestic and foreign or alien corporations can be held constitutional,
so that the means of differentiation "nationality" cannot be deemed to be a
rational goal of differentiation itself. ° A similar statute of Ohio was held
unconstitutional a few years later in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enterprises,Inc.,"' however, for violating the Interstate Commerce Clause.
In this context, the revealing phrase was that "state interests that are legitimate
for equal protection or due process purposes may be insufficient to withstand
Commerce Clause scrutiny."'
It follows, therefore, that the rational basis

214. 455 U.S. 404 (1982).
215. See alsoBendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888,
893 (1988); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315 (1945).
216. Searle, 455 U.S. at 408-10; see also Bendix Autolite, 486 U.S. at 893-94.
217. Particularly, if the threshold of doing business is not achieved yet.
218. Searle, 455 U.S. at 408-09.
219. This was only deemed worthy to be mentioned in a footnote, Id at 409 n.6.
220. Id. at 420. He formulates: "[I]n my view the Constitution requires a rational
basis for the special burden imposed on the disfavored class as well as a reason for
treating that class differently." Id. See furthermore, Cass R. Sunstein, Naked
Preferencesand the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984), who proves the
inadmissability of such "naked preferences" under the several provisions of the U.S.
Constitution protecting against discrimination.
221. 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
222. Id. at 894.
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test under the Equal Protection Clause is weaker than the review of classifications under the Commerce Clause.
In the well-known case of Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v.
State Board of Equalization of California, the rational basis test was
cemented for a differentiation between domestic and foreign corporations in
the area of state tax law. According to that decision, a differentiating or
discriminatory taxation is constitutional, if it stands in a rational relation to a
legitimate state interest as the goal striven for by the classification.2 24
2. Supreme Court on the Way Towards a Slight Tightening of the
Standard of Review?
In recent years, however, a slight tightening of equal protection review
for state classifications between foreign and domestic corporations may be
noticed in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Even if the rational basis test still
serves as the starting point, on close inspection there seems to be a tendency
toward an intermediate scrutiny standard: In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
v. Ward,"2 where a discriminatory state tax statute for foreign insurance
companies was at stake, the Supreme Court held, in a majority opinion, that
the strife for improving the local economy alone at the expense of foreign
corporations does not present a legitimate state interest under the rational basis
test. 226 Here, the Equal Protection Clause receives more bite than usual,
despite the application of the weak rational basis test, because it is the main
goal striven for by the discriminatory state legislation that is prohibited. 7
It remains questionable whether the Supreme Court would want to transfer this
line of argument to alien corporations also, or would restrict it to foreign
corporations. The particularly close relationship between the sister states
could speak against this transfer.

223. 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
224. Id. at 668. Other examples for application of the rational basis test for

discrimination on grounds of corporate nationality are Burlington N. R.R. v. Ford, 112
S.Ct. 2184 (1992); Amerada Hess Corp. v. New Jersey Dep't of Treasury, 490 U.S.
66, 79-80 (1989); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959);
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 572-74 (1949).
225. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
226. Id. 876-79. Cf also 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supranote
32, at 337-38; Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens ofEqual and TerritorialStates: The
ConstitutionalFoundationsof Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 269 (1992).
227. See also Is the Rationality Test Changing? in NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

supra note 57, at 587; Laycock, supra note 226, at 269.
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3. Different Concepts in Constitutional Doctrine
Law review articles also predominantly suggest the rational basis test for
reviewing differentiations between foreign and domestic corporations.228 B.
Currie & Schreter call the rational basis test a "principle of reasonable classification" in this context and explicitly want to apply it to foreign corporations
qualified to do business in the state. n 9 Alien corporations, therefore, are left
without any arguments-in the few statements in law review literature-put
into the same position as the merely weakly protected nonresident aliens."
In this context, it is pointed out that the application of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not mean that a statute may not
impose special obligations upon a foreign corporation, but simply that these
obligations must stand in a reasonable relation to the fact that corporations are
involved as well as to the nature of the respective branch of business. Even
within corporations, a classifying statute is permitted, for instance, between the
different branches of business or on account of the different size of
enterprises. This is particularly feasible in tax legislation. 3 '
In the following Part, this Article will discuss the question of applicable
constitutional review anew. It will forward the proposition that for differentiations between domestic and foreign corporations a more intense level of
scrutiny than the simple rational basis test should be applied. It remains
questionable whether one has to differentiate between foreign and alien
corporations insofar as to which level of scrutiny has to be applied.
Additionally, it could turn out necessary to differentiate between federal and
state classifications as done in the field of alien natural persons, although
ultimately this results in a mix-up of questions of jurisdiction and basic
constitutional fundamental rights questions. Restrictive regulations for foreign
and alien corporations are probably predominantly those of the states. A
difference as to natural persons is that for corporations there is no comparable
U.S. citizenship, but only state "citizenships."

228. See Mark E. Kruse, Comment, California'sStatutory Attempt to Regulate
ForeignCorporations:Will it Survive the Commerce Clause?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
943, 961-63 (1979) [hereinafter Comment, California'sStatutory Attempt]. See also
Julian N. Eule, Laying the DormantCommerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 45455 (1982) for nonresidency and out-of-state citizenship.
229. B. Currie & Schreter, supra note 165, at 5-6. In the sense of something like
the rational basis test, LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 11, at 713, speak of "a sensible basis.
for classification."
230. See Fred L. Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real
Estate, 60 MINN. L. REv. 621, 644 (1976).
231. See CORWiN ET AL., supra note 179, at 415-16. For cases see, e.g., Morey

v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 464-66 (1957).
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C. Strict Scrutiny for DiscriminationAgainst Alien Corporations?
At first sight differentiations between foreign and domestic corporations
seem to take place in the field of commercial law in its widest sense. This
would strongly indicate applicability of the simple rational basis test which,
as pointed out supra,"' is predominant in the area of commercial and social
legislation.

There are two ways to argue persuasively for the application of strict
scrutiny for discriminations against foreign or alien corporations. Either one
must, by way of the four indicators (topoi) laid out previously, 3 reach the
conclusion that foreign and alien corporate nationality is a suspect classification like race, national origin and alienage, or at least a quasi-suspect one like
gender or illegitimacy. 4 Or one must conclude that statutory (commercial)
legislation of foreign and alien corporations touches in its substance upon
some fundamental right. In this argumentative line, it might be necessary for
consistency to determine, as a first step, whether foreign corporations may
invoke the respective fundamental rights, or whether they may do so indirectly
via the Equal Protection Clause. On the other hand, the fundamental rights
solution might be a step-by-step approach, since here the specific legal topic
and areas of law touched upon might be essential, so that universally valid
statements could not be made. Thus Neuman, for instance, argues that
territorial discriminations, i.e., geographically defined classifications, are not
to be considered as per se suspect, but should only be subjected to strict
scrutiny, if the specific classifying statute touches upon a fundamental
right. 5
1. Corporate Nationality as Suspect Classification?
To begin with, the four factors for suspect classifications shall be
examined as to the use of foreign and alien corporate nationality as the
criterion of differentiation.
a. Prejudice Against a Discrete and InsularMinority
It is somewhat doubtful whether the factor of prejudice against a discrete
and insular minority originating from the famous footnote 4 of Carolene
Products (factor 1) is fulfilled by the connecting factor of foreign and alien
corporate nationality. Certainly, foreign and alien corporations are easily to

232. See supra part II.A.
233. See supra part II.B.
234. The allocation of these two criteria of differentiation is debated.
235. Neuman, supra note 39.
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be distinguished ("discrete") from domestic corporations, using the place of
incorporation rule. This rule is heavily used in different fields of the U.S.
legal system. 6 Whether there is a minority might already be doubtful. At
least, foreign corporations in the sense of out-of-state corporations are not an
obvious minority in relation to domestic corporations in most states.
Particularly in the U.S., it is most common to merely incorporate in one state
and do business predominantly in one or several other states. In order to
establish a minority proportion, it might be necessary to concentrate on the
individual case or the individual state and its economic statistical data,
respectively. In Delaware, for instance, the most popular state of incorporation, there should be a strong predominance of foreign corporations as
opposed to domestic corporations. As to alien corporations, there should
always be a minority relationship, for the activities of those corporations

should in every state only amount to a small fraction in relation to domestic
or at least to U.S. corporations.
It is doubtful, furthermore, whether there is prejudice. Certainly,
prejudice against alien (foreign) corporations is not as intense as it has been
against the Afro-Americans, the prototypical suspect criterion. However,
considering the obviously protectionistic policy in some states reflected in
verbal statements and often in discriminatory and restrictive statutes,237 and
particularly in the frequency of the use of the control theory,23' a

236. See, e.g., Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 556 (1871);
McDermott Inc. V. Lewis 531 A.2d 206 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987); SCOLES & HAY,
supra note 11, at 913-14, 918-20.
237. See the examples discussed infra at part IX.A-B.
238. According to the control theory the nationality of a corporation is determined
by the citizenship of the natural persons in control. Significantly enough, this theory
originated in the so-called enemy state legislation. It is debated what percentage of
participatory holdings establish control (51%, 66%, 75%) and whether one has to look
to the nationality of the incorporators, of the shareholders or of the managers. See
Hadari, supranote 5, at 23-25; Kronstein, supra note 5; Vagts, supra note 6, at 154451; Van Hecke, supranote 5, at 230-33; Williams & Chrussachi, supranote 5, at 33942. From the perspective of international law, see Lucius C. Caflisch, Protectionof
Corporate Investments Abroad in the Light of the Barcelona Traction Case, 31
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
V6LKERRECHT [JOURNAL OF FOREIGN PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW; Za6RV] 162 (1971). For the theory of control as to the multinational enterprise
compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 414(2) (1986);
Stanley J. Marcuss, Jurisdictionwith Respect to ForeignBranches and Subsidiaries:
Judicial Power in the Foreign Affairs Context Under Section 414 of the Foreign
Relations Restatement, 26 INT'L LAW. 1 (1992); see also William Laurence Craig,
Application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by
Americans: Reflections on Fruehaufv. Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REv. 579 (1970);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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surprisingly deep distrust of and strife for delimitation from alien corporations
is found. This is also evidenced by the great number of state and federal
restrictions for alien corporations.? 9

The relative "invidiousness" also

results from the quasi-arbitrary aggravation or slackening of economic
regulation of foreign or alien investment and corporations depending on the
country's development of internal and external trade.

b. History of Discrimination
A suspect classification is assumed particularly, if there is a lengthy
history of discrimination the respective (societal) group looks back to. In the
literature, this question, as far as can be seen, is hardly discussed for the
criterion of foreign and alien corporate nationality. A student note argues that
the open door policy of the U.S. government towards alien investment in the
past years does not present a history of discrimination versus alien corporations, so that application of strict scrutiny was not justified. 4
This assessment, however, appears unjustifiably optimistic and
euphemistic. It was not before the end of World War II and only under the
auspices of the United Nations that the international co-operation and the
relaxation of restrictions on foreign trade was intensified, certain first signs in
the times of the League of Nations notwithstanding. However, even after

Konrad Ginther, NationalityofCorporations,16 OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT

FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT [AUSTRIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW;
OZoffR] 27, 47-55 (1966).
239. See, e.g., BUNGERT, ALIEN CORPORATIONS, supra note 23, chapter 4;
EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE

UNITED STATES (1989); Harvey E. Bale, The US. Federal Government's Policy
TowardsForeignDirectInvestment,in REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN CANADA AND UNITED STATES 29 (Earl H. Fry & Lee H. Radebaugh eds., 1983);
Herbert Brownell, ForeignInvestment in the UnitedStates Should Not Be Restricted,
in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 57-63
(Daniel M. Evans et al. eds., 1976); Paul McCarthy, Government Regulation of
Foreign Investment in the United States, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 84, at 92-101 (Daniel M. Evans et al. eds.,
1976); Michael V. Seitzinger, ForeignInvestment in the UnitedStates: MajorFederal

Restrictions, Congressional Research Service Reports 10-27, 89-376, (1989); Cecilia
M. Waldeck, Note, Proposalsfor Limiting ForeignInvestment Risk Under the ExonFlorioAmendment, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1255-56 (1991) [hereinafter Note, Exon-

FlorioAmendment]. For an overview of U.S. restrictions for multinational enterprises
see Detlev F. Vagts, The United States of America and the MultinationalEnterprise,
in NATIONALISM AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 3, 8-19 (H.R. Hahlo et al.
eds., 1973).
240. Note, Exon-Florio Amendment, supra note 239, at 1233.
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World War II still many restrictions and discriminations existed and continue
to exist.24 ' Particularly restrictive and discriminatory in this context are:
the cofitrol of alien investment by procedural impediments;242 the extensive
powers under the Exon-Florio Amendment;243 the far-reaching possibilities
for restrictions in the sector of radio communications, which partly can be
traced back to enemy state legislation;244 and the tax burdens for alien
corporations adjusted in a short time reaction to the respective developments
of internal trade, which meanwhile on account of the instrument of treaty
overriding no longer acknowledge international treaties in force as boundaries
to municipal restrictive law-making. Besides the restrictions illustrated, the
widely spread principle of the control theory originating from enemy state
legislation (i.e., the Trading with the Enemy Act),245 appears to reflect an
on-going history of discrimination.
c. Lack of Democratic Representation
A fundamental factor for attributing suspect classification status to a
criterion of differentiation is the leitmotif of democratic participation.
Particularly, for the criteria of race and national origin, the application of strict
scrutiny aims to compensate, on the (secondary) court level, for a lack of
democratic representation and participation of minorities with the consequential political powerlessness, and by attempting to ensure democratic participation (on a primary level), for the future in some way, inter alia, by
granting affirmative action. 46 This objective particularly comes forth in
factor (3), stigmatization of a politically powerless segment of society.
On first sight, rating alien and foreign corporate nationality as a suspect
classification criterion does not seem to achieve this objective. In the
constellation of foreign corporations, generally economic participation alone

241. Compare cites supra in note 239.
242. See the discussion infra part IX.A.10.
243. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 5021, Pub. L. No. 100418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (1988) (codified as 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (West 1991 & 1993
Supp.)). See also the discussion infra part IX.A.1.
244. See the discussion infra part IX.A.7.b.
245. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-44 (West 1990 & 1993 Supp.).
246. See also San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973);
Mercado v. Kingsley Area Schools, 727 F.Supp. 335, 344 (W.D. Mich. 1989); ELY,
supranote 39, at 82-87; TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 1451-54 and
1465-66; Fiss, supra note 29, at 154-56. For the aspect of decontextualization in equal
protection jurisprudence in the field of racial inequality compareJohnathan P. Nelson,
The Emergence of Decontextualizationin the Equal ProtectionJurisprudenceof the
United States Supreme Court, 29 WILLAMETTE L.REv. 669 (1993).
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is asked for. Therefore, awarding suspect classification status with consequential strict scrutiny would have to be based upon other evaluations. It seems
to be a particular problem that discrimination of domestic corporations against
domestic natural persons, which might become relevant, for instance, in state
tax legislation, are also only reviewed under the simple rational basis test,
since these are to be attributed simply to the "profane" non-political economic
area and economic freedoms.247
On the other hand, the economic, legal, and political framework may
only be changed by participation in the democratic processes and legislation.
Such participation, also in the form of lobbying, can prevent the passage of
discriminating legislation. Therefore, it is not inconsistent to argue that the
lack of representation of alien and foreign corporations in state and federal
legislative organisms should at least be compensated for, on a secondary level,
-by increased judicial protection.
A similar argument, which reminds one of Ely's theory of representation
reinforcement,24 is to be found in a student note discussing Western &
249 The
Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization.
note
argues that foreign corporations are characterized by a lack of political
representation. The political process of a state, the note argues, provides
enough checks and balances for domestic persons against arbitrarily burdensome legislation. However, this control is lacking as to the regulation of
doing business of foreign corporations.2
This factor is supposed to lead
to the increased intensity of equal protection scrutiny, that is to "fair and
substantial relation scrutiny of means."25' Furthermore, if the actual
governmental goal sought to be achieved is found unconstitutional, the Court
should not-as it is generally done-uphold the regulation, if it only finds
another perceivable goal of the regulation that is constitutional.252 On the
contrary, a stricter "actual purpose scrutiny" should be applied, which merely
looks to the goal of differentiation brought forward by the legislature.2 3

247. See also infra section 4.
248. ELY, supra note 39, at 87; see also Ron Replogle, Note, The Scope of
Representation-ReinforcingJudicialReview, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1592 (1992).
249. 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
250. Kirk D. McQuiddy, Note, Taxing Out-of-State CorporationsAfter Western

& Southern: An Equal ProtectionAnalysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 877, 893-95 (1982)
[hereinafter Note, Taxing].
251. Id. at 897-98.
252. See also supra part II.C.
253. Note, Taxing, supranote 250, at 895-97.
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d. Unalterable Trait
To transfer the argumentative line of an unalterable trait (factor 4) to
corporations seems somewhat questionable. One might assert the possibility

of "traits" of a corporation due to its legal entity status, although one has to
keep in mind that those originally and properly referred to natural persons.
The question of unalterableness, however, seems to be problematic. For alien
natural persons, the unalterableness of alienage has been questioned because
aliens may apply for U.S. citizenship under certain preconditions, particularly
five years of U.S. residence, and thus, may eliminate the factor of discrimination with administrative assistance. This should hold true even more for
foreign corporations, at least under the rule of incorporation inherent in U.S.
law, 4 since here no time limit has to be fulfilled. A (re-)incorporation in
the U.S. or the incorporation of a U.S. subsidiary-is possible any time, though
under some financial expense. However, there will be an additional financial
and organizational expenditure, if a subsidiary is incorporated and now two
organizational centers have to be managed. For a reincorporation in the U.S.
the argument of troublesomeness and costs" cannot be advanced as easily as
in countries following the seat rule: Only according to the (German) seat rule
an effective domestic management is essential for maintaining status as a

254. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87-94 (1987);
Liverpool London Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566 (1870);
McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987); SCOLES & HAY, supra note 11,
at 913-14 and 918-20; RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 304 (3d ed. 1986 & 1991 Supp.); Norwood P. Beveridge, The InternalAffairs
Doctrine: The ProperLaw of a Corporation,44 BUS. LAW. 693 (1989); Henry E.
Foley, Incorporation,Multiple Incorporationand the Conflict of Laws, 42 HARV. L.
REV. 516, 518-19 (1929); Hadari, supranote 5, at 7-8; Mary Twitchell, The Myth of
GeneralJurisdiction,101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 633 (1988); Vagts, supra note 6, at
1525-30; 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 893 and § 896 (1990). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 302, 304-09 (1971).
255. In detail, there might be four considerations advanced against immediate
(re-)incorporation. First, business might be considerably more difficult if the alien
corporation is doing business in several countries on a sort of medium business activity
level in each and now should be forced to incorporate a subsidiary in each of those
countries. Second, the U.S. business activity volume might not suffice to make
incorporation of a subsidiary profitable. Third, the special organizational structure of
the individual corporation might insure that a central management in the foreign,
home, country will work more efficiently and profitably. Fourth, many restrictions for
alien corporations not only are connected to the alien nationality of the corporation
itself, but additionally by way of the control criterion, look to the alien persons
controlling the (domestic) corporations, so that reincorporation in the United States is
of no help.
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domestic corporation.

6

According to the U.S. rule of incorporation,

however, it is not necessary to do business at the seat of the (U.S.) corporation
to maintain domestic corporation status.
e. Parallelto Nonresidency?
If alienage or nationality of a corporation is not thought equivalent to
nationality or alienage of a natural person, but treated as correspondent to the
criterion of "nonresidency" of a natural person, strict scrutiny is also
necessitated. Established Supreme Court doctrine uses strict scrutiny in this
situation, although different doctrinal aspects govern. Whereas alienage
basically is considered a suspect criterion in the context of state classifications,
nonresidency in the state is not viewed as such. Nonresidency, usually, is the
ultimate starting point in the context of the so-called right to interstate travel,
which is an accepted fundamental right leading to strict scrutiny under the
fundamental rights branch of the Equal Protection Clause.257 An equation
of nonresidency and foreign or alien nationality of a corporation is not too farfetched, it is used by some authors, by some courts, and in some statutes. 8
However, clinging to nonresidency leads to strict scrutiny on the described
indirect path only for classifications by the states. For federal classifications,
the situation is ambivalent, particularly due to an overlap with considerations
of legislative powers, a right to travel abroad is not recognized." 9

f

Parallelto the PoliticalFunction Exemption?

Whereas for state discriminations against alien natural persons a political
functions exception from strict scrutiny is recognized,260 there seems to be
no ready parallel in the situation of foreign or alien corporations. These are
not put into a situation where they have to fight back against discrimination

256. See especially Carsten Thomas Ebenroth, Gaining Access to Fortress
Europe-Recognitionof U.S. Corporationsin Germany and the Revision of the Seat
Rule, 24 INT'L LAW. 459 (1990); see also Hartwin Bungert, Deutsch-amerikanisches
internationales Gesellschaftsrecht-Staatsvertragliche Festschreibung der
Uberlagerungstheorie? ["German-American Conflict of Corporate Laws', 93
ZVglRWiss 117 (1994).
257. See the citations, infra section 2, particularly Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); in this context, see also E. Thaddeus Lewis, Note, Constitutional
Law-Balancing Test in DurationalResidence Equal ProtectionAnalysis-Williams
v. Zobel, 56 WASH. L. REV. 763 (1981).
258. See supranote 14 et seq.
259. See immediately infra at section 2.c.
260. See supra part II.A.4.
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in regard to political functions and offices. For the exemption for illegal
aliens discussed supra,26' there is also no direct parallel for foreign or alien
corporations."'

g. Summary
To sum up, although not all of the four generally acknowledged factors
are completely fulfilled, which would necessitate rating foreign corporate

nationality and alien corporate nationality as a suspect classification, many
arguments can be made that at least several factors are fulfilled to a large
extent. These factors or topoi do not have, as previously mentioned, 3 the
character of inalienable preconditions, but only of indicia. The more of them
that are clearly fulfilled, the more probable the application of strict scrutiny.
In view of the doctrinal evaluation practiced in the U.S., it appears to be too
daring to ask for strict scrutiny review for differentiations on account of
foreign or alien corporate nationality, particularly when considering that
jurisprudence and literature clearly strive to limit application of strict scrutiny
in order to maintain an adequate relationship between the judicial and the
legislative branch and in fear of an excessive judicial activism. However, the
delineation above made it obvious that in relying on the structural equal
protection doctrine advanced by the Supreme Court itself, it is no longer
consistent to apply merely rational basis review in the constellations

considered. Due to the indicia character of the factors discussed, it appears
inevitable to rate a legislative differentiation on account of "foreign or alien
corporate nationality" as quasi-suspect, consequentially triggering intermediate
scrutiny.

2. Parallel to the Right to Travel as a Fundamental Right?
Arguments necessitating at least intermediate scrutiny can also be made
from the approach of the so-called fundamental rights branch of the Equal
Protection Clause, which usually also triggers strict scrutiny. I will dwell
upon this approach in the following.
a. The Doctrine of FundamentalRights Equal Protection
Thus far, the following have qualified as fundamental interests, resulting
in strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause: the right to vote;
261. See supra part III.A.5.

262. But see the special considerations of parallelism infra at the end of section

3.b.
263. Supra part II.B.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2

52

19941

Bungert: Bungert: Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations
FOREIGNAND ALIEN CORPORATIONS

the right to privacy, particularly the right of procreation and the right to
marry; procedural guarantees in criminal proceedings, and the more general
right of access to courts; and the right to travel, more accurately the right to
interstate migration."
Similar and additional fundamental interests were

acknowledged under the Due Process Clause as substantive due process,
triggering a similarly strict level of constitutional review. However, in the
well-known decision of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 265 for instance, education was denied the status of a fundamental
right in the sense of the Equal Protection Clause. 266 The respective
fundamental right or interest must be guaranteed explicitly or implicitly by the
Constitution.267
Considering this doctrinal construction, it is interesting to ask for the
essential difference between a constitutional review under the fundamental
rights equal protection approach, i.e., that is application of strict scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause, if it is indicated by an infringement upon
fundamental rights or interests, and the so-called direct substantive review, i.e.,
constitutional review as to an encroachment upon the substantial fundamental
right (freedom right) itself. This question seems to be seldom asked in U.S.
constitutional doctrine.268 The answer probably has to be that the Equal
Protection Clause predominantly guards fundamental interests that are not
protected or guaranteed independently by a rights or liberties provision of the
Constitution, although the clause comprises also the protection of those rights
which implicitly underlie the system of the Constitution or its several
provisions. 26' According to Neuman, fundamental rights equal protection
provides a protection in addition to the substantive liberal rights; because, by
emphasizing the distributive aspect of basic rights, it also prevents restrictions
of the majority laid upon the minority, which might be upheld due to their
universal application when taking strictly the perspective of a liberal right. 7

264. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supranote 57, at 757-907;

Lupu, supranote 27, at 1003-54; Note, Developmentssupranote 34, at 1127-28. For
the recognition of a right to engage in political expression as a fundamental right for
corporations under the equal protection clause see Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667-68 (1990).
265. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
266. Id.

267. Id. at 30-34.
268. Exceptions are, e.g., Lupu, supranote 27, at 1027-54; Neuman, supranote
39, at 277-78; Westen, supra note 29, at 560-69; touched briefly also in Note,

Developments,supra note 34, at 1128.
269. See also Note, Developments, supranote 34, at 1128; Lupu, supranote 27,
at 1030-50; but see id. at 1060-75.
270. See Neuman, supranote 39, at 279-87, which, in my opinion, in its ultimate
analysis is not persuasive.
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Therefore, one might conclude generally that a categorical separation of the
constitutional right prototypes of equal protection rights and fundamental
freedom rights is not possible, but that a fusing of equal protection and
fundamental freedom rights takes place in some areas, as elucidated here."'
This commingling of equal protection rights and substantial freedom rights is
also elucidated in the doctrinal concept of the Equal Protection Clause of
Perry. Perry construes the principle of fairness to be underlying the Equal
Protection Clause in three different variations: fairness-as-accuracy, fairnessas-nondiscrimination, and fairness-as-proportionality. Particularly in the third
perspective, the close context of equality and proportionality is emphasized.272
b. Right to InterstateMigration For Foreign Corporations?
Searching for a fundamental right of the alien or foreign corporation
acknowledged by the Supreme Court that might be encroached upon by
classifications on grounds of foreign corporate nationality, one could draw a
parallel to the right to travel, also called right to interstate migration. The
individual's right to move between and within the several states has always
played an important role in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. It has
been viewed as one of the fundamental cornerstones in the framework of the
confederation. In the leading case of Shapiro v. Thompson,2 3 the Court
acknowledged it for natural persons as a fundamental right or fundamental
interest under the fundamental rights branch of the Equal Protection Clause.
Legislation that touches upon this right, particularly by attempting to impede

271. For an opposition of a juxtaposition of equal protection rights and
fundamental freedom rights see also Westen, supranote 29, at 539-77. According to
Westen, equality is a derivative (secondary) relation, it is logically inferior to
(freedom) rights. Id. at 548-49. Due to their comparative character, at least some
equality rights, such as the Privileges and Immunities Clause, presuppose a substantive
freedom right. Id. at 553-55. For an argument in favor of a close, but
distinguishable, relation between freedom rights ("substantive protection") and equality
rights ("equality-based protection") demonstrated using the example of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause see John Harrison, Reconstructingthe Privilegesor Immunities
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992); see also, in traces, Michael J. Perry,
Constitutional "Fairness":Notes on Equal Protection and Due Process, 63 VA. L.
REv. 383, 385 (1977). For an approach of equality rights and freedom rights within
the equal protection clause under the perspective of a comparative/noncomparative
right see Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a ComparativeRight, 65 B.U. L. REv. 387
(1985).
272. Perry, supranote 271, at 390-413.

273. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also D. P. CURRIE, THE SECOND CENTURY, supra
note 51, at 433.
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migration between the states or to discourage new residents from settling
down in the state by unfavorable regulation, is consequently subjected to strict
scrutiny. 4 It must be kept in mind, however, that the Equal Protection
Clause cannot grant a right of free entry or immigration to the state in the
sense of a positive right of participation or a "negative" freedom, i.e., an
individual's right to be safe from governmental interference. 5 This
fundamental right may only be invoked under the relativistic, comparative,
Equal Protection Clause, so that a state activity may be held unconstitutional
only by means of a comparison with the disfavorably treated under a highintensity level of review.
All Supreme Court decisions concerning the fundamental right to travel
have so far addressed only natural persons. To the author's knowledge, no
case concerning a corporation has been decided yet. However, it appears
merely consistent to also grant corporations a right to travel or, respectively,
a right to interstate migration, here in the form of the freedom of movement
and freedom of establishment, since, after all, corporations are recognized as
being able to invoke the Equal Protection Clause as well.1 6 This
fundamental right would be touched upon in the case of discriminations
against foreign corporations as opposed to domestic corporations in the
commercial area, so that strict scrutiny would have to be applied under the

Equal Protection Clause.

274. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supranote 57, at 873-86;
2 ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 679-95; TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 1455-57; see also Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).

275. For definition of these terms of constitutional doctrine see Ernst Brandl &
Hartwin Bungert, Constitutional Entrenchment of Environmental Protection: A
Comparative Analysis of Experiences Abroad, 16 HARV. ENVT'L L. REv. 1, 9-12

(1992).
276. See supra part IV.A.1. See particularly,The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722,

744 (D. Cal. 1882) (Field, J.) ("It would be a most singular result if a constitutional
provision intended for the protection of every person against partial and discriminating
legislation by the states, should cease to exert such protection the moment the person
becomes a member of a corporation."), appeal dismissedas moot, San Mateo County
v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885). According to this "Field

rationale," "the courts will look through the ideal entity and name of the corporation
to the persons who compose it, and protect them, though the process be in its name,"
RailroadTax Cases, 13 F. at 748. Justice Field was confirmed by Chief Justice Waite
in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). See also
Comment, Personification,supra note 2, at 1460; O'Kelley, supra note 159, at 1353-

56.
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c. Expansion to Alien Corporations?
The right to interstate migration was developed upon structural and
systematic considerations for U.S. citizens, who should not become object of
discrimination in the case of residence in another state. This follows, in
particular, from the deduction of this fundamental right or interest from the
concept of federalism. All the constellations of the Supreme Court's leading
cases deal with U.S. citizens. On the other hand, however, the right to
interstate travel has not been expressly denied to alien persons. The reason
for the lack of Supreme Court decisions as to the question of a right to
interstate travel for alien natural persons under the Equal Protection Clause
probably is that alien discrimination in each case has been reviewed under the
suspect classification prong of the Equal Protection Clause, 277 so that
considerations concerning the fundamental interests prong of the Equal
Protection Clause were unnecessary.
Thus, if one transfers the right to interstate migration as a fundamental
right under the Equal Protection Clause to corporations, clearly foreign
corporations are protected, corresponding to residents of other states. But is
seems problematic whether the right to interstate travel may also be attributed
to alien corporations, i.e., corporations organized under the law of another
nation.
In this context, one should keep in mind that for natural persons and
U.S. citizens the right to travel abroad, which has been invoked against federal
discriminations, despite promising expectations 278 is not recognized as a
fundamental right today, so that in this respect mere rational basis review is
applied under the Equal Protection Clause. This is rooted particularly in the
special competence of the federal government27 in the field of law of
citizenship and foreign policy.280 On close inspection, the discriminatory
restrictions for foreign corporations, extending the line of argument
analogously, do not concern precisely a right to travel abroad. Alien corporations do not want to do business abroad, but in the U.S. Furthermore, as
already explained, in the context of the suspect criterion approach, for
corporations the considerations of federal powers relevant for the denial of a
right to travel abroad for natural persons do not play an important role.
For attributing a right to interstate migration to alien corporations, one
could argue that in legal literature the holders of this fundamental right are

277. See supra part III.A.2.
278. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
279. Several cases of the Supreme Court dealt with questions of issuing passports.
280. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 240-44 (1984); Califano v. Aznavorian,
439 U.S. 170, 174-78 (1978); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra
note 57, at 868-73.
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mostly referred to in a neutral manner. Nowak & Rotunda, for instance,
simply speak of "persons, '281 a term which could address natural persons

and also corporations. Karst stated in 1977 that the basic principle of
substantive equal protection is the guaranty of equal citizenship. 282 This
statement rightfully is criticized as being too one-sided in view of the
complexity of equal protection doctrine.283 Furthermore, alien corporations

should not be excluded as holders of a right to interstate migration in the
sense of a fundamental right, solely because the notion of "citizen" in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause is not applicable to alien, foreign and
domestic corporations according to the Supreme Court's interpretation.284
The steps of interpretation in the context of this clause are not transferable,
because one deals with a sort of indirect interpretation of fundamental
Also, one could rely in this regard on a
constitutional freedoms.
transferability of the similar interpretation of the diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction clause of Art. III of the U.S. Constitution; the applicability of
which to corporations was accepted by the Supreme Court in the end.285

281. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 57, at 883-86.
282. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 4 (1977).
283. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 27, at 1054-60.
284. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586-87 (1839) (Taney,
C.J.); Bruce K. Adler, The Corporation's Vade Mecum of ConstitutionalRights, 7
CORP. L. REV. 133, 138-39 (1984). For a critique of the decision see DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT-THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
(1789-1888) 237-40 (1985) (hereinafter D.P. CURRIE, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS);

supra note 167, at 42-49. See also Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 181 (1868); and the citations in note 181 supra.
285. Initially, the Supreme Court in Bank of United States v. Deveaux denied
corporations the status of citizens as used in the diversity of citizenship clause, because
[t]hat invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity, a
corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen; and, consequently, cannot
sue or be sued in the courts of the United States, unless the rights of the
members, in this respect, can be exercised in their corporate name. If the
corporation be considered as a mere faculty, and not as a company of
individuals, who, in transacting their joint concerns, may use a legal
name, they must be excluded from the courts of the Union.... That
name, indeed, cannot be an alien or a citizen; but the persons whom it
represents may be the one or the other....
Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86-87 (1809). But later the
Court used a fiction and treated corporations as if they were citizens, Marshall v.
Baltimore & 0. R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 329 (1853); Louisville, Cincinnati &
Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844); HENDERSON, FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS, supra note 167 at 60-62; Dudley 0. McGovney, A Supreme Court
Fiction: Corporationsin the Diverse CitizenshipJurisdictionofthe FederalCourts, 56
HENDERSON, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS,
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This transfer would particularly be suggested by the perspective of optimization of judicial protection. Finally, the right to interstate travel is not a civic
right in its narrow sense, which would only be available to citizens.286
Furthermore, the criterion of foreign corporate nationality seems to be
comparable to the criterion of residence which was used by most regulations
underlying the decisions on the right to interstate travel.287
According to these considerations, there are no profound objections
against transferring the right to interstate travel to alien corporations. The
potential constructive doctrinal difficulties discussed previously might cause
one not to be willing to conceive this right as a fundamental right in the
context of foreign and alien corporations. In any case, it is a quasifundamental right, so that respective differentiations are subjected to
intermediate scrutiny.
d Right of Access to Courts
Alien and foreign corporations, furthermore, must be able to invoke the

right of access to courts, acknowledged by the Supreme Court as a
fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause.288 Some speak of a
fundamental right to equal litigation opportunity in this respect.289 These

HARv. L. REV. 853 (I), 1090 (II), 1225 (III) (1943); Neil J. Rubenstein, Alienage
Jurisdictionin the FederalCourts, 17 INT'L LAW. 283, particularly 288-90 and 295-97
(1983); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Note, Alien Corporationsand Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction,84 CoLUM. L. REv. 177, 193-96 (1984); see also James W. Moore &
Donald T. Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: A
Supreme Court FictionRevisited, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1426 (1964).
286. In the context of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment the Supreme Court defined specific civic rights, i.e., rights specifically
connected to U.S. citizenship, such as the right to petition or the right to vote, which
are the only "privileges" protected in that constitutional provision. Thereby, the Court
placed the fundamental rights incorporated in the Bill of Rights as well as all other
rights or privileges connected with state citizenships out of the reach of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-81
(1873); D.P. CURRIE, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 284, at 342-51.
287. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 57, at 873-83;

Lupu, supra note 27, at 1060-64.
288. As to this right cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 57, at 889-93. A similar consideration,
i.e., the application of a strict scrutiny review on account of the impairment of the
fundamental right of access to courts for territorial discriminations, is found in
Neuman, supra note 39, at 277.
289. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 1461-63.
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considerations would also provoke application of a strict scrutiny review for
alien and foreign corporations under the Equal Protection Clause.
3. Significance of Qualification for Doing Business Under
the Equal Protection Doctrine

a. Requirements and Consequences of Qualification
Foreign and alien corporations, according to each state's statutory
law-the statutes are either called "qualification statutes" or "foreign
corporation laws"-have to register or to be admitted by the Secretary of State
or a comparable agency, before doing business within that state. The
corporation has to file a copy of its certificate of incorporation with the
Secretary of State and to name an instate registered agent, particularly for
purposes of service of process. "Doing business," a precondition for
qualification, commences when the foreign or alien corporation carries out a

substantial part of its business transactions in the state, permanently rather than

occasionally.29 Simply maintaining an office in the guest state, for instance, does not constitute doing business. 9' Although states differ

considerably in how many contacts they require for "doing business" or
"transacting business, 2 92 most of them have statutory lists of activities not
constituting doing business, modelled after R.M.B.C.A. § 15.01(b).293 In

290. For this complex see, e.g., William Laurence Walker, Foreign Corporation

Laws: A Current Account, 47 N.C. L. REV. 733 (1969); William A. Holby, Note,
"DoingBusiness": DefiningState Control Over Corporations,32 VAND. L. REV. 1105
(1979) [hereinafter Note, Defining State Control].
291. James v. United Artists Corp., 305 U.S. 410 (1939); Eisner v. United Am.
Util., Inc., 180 A. 589 (Del. Ch. 1935); People v. Horn Silver Mining Co., 11 N.E.
155 (N.Y. 1887).
292. See A GUIDE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER UNITED STATES LAW,
[STUDY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE TO STUDY FOREIGN

INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES] 54-55 (Allan R. Roth ed., 1979); Patricia L.
Grove, "Doing Business" in Oklahoma: Will Minimum Contacts Subject a Foreign
Corporationto Oklahoma'sQualificationStatutes?, 17 TULSA L.J. 23 (1980); John J.
Stenger & William B. Gwyn, Jr., ForeignCorporationsin North Carolina:The "Doing
Business"Standardsof Qualification,Taxation, andJurisdiction,16 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 711 (1980); Robert V. Okulski, Comment, QualificationRequirements, supra
note 194; Note, ForeignCorporations:What Constitutes "DoingBusiness" underNew
York's QualificationStatute?, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1042 (1976); 18A FLETCHER CYC.
CORP. § 8804.1 (1987).
293. See, e.g., California, CAL. CORP. CODE § 191(c) (West 1993); Delaware,
DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 373, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 373 (1993); Florida, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.1501(2) (West 1992); New York, N.Y. BUs. CORP. LAW § 1301(b)
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order to enforce the qualification requirement the states establish sanctions
such as fines, personal liability of the shareholders by not recognizing the
corporate veil of a non-qualified ("unauthorized") foreign corporation, denial
of judicial protection for suits connected to the business activities in instate
courts, or, rarely, voidness or invalidity of the contracts concluded by the nonqualified foreign corporation. 9
In this section the significance of "qualification" of an alien or foreign
corporation for equal protection analysis will be discussed. As pointed out
earlier,295 its point of departure is that the equal protection itself is
(internationally) applicable to foreign and alien corporation for every state
discrimination that touches upon interstate commerce or foreign commerce,
according to a conflict of constitutional laws approach.
b. Significance of QualificationAccording to the
TraditionalConcept
According to the traditional concept, however, on the conflict of
constitutional laws level, the Equal Protection Clause merely commenced to
be applicable for regulations of intrastate commerce, when the alien or foreign
corporation was admitted by the state to do business within the state, the socalled qualification, even if for the act of qualification no conditions
unconstitutional themselves could be imposed. 96 Obviously, a gap in
judicial protection opens here, which renders discriminations against alien and
foreign corporations constitutional. According to the traditional view, the
courts seem to have developed a parallel between qualification and the
reservation clause of the Equal Protection Clause of "within its jurisdiction."
The state could set the conditions for qualification, which usually relies upon

doing business, at its leisure, but only after qualification was the foreign
corporation "within its jurisdiction," and only then, could the foreign
corporation invoke the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, a corporation not

(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993); citations in 17A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 8464.1
(1987).
294. See Note, Sanctionsfor Failure to Comply with Corporate Qualification
Statutes: An Evaluation,63 COLUM. L. REV. 117 (1963); 17A FLETCHER CYC. CORP.
§§ 8447-48, 8507 (1987); compare, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1027(1),(5)
(1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1312 (McKinney 1986 & 1993 Supp.); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 2120 (1993).
For treatments of the whole complex of qualification see, e.g., Walter O'Connor,
Foreign Companies Doing Business With the United States, 21 TAx ADVISOR 37

(1990); Walker, supra note 290; Note, Defining State Control, supra note 290.
295. See supra part IV.A.
296. See supra part IV.A.3-5.
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admitted does not even fall under the protective shield of the Equal Protection
Clause, so that the question of the applicable level of scrutiny does not arise.
Left without protection are primarily those foreign or alien corporations that
in an unlawful way did not apply for qualification, although they crossed the
threshold of doing business due to the amount of their state contacts. Those
are subjected to sanctions in the state qualification statutes, but in fact did
cross the border of "within its jurisdiction," because they fulfill the doing business criterion, so that the Equal Protection Clause is applicable according to
conflict of constitutional laws. Since qualification itself becomes obligatory
merely above the threshold of state contacts of doing business, those
corporations that have very few state contacts were left without equal
protection because those are not subject to the qualification requirement; so
that theoretically they never could come within the protection of the "within
its jurisdiction" formula.
The traditional view, additionally, leads to an unequal treatment of alien
juridical and alien natural persons, if one equates the notions of residence and
qualification. If one puts, for purposes of equal protection doctrine, a foreign
corporation after qualification on par with a resident alien, and a foreign
corporation before or without qualification on par with a non-resident alien or
illegal alien, respectively,297 by transferring the Supreme Court's equal
protection doctrine for state discriminations of aliens,298 strict scrutiny
should be applicable in the first constellation and rational basis review in the
second constellation. In fact, however, according to traditional doctrine, alien
and foreign corporations do not enjoy any protection under the Equal
Protection Clause before registration, pursuant to the level of conflict of
constitutional laws.
c. Significance of Qualification Under a Modern Concept
According to the modem view, this problem and this unequal treatment
within the Equal Protection Clause itself should no longer exist. In Kentucky
Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp.,2 99 the-conflict of

constitutional laws-restriction of the "within its jurisdiction" reservation
clause of the Equal Protection Clause is defeated. In the general remarks on
the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. Constitution the approach of a subjection
factor becomes strong. Every (alien) corporation affected by an act of an U.S.

297. This might suggest itself, because by means of qualification the foreign or
alien corporation is registered with the Secretary of State and is administered by its
administration, appoints an agent of service and thus may do in-state business without
sanctions.
298. See supra part III.A.2-5.
299. 262 U.S. 544 (1923).
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federal or state branch of government may have recourse to an U.S. court and
invoke the Equal Protection Clause. 3°° This concept of irrelevance of
qualification for the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause would
probably also be reached by emphasizing the previously mentioned
fundamental right of access to courts.3"'
4. Unconstitutional Unequal Treatment of Alien Natural and Alien
Juridical Persons Under the Equal Protection Clause Itself?
Attempting to apply strict or, at least, intermediate scrutiny to govemmental acts distinguishing on account of the criterion of foreign or alien
corporate nationality, an argument can be made that the differentiation of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence itself between application of strict scrutiny for
classifications against alien natural persons, in the regular constellation, and
application of the wide rational basis test for classifications against alien
juridical persons establishes unconstitutional unequal treatment. This
argument has not been made yet, as far as I can see. In any case, the lack of
such a claim does not stem from the fact that the (foreign) corporation does
not have a complete constitutional entity status,3 2 because at least all
constitutional right provisions are applicable to (foreign) corporations that
refer to "persons." Points of discussions for such a suggested "internally
comparative" 0 3 line of arguments are put forward by Laycock, who
considers the parallel goals of national unity and interstate equality imminent
in the structurally related constitutional provisions of the Equal Protection
Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause in its
equality component to the same extent desirable, independent whether foreign
natural persons or foreign corporations are affected by state discriminations.
Therefore, he argues for a modification of the Supreme Court's

300. See supra part IV.A.4.
301. See immediately supra part IV.C.2.d.
302. The following constitutional rights are applicable to (foreign) corporations:
the right to freedom of speech, the protection against takings, protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the diversity
jurisdiction of U.S. CONST art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Not applicable are the privilege against
self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment, the right to privacy, or the Privileges and
Immunities Clauses. See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizingthe Impersonal: Corporations
and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990). See also BUNGERT, ALIEN
CORPORATIONs, supra note 23, chapter 8.
303. This expression refers to a comparison of different constitutional provisions
of non-discrimination within the Constitution itself.
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However, this line of arguments appears to be only
jurisprudence. 3
conceived for the particularly close relationship of interstate or foreign objects
of comparison, not for alien persons.
On the other hand, cases reflect express statements that governmental
classifications between corporations and natural persons or unincorporated
aggregates, particularly in the field of tax law, principally do not violate the

Equal Protection Clause, except when they are arbitrary and without a rational

interest.0 5 Sometimes not very convincingly, the act of doing business in
corporate form itself is considered as such an advantage that a consequential
burden, e.g. taxation, for the corporation without a respective burden for the
natural person or the non-corporate association is viewed as justified." 6
Mostly these statements are coined for domestic corporations and natural
persons, but this is not necessarily so.
Some authors suggest that a differentiation between natural persons and
corporations might be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, but will
be held unconstitutional only if no rational interest is found for the respective
differentiating regulation in the specific constellation." 7 Sometimes, the
more general statement is found that a differentiation between natural persons
and corporations amounts to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
because equal situations are treated unequally, which particularly would be
indicated by the perspective of natural persons looming behind the corporate
veil.3"'
Thus, for different treatment of corporations and natural persons
generally or, respectively, of domestic corporations and natural persons merely
the weak rational basis test is used. In an old Supreme Court case of 1938,
one encounters a formulation which in its literal meaning seems to suggest
that for alien corporations strict scrutiny is applicable. There, the Court held
that alien juridical persons may invoke the protection of the Equal Protection

304. Laycock, supra note 226, at 269-70.

305. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Lawrence
v. State Tax Comm'n of Mississippi, 286 U.S. 276 (1931); Kentucky Finance Corp.
v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 551 (1923); Michigan Cent. R.R.
v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245 (1906); Road Improvement Dist. No. 7 v. St. Louis-San
Francisco R.R., 28 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1928); 14A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 6925
(1987).
306. Lehnhausen, 410 U.S. at 365.
307. See, e.g., HORST EHMKE, WIRTSCHAFT UND VERFASSUNG-DIE
ZUR
DES
SUPREME
COURT
VERFASSUNGSRECHTSPRECHUNG
WIRTSCHAFTSREGULIERUNG [ECONOMY AND CONSTITUTION-THE SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE ON REGULATING THE ECONOMY] 405 (1961).

308. See, e.g., Green, supra note 181, at 236. It should be noted that this general
conclusion is probably not conclusive.
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Clause exactly to the same extent as alien natural persons.3" However, one
must keep in mind that at that time the modem two tier-doctrine of the Equal
Protection Clause did not exist yet, so that the Court's wording could not
signify a credo-like application of strict scrutiny." 0 Besides, that decision
concerned the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the
Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, the constitutional evaluation of the
"internally comparative" argumentative figures within the Equal Protection

Clause, that is, the question of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause by
applying differently intensive levels of constitutional review to alien natural
and alien juridical persons itself, is still left open. However, it seems unlikely
that the Supreme Court will start to use strict scrutiny for discriminations
against alien or foreign corporations solely based on this argument.

5. Different Standard of Review for Federal and State
Differentiations
For alien natural persons the Supreme Court practices different standards
of review under the Equal Protection Clause, strict scrutiny for state
differentiations of resident aliens, except in constellations touching upon
political functions or restrictions for illegal aliens or nonimmigrant aliens; and
low level scrutiny for federal differentiations. 3" Should this dual track
structure be transferred to alien juridical persons? So far, the decisions of the
Supreme Court, on the one hand, concern predominantly state differentiations.
On the other hand, at present such a distinction may not be used, because for
foreign or alien corporations the rational basis test is evenly used.
In favor of a uniform standard of scrutiny for foreign corporations the
argument could be made that although the Federation may still have legislative
powers for interstate and foreign commerce, the power of naturalization is not
involved at all. In this respect, the situation is different from that of alien
natural persons. Therefore, the uniform use of the proposed intermediate
scrutiny is strongly recommended. This use would not amount to a violation
"
of the Equal Protection Clause, discussed supra in the reverse direction, 2
by unequal treatment of alien natural and juridical persons as to the standard

309. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 79-80 (1938) ("A
corporation which is allowed to come into a state and there carry on its business may

claim, as an individual may claim, the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against
subsequent application to it of state law.").
310. See also Michael Kuzow, Comment, CorporateAliens andOklahoma 'sAlien

Landownership Restrictions, 16 TULSA L.J. 528, 542 (1981) [hereinafter Comment,
CorporateAliens].

311. See supra part III.A.2-5 and B.1.
312. See immediatelysupra part IV.C.4.
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of review. Obviously, here the constitutional situation, particularly as to the
legislative powers, is not comparable. Furthermore, some authors suggest an
expansion of strict scrutiny for alien natural persons to certain federal
acts," 3 but no one argues conversely for an extension of the rational basis
"
test to state acts.
6. Distinguishing Other-Country Corporations and
Other-State Corporations
It is difficult to decide whether the application of intermediate scrutiny
argued for supra should merely be used for foreign corporations, i.e.,
corporations from other states, or also for alien corporations, i.e., corporations
from other countries. On the one hand, there are few sources in U.S.
jurisprudence or legal literature. On the other hand, there is the problem
initially mentioned," 4 that the notion "foreign corporation" is sometimes
restricted to out-of-state corporations, but sometimes it is used in a broad
sense including alien corporations, whereas the differing use is often not
discernible from the text of the individual provision.
In my opinion, however, it does not seem too daring to expand strict or
at least intermediate scrutiny to alien and foreign corporations in the same
way. First, in the context of natural persons strict scrutiny was used expressly
for alien persons." 5 Second, the interstate and foreign Commerce Clause
in its aspect of a non-discrimination clause is unhesitatingly applied in favor
of alien corporations. 1 6 Third, approaching a subjection factor on the
conflict of constitutional laws level for the Equal Protection Clause insinuated
in Kentucky Finance Corp. v. ParamountAuto Exchange3 17 speaks in favor
of a uniform protection of foreign and alien corporations not only by the
Equal Protection Clause itself, but also by the same intensity of constitutional
review.
7. Domestic Corporations Controlled by Aliens
Considering the types of differentiations used in statutory business law
as to juridical persons (corporations), one has to distinguish a third category
besides alien natural persons and alien juridical persons: domestic juridical

313. See supra part III.B.3.

314. See supra part I.
315. and not "foreign" persons.
316. See, particularly, Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477
U.S. 1 (1986) (Canadian corporation); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434 (1979) (Japanese corporation).
317. 262 U.S. 544 (1923). See supra part IV.A.4.
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persons controlled by alien persons (control theory). It is doubtful whether
these resemble more closely resident aliens, that is alien natural persons,
suggesting use of strict scrutiny, or foreign corporations, suggesting use of
rational basis review.31 s
As far as I can see, in Supreme Court cases the' question of which
standard of review should be used for domestic corporations controlled by
alien persons under the Equal Protection Clause has not yet arisen, nor
decided. The question generally is not discussed in literature. Some authors,
however, assume that probably minimum scrutiny of the rational basis test will
be applicable, if a statute is under equal protection review that uses a
classification on the basis of shareholders' nationality within the class of U.S.
corporations. 1 9 One author additionally argues that strict scrutiny is
triggered by certain individual, personalistic factors which in principle are not

present in the case of corporations as juridical persons.32
Furthermore, there is the argument of abuse and circumvention. If
nonresident aliens enjoy a weaker level of equal protection against discriminatory state laws on the economic sector than domestic corporations, i.e., merely
rational basis review, this could provoke these aliens to do business in the
form of a domestic corporation incorporated in the respective state, but
controlled by them, in order to consequently enjoy additional rights. 2'
8. Reverse Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause also covers the constellation of reverse
discrimination, i.e., discrimination of domestic corporations in favor of foreign
or alien corporations, which leads to a preferred treatment of foreign or alien
corporations. 322 According to traditional doctrine, in these constellations,
rational basis review is applied consistently.3" Such a reason was found,
for instance, in the constellation of a tax imposed upon domestic corporations,
but not upon out-of-state corporations, in the creation of investment incentives
for out-of-state corporations.32 4 If, however, the state constitution contains

318. As to this problem see also Note, Exon-FlorioAmendment, supranote 239,
at 1233-34.
319. See Morrison, supranote 230, at 643-44; Comment, CorporateAliens, supra
note 310, at 542. See also BERGER & MCCONNELL, supra note 136 at 9.
320. Comment, CorporateAliens, supra note 310, at 542.
321. This danger is pointed out by BERGER & MCCONNELL, supra note 133, at
9.
322. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 176-78 (1985).
323. See, e.g., id. at 178.
324. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959). See also
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an explicit non-discrimination clause in favor of alien or foreign corporations,
such state legislation, particularly tax laws, may be unconstitutional.325
Thus, for instance, the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and
the equality provision of the Oklahoma Constitution was held violated by a
statute that imposed higher taxes upon domestic corporations than upon
foreign corporations for the same activity.326
In National Paper & Type Co. v. Bowers,32 however, unconstitutional
unequal treatment of domestic corporations was denied in the context of
taxation, if by the federal tax statute domestic corporations are more heavily
taxed than foreign corporations on their United States source income. It was
held justifiable to leave the taxation to the foreign corporation's state of
incorporation. A further justification for the different treatment was found in
the attempt to entice alien business to the United States. Finally, it was
argued that-as a sort of abstract quid pro quo for the tax-domestic
corporations are favored by the possibility of diplomatic protection exerted on
their behalf by the United States all over the world, whereas alien corporations
are left to their proper home country. The constitutional yardstick of the
decision has been the Equal Protection Clause read into the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.328
According to this author's equal protection concept it is self-evident that
intermediate scrutiny comes into play also for the constellation of reverse
discrimination. For the constellation of reverse discrimination, no higher or
lower qualitative requirements for the justification and the relation between
criterion of differentiation and goal of differentiation arise than for the
constellations of ordinary discrimination.
9. Summary
To sum up, I argue that discrimination against alien and foreign
corporations has to be reviewed under the Equal Protection Clause at least
under the intermediate scrutiny standard, if not strict scrutiny. This implies
that the differentiation used is only constitutional if it serves an important
governmental interest and stands in an essential relation to achievement of this
goal. Strict proportionality has to be maintained between the differentiation

Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U.S. 442 (1925); 14A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 6926
(1987).
325. Weems v. Bruce, 66 F.2d 304, 307 (10th Cir. 1933); also North Tintic
Mining Co. v. Crockett, 284 P. 328, 329-30 (Utah 1929); 14A FLETCHER CYC. CORP.
§ 6926 (1987).
326. Weems v. Bruce, 66 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1933).
327. 266 U.S. 373 (1924).
328. As to this constructive approach see supra part II (initial paragraph).
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(the means) and the goal striven for (the end). This standard of review is
applicable for discriminations against alien corporations as well as for
discriminations against foreign corporations. According to the modem
concept, furthermore, it does not matter whether the alien or foreign
corporation fulfilled the preconditions of qualification or even had to fulfil
them. Finally, intermediate scrutiny has to be applied uniformly for state and
federal discriminations of foreign corporations, in the constellation of ordinary
discrimination as well as in the constellation of reverse discrimination.
V. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
The Privileges and Immunities Clause guarantees intra-state equality.329
In this function as a non-discrimination clause, it resembles the Equal
Protection Clause.330 Under the interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause
fundamental activities are distinguished from nonfundamental activities. For
the former, state differentiations have to be reviewed under a strict scrutiny
test: The state must be able to set forward substantial reasons for its
differentiation as well as a relation of the differentiation to the reasons. For
nonfundamental activities, on the other hand, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause does not apply. Here, review can only be done by using the minimum
rationality standard under the Equal Protection Clause. 33' The Supreme
Court's distinction between fundamental and nonfundamental sometimes seems
vulnerable. For instance, there is supposed to be no fundamental right of
moose hunting in Montana,332 but there is supposed to be one of working
at pipelines in Alaska.333
In a famous holding in Toomer v. Witsell the Supreme Court said that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not provide absolute protection, but

329. As to the overlap of Equal Protection Clause, Privileges and Immunities
Clause, and Interstate Commerce Clause see also D.P. CURRIE, THE SECOND
CENTURY, supra note 51, at 580-85.
330. See also SCOLES & HAY, supra note 11, at 103 and 109. For the

relationship of the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
see B. Currie & Schreter, supranote 165, at 6-7. As to the strong parallels of dormant
Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause, see Sunstein, supra note 220,

at 1710.
331. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate

Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 509-16 (1981).
332. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 387-88.
333. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). For a critique see also TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 535-36.
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allows a differentiation, if there is a substantial reason."' Thus, the Court
committed itself to a substantial relationship test. Predominantly, the Toomer
review standard for fundamental activities under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause is not considered equal in intensity to strict scrutiny review under the

Equal Protection Clause in intensity.33

Rather, the Toomer test is said to

equal the intermediate standard under the Equal Protection Clause.336 Up
to now the Supreme Court has clung to the substantial relationship test,337
which may approach a strict scrutiny test.338 339 In fact, however, it
corresponds more to the intermediate scrutiny test.
Many criticize the weakness of constitutional review under the Toomer
test. Simson, for instance, argues that it probably is closer to the objective of
the Constitution and the original understanding of the framers of the
Constitution to use a strict scrutiny standard within the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and to require not only a substantial, but a compelling
governmental interest for the justification of a discrimination, at least against

residents, as well as to require a relationship of essentiality between means and
end of the governmental classification. By applying this standard of review,
few state classifications, except for the residence requirement for election
334. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948):
Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities
clause is not an absolute. It does bar discrimination against citizens of
other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination
beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States. But it does
not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where there are
perfectly valid independent reasons for it. Thus the inquiry in each case
must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether the
degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them. The inquiry must
also, of course, be conducted with due regard for the principle that the
States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in
prescribing appropriate cures.
335. See Varat, supra note 331, at 513-14. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396, requires
merely "substantial" and not "compelling" reasons ofjustification as well as a "close,"
and not a "necessary" means-end-relationship.
336. See ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 647-53;
TRIBE,

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW,

supra note 32, at 532-45; Gary J. Simson,

DiscriminationAgainst Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 381-82 (1980); Varat, supra note 331, at 514

n.109.
337. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985);
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222
(1984); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S.
656 (1975). See also Laycock, supra note 220, at 260.
338. Laycock, supra note 220, at 268.

339. Eule, supra note 222, at 454-55.
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purposes and for employment at a public office, would survive. 40 However,
in a more general context, some see the main difference between the Equal
Protection Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the fact that the
latter establishes a strict scrutiny test for its area of application, i.e., that a
differentiation on account of state citizenship is treated like a differentiation
by suspect classification and is -upheld merely in few exceptional
instances.3 4'
As already mentioned, on the prior level of conflict of constitutional
laws, following the traditional view of the Supreme Court, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause does not apply to foreign corporations, and generally not
to corporations, since they are not "citizens" in the understanding of this
constitutional provision.342
Thus, this constitutional provision cannot
prohibit the imposition of licenses or discriminating taxes upon foreign
corporations not admitted, either.343 Although some, like Carpinello for
instance, argue for the expansion of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to
corporations,3" the strong current Supreme Court doctrine does not make
a change seem probable.
VI. IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACT CLAUSE
It cannot generally be assumed that the state concludes an implicit
contract with the foreign corporation upon admission, so that every subsequent
imposition of additional burdens, and, particularly, taxes would be unconstitutional.345 In some instances of taxing business transactions, however, a
foreign corporation may be able to challenge a violation of the impairment of
obligations of Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution which forbids an

340. Simson, supra note 330, at 383-401. Compare the parallels in the
differentiation between U.S. citizens and aliens under the Equal Protection Clause.
341. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 226, at 266-67. See also Eule, supra note
228, at 454-55.
342. See citations in note 284, supra. See particularly Western & S.Life Ins. Co.
v. State Bd. of Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 648, 656 (1981); 18A FLETCHER
Cyc. CoRP. -§ 8850 (1987); and recently Laycock, supra note 226, at 268. For
discrimination between local and sister-state corporations in this context recourse must
be found in the Commerce Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.
343. See supra, note 342.
344. George F. Carpinello, State Protective Legislation and Nonresident
Corporations:The PrivilegesandImmunities Clause as a Treaty of Nondiscrimination,
73 IowA L. REv. 351 (1988).
345. Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910); American Smelting &
Refining Co. v. Colorado, 204 U.S. 103 (1907); 18A FLETCHER CYc. CORP. § 8854
(1987).
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impairment of existing contractual obligations by the state."' This constellation, ultimately, encounters again the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
according to which the state may admit a corporation under conditions as long
as those do not violate the U.S. Constitution. 47 Therefore, a right of equal
protection for foreign or alien corporations before admission cannot be
founded on the Impairment of Obligations of Contract Clause.
After admission the Impairment of Obligations of Contract Clause offers
no strong protection for foreign and alien corporations either. Despite its
absolute wording, according the Supreme Court's understanding, this
constitutional provision does not completely disallow impairing statutes.
Preconditions of a three-step-review for a violation of the impairment of
obligations of contract clause are (1) that the state statute presents a substantial
impairment of a contractual obligation, (2) that it does not intend the
promotion of a substantial legitimate public interest, or (3) that there is no
rational and close relation between the means of the impairment of a
contractual obligation and the intended goal of promotion of the established
public interest. 3" Due to these preconditions, a strong structural similarity
to strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause is established. As
opposed to its historic importance, however, this constitutional provision
hardly plays a role in today's economic decisions of the Supreme Court.
VII. COMMERCE CLAUSE

State restrictions of interstate commerce violate the Commerce Clause:
First, when directly discriminating against persons of other states or in interstate commerce; and second, in cases of indirect discrimination that present an
excessive burden on interstate commerce and are not justified by a local
benefit?49

State restrictions of foreign commerce are merely accepted, if,

in addition to the preconditions outlined, no impairment of national unity takes

346. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; New York, L.E. & W.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania,
153 U.S. 628 (1894); see also American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Colorado, 204
U.S. 103 (1907); 18A FLETCHER Cyc. CORP. § 8854 (1987).
347. See supra part IV.A.5.
348. See ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 102. For
an extensive review of the doctrine and historic development of the impairment of
obligations of the Contract Clause, see id. at 86-104; Sunstein, supra note 220, at
1719-23.
349. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-71 (1945). See also Donald
H. Reagan, The Supreme Court andState Protectionism:Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986); and the impermissible burden test
under Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
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place, and, in the special constellation of a tax regulation, the risk of multiple
taxation is not increased. 50 Thus, under the Commerce Clause, too,
discriminations are reviewed under a sort of strict scrutiny. However, the area
of application of the Commerce Clause is confined to state discriminations
against or within foreign commerce and interstate commerce. Excluded are
federal discriminations and state discriminations within intrastate commerce.
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE NEW STANDARD OF REVIEW
Foreign and alien corporations may invoke the non-discrimination
clauses of the Equal Protection Clause, the Dormant Foreign and Interstate
Commerce Clause, and the Impairment of Obligations of Contract Clause, but
not the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which is a type of most-favored
nation clause. According to the traditional concept, particularly that of the
Supreme Court, a mere rational basis test is used under the Equal Protection
Clause which upholds a legislative differentiation between foreign or alien and
domestic corporations as constitutional, if the relation between criterion of
differentiation and goal of differentiation is not arbitrary.
For differentiations between foreign or alien corporations and domestic
corporations, this Article holds at least intermediate scrutiny review applicable,
in some constellations possibly even strict scrutiny review. This follows
consistently both from awarding differentiations on grounds of corporate
nationality suspect classification status, triggering strict scrutiny, and from the
application of the right to interstate migration and the right of access to courts
to alien or foreign corporations under the fundamental rights branch of the
Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, a legislative differentiation conforms
to the Equal Protection Clause only, if it serves important governmental
objectives and is substantially related to achievement of those objectives. 5 '
Also, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which merely protects
fundamental activities, a somewhat stricter standard of review is applied,

insofar, the classification of which as intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny
is disputed. On the conflict of constitutional laws level, this constitutional

350. Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986); South
Central Timber Developmental, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); Container Corp.
of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 61 (1891);
Campeau Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 679 F.Supp. 735 (S.D. Ohio 1988). See
also 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 24 (1976 & 1993 Supp.).
351. Application of intermediate scrutiny entails a shift of the burden of proof for
the discriminative intent: if the plaintiff established prima facie evidence for
discrimination, the state/government has to prove the lack of discriminative intent; see
supra part II.C.
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provision, however, may neither be invoked by foreign nor by alien corporations. The Impairment of Obligations of Contract Clause, on the one hand,
is only applicable to alien and foreign corporations after admission to doing
business in the state. On the other hand, despite its wording it has no absolute
character according to traditional jurisprudence, but allows a justification
under a standard of review similar to equal protection strict scrutiny. Under
the Commerce Clause, too, differentiations are reviewed under a sort of strict
scrutiny, although in substance restricted to state discriminations against and
within foreign commerce and interstate commerce.
Thus, this kind of uniformity of a standard of review similar to strict,
or at least, intermediate scrutiny under other provisions of the U.S. Constitution protecting or, according to their structure, possibly protecting foreign
and alien corporations or, more generally, cross-border commercial activity,
serves as a systematic argument for applying intermediate scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause to legislative references to foreign or alien corporate
nationality.
IX. EXEMPLARY APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
PROPOSED
This article will be rounded up by a practical application of the
suggested equal protection doctrine for foreign and alien corporations. First,
some typical justifications proffered for legislative discriminations shall be
tested under the suggested equal protection standard of review. Second,
exemplary discriminatory regulations for foreign and alien corporations shall
be examined as well. A conclusive review is not at all intended.
A. Review of Typical Justificationsfor DiscriminationsAgainst
Foreign/Alien Corporations
1. National Security
"National security" is often used as a justification of restrictions and
discriminations against alien corporations. For instance, it is of critical
importance in the Exon-Florio Amendment:352 The President may prohibit
or suspend an acquisition, merger or takeover of a person engaged in interstate

352. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 5021, Pub. L. No. 100418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (1988), (codified in 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (West 1991 & 1993
Supp.)). See also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 301, 19 U.S.C.

§ 2411 (West Supp. 1993) ["Super-301"], in Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer,
UnilateralAction to Open ForeignMarkets: The Mechanics of RetaliationExercises,

22 INT'L LAW. 1197 (1988).
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commerce in the United States which could result in foreign control of persons
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States, if the transaction
threatens to impair national security. The surveillance of and investigation
into these transactions is mandated to the Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United States (CFIUS), which will inform the President and submit
proposals. 53
It is feared that CFIUS may construe very broadly the key term of national security not defined by the statute itself, and thus, create a wide area of
potential interference for the U.S. government. The notion of national
security, then, would depend mainly on political considerations and fluctuate
respective to the predominant political climate." 4 Furthermore, the wide
interpretation in connection with the reporting proceedings might entail the
danger that foreign investors consider almost all of their transactions
potentially relevant and consequently submit them to CFIUS, so that the ExonFlorio Amendment might turn out as a de facto screening of foreign direct
investment. 55 The hotly debated proposed rules to the Exon-Florio
Amendmene 6 do not define the notion of national security restrictively.
It is often pointed out that there is a danger that foreign investors might
attempt to control certain sectors of industry in order to interfere with or harm
the U.S. economy and in order to use this control to exert political pressure
on U.S. government.3 7 From a narrower perspective, most often the

353. For details see GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 239 at 97-100; Josd E.
Obligations
Alvarez, PoliticalProtectionismand UnitedStateslnternationallnvestment
in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990) Note, Exon-

Florio Amendment, supra note 239, at 1209-23. For a current survey of the steps
taken under Exon-Florio and its expansion by the 1992 Byrd-Exon Amendment see
Patrick L. Schmidt, The Exon-Florio Statute: How It Affects Foreign Investors and
Lenders in the United States, 27 INT'L LAw. 795 (1993).

354. In this context it is elucidating that the originally proposed version of the
Exon-Florio Amendments not only contained potential impairments of national
security, but also of essential commerce. See H.R.CONF.REP. No. 576, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 514, 925 (1988) reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547.
355. For these concerns see GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supranote 239, at 100; Note,
Exon-FlorioAmendment, supra note 239, at 1211-14, 1221-23 and 1248-54; see also
Gerald T. Nowak, Above All, Do No Harm: The Application of the Exon-Florio
Amendment to Dual-Use Technologies, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1002 (1992).

356. Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign
Persons, 54 Fed.Reg. 29744 (1989) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800) (proposed
July 14, 1989), 56 Fed.Reg. 58774 (1991) (final rule Nov. 21, 1991). See also Note,
Exon-FlorioAmendment, supra note 239, at 1209-19.
357. See Note, The Rising Tide ofReverse Flow: Would a Legislative Breakwater
Violate U.S. Treaty Commitments?, 72 MICH. L .REv. 551, 556 (1974) [hereinafter
Note, Rising Tide].
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argument is based on the danger of sabotage or damage, particularly on the
military sector and the sector of national defense.358 The justification of
national security is furthermore proffered for restrictions in certain key
industries, such as radio communications, coastal and inland navigation,
aviation 9above U.S. territory, as well as, production and use of nuclear
5
energy.
The Supreme Court once regarded this criterion in a different context as
"a broad, vague generality." 60 When applying the rational basis test under
the Equal Protection Clause, however, a rational relation between the
protection of national security and the necessity to protect certain sectors of
commerce and industry against alien control may be established, particularly
when considering the wide discretion of the legislature under this standard of
review.36' On the other hand, when applying intermediate scrutiny as
proposed in this article, two different situations have to be kept apart: the
narrow field of national security and the much larger area of national
interests.36 National interests function, for instance, as justification for the
surveillance of certain types of foreign investments in the U.S. by CFIUS.363
In my opinion, the objective of protection of national interests does not
meet the requirements of the intensified standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause. It is already questionable whether the notion fulfills the
qualitative requirements of a justification, since ultimately it is similar to the
objective of differentiation of "protection against alien control 3" in that it
expresses pure protectionism, in which the goal of differentiation comes close
to unadmissable congruence with the criterion of differentiation itself. In any
case, it at least lacks the required rational relationship between the criterion
of differentiation and the goal of differentiation, that is, it does not fulfill the
requirement of proportionality. The notion of national interests is not cut
precisely enough, it is not closely tailored to the specific subject matter
regulated, and it seems over-inclusive. Furthermore, national interests may
also be impaired by the activities of domestic corporations. The definition of
the notion is simply subject to the arbitrariness of the executive branch.

358. See Note, Rising Tide, supra note 357, at 556.
359. See Elliot L. Richardson, United States Policy Toward Foreign Investment:
We Can't Have It Both Ways, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 281, 307-08 (1989).
360. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J.).
This famous decision is rooted in the freedom of speech context, where a stricter
standard of review than the rational basis test reigns under the Equal Protection Clause.
361. See also Note, Exon-FlorioAmendment, supra note 239, at 1234 (arguing
for constitutionality of the Exon-Florio Amendment).
362. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 353, at 307-08.
363. See Richardson, supra note 359, at 308.
364. See infra part IX.A.4.
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The justification of national security, however, in principle satisfies the
qualitative requirements of heightened scrutiny. When focusing on the close
tailoring to the specific subject matter regulated this is evident, for instance,
in a sensitive sector like the sector of nuclear energy.365 But there are
restrictions to be noted. First, the adequacy, fit, or necessity is doubtful, if in
the concrete matter potential impairments of security also come from domestic
corporations or from those domestic corporations that are exclusively or
predominantly owned by alien natural persons and if these are not subject to
surveillance and control in a similarly effective way. In this case, there is
simply a direct and exclusive discrimination of alien persons under the epitaph
of concerns for national security. Second, doubts can be raised as to the
adequacy of this justification in sectors which have turned out to be an annex
to the military industry during the world wars, such as merchant navigation.366 It seems, however, more persuasive that the current situation of

365. According to a discriminative provision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 (West 1973 & 1993 Supp.), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) may not issue a license for production facilities using nuclear materials to "an
alien or any corporation or other entity if the Commission knows or has reason to
believe it is owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a
foreign government." 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (West 1973 & 1993 Supp.) (footnote
omitted); NRC, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 C.F.R.
§ 50.38 (1990). The provision is motivated by fears of a potential danger to national
defense and national security as well as for public health and safety. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2133(d) last sentence, 2134(d) (West 1973 & 1993 Supp.) ("In any event, no
license may be issued ... if ... the issuance of a license to such person would be

inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the
public."). See also Siegel v. Atomic Energy Commission, 400 F.2d 778, 781, 784
(D.C. Cir. 1968); NRC, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,
10 C.F.R. § 50.40(c) (1990).

See also Federal Restrictions on Foreign Direct

Investment in EnergyResources, in MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED

STATES 429, at 437-40 (J. Eugene Marans & Jonathan J. Rusch eds., 1984 & 1991
Supp.); ROTH, supra note 292, at 170-72; Note, Exon-Florio,supra note 239, at 119192.
366. According to Merchant Marine Act of 1920 § 27, merchant vessels being
operated between two points in the United States, directly or via a foreign port, must
be owned by persons who are either U.S. citizens or U.S. corporations. Pub. L. No.
66-261, § 27, 41 Stat. 988, 999 (1921) (codified as amended at46 U.S.C. § 883 (West
Supp. 1993)). See also Paul G. Kirchner, FederalRestrictionson ForeignInvestment
in the UnitedStatesMaritimeIndustries,in MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INTHE
UNITED STATES 474, 478-82 (Eugene Marans et al. eds., 1984 & 1991 Supp.);
Seitzinger, supra note 239, at 12-15; see also ROTH, supra note 292, at 159-65; Vagts,
supra note 6, at 1497-1508. U.S. corporations controlled by alien persons are also
excluded from this activity. 46 U.S.C. § 883-1 (West 1975 & 1993 Supp.). As to U.S.
corporations controlled by alien persons see also the requirements of the Shipping Act
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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international security is so far from the state of war that maintaining the
restrictions appears excessive and premature. Third, in order to pay regard to
intermediate scrutiny the notion of security interests must be construed
narrowly.367 Therefore, it seems ideal when Art. XXI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]368 permits a member state's
deviation from the principles of national treatment and most-favored nation
treatment only, if this is necessary for the protection of essential national
security interests. If one takes into account that GATT obligations are
considered more on the side of weak obligations, this tightened standard must
a fortiori be given effect under the heightened scrutiny standard under the U.S.
Equal Protection Clause.
2. Protection of Domestic Employees Against Unemployment
Sometimes it is suggested, as an objective of legislative restrictions
against alien corporations, that U.S. employees must be protected against the
possibility that the alien corporation liquidates its U.S. branches or affiliates,
unscrupulously abandoning the U.S. citizens employed at these facilities to the
fate of unemployment. 69

of 1916 § 2, 39 Stat. 728, 729 (1917), § 46 U.S.C. § 802 (West 1975 & 1993 Supp.).
Seventy five per cent of the shares must be owned by U.S. persons and the president
or chief executive officer as well as chairman of board of directors must be U.S.
citizens. Id.

These regulations are motivated by concerns of "national security." They were
introduced during or after World War I, when people had realized that during the time
of war or a national emergency the merchant marine signifies an essential support of
the navy, therefore alien control of the merchant fleet would present a threat to
national security. See Kirchner supra at 475-76; Vagts, supra note 6, at 1504-07.

367. In an earlier piece I suggested a narrow understanding of this notion in the
context of the nondiscrimination clauses of the EC Treaty and the applicable strict
standard of review. See Hartwin Bungert, Auswirkungen des EG-BeitrittsSpaniensauf
GrundstiickserwerbsbeschrdnkungenfirAuslander
im spanischenRecht [Consequences
ofSpain's Accession to the EC on Land OwnershipRestrictionsfor Aliens in Spanish
Law], 1990 REcHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT ["LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCE," RIW] 461, 466-67 (1990).
368. Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (parts 5 & 6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
(1950). See also Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs
and Trade in UnitedStates Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479 (1990); John H.
Jackson, The GeneralAgreementon Tariffs and Trade in UnitedStates DomesticLaw,
66 MICH. L. REv. 249 (1968); Note, United States Participation in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 505, 543-46 (1961).
369. See Note, Rising Tide, supra note 357, at 554-55, pointing at a respective
statement of Representative Gaydos, 119 CONG. REC. H6891 (1973).
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This goal of differentiation cannot withstand heightened equal protection
scrutiny. The protection of domestic employees against unemployment may
well be an important governmental objective, although already the restriction
to "domestic" is precarious. In any case, however, its application does not
comply with the proportionality principle, i.e., it is not narrowly tailored. The
differentiation between U.S. and alien corporations in this respect could
merely be upheld, if the underlying unspoken presupposition were correct, that

alien corporations would or had to close their plants before U.S. corporations
would do so. This presumption does not seem persuasive. On the one hand,
larger investments in the United States will most certainly be carried out,
particularly by multinational enterprises, which spend sufficient resources and
planning to prevent short-time bankruptcies.37 On the other hand, the basic
problem may be overcome, if for alien corporations the provisions of social
carry-over arrangements for employees are also put into force. Besides,
smaller alien corporations will employ, to a large extent, employees of their
country of origin, anyway.
3. Lack of Consent to U.S. Economic Policy
Some suggest that the interests of the alien corporation or of their
country of origin may conflict with the goals of U.S. economic policy. Thus,
for instance, it might turn out impossible for the U.S. government to persuade
the management of an alien corporation to join in voluntary self-restrictions
for price increases as the domestic enterprises of the sector would succumb to
in the context of a sort of concerted action in an economic emergency
situation. Furthermore, it is argued that an alien enterprise could refuse to
participate in an U.S. embargo against a specific country with its U.S. business
(production facilities, subsidiaries, branches) a somewhat unlikely
instance.37' However, due to the wide extraterritorial application of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 and U.S. export controls generally, the
direct and indirect enforcement powers of the U.S. government should reach
far enough to enforce recognition of the U.S. embargo in the latter occurrence.
Also, this argument can surely not generally justify all restrictions for alien
corporations. For as a starting-point, it has to be kept in mind, on the one
hand, that the U.S. Constitution is neutral as to economic policy. It does not
prescribe a specific form of economic system and it also does not prohibit a
specific one.37
Consequently, by means of the Constitution, a specific

370. For a similar argument see Note, Rising Tide, supra note 357, at 555 n.19.
371. See the arguments made in Note, Rising Tide, supra note 357, at 555-56.
372. See RICHARD M. BUXBAUM, Economic Law in the UnitedStates ofAmerica,
in BEGRIFF UND PRINZIPIEN DES WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS-SIEBZEHN LANDESBERICHTE
ZU EINEM INTERNATIONALEN SYMPOsIUM-[DEFINITION AND PRINCIPLES OF
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economic system cannot be enforced. On the other hand, setting aside such
situations of voluntary self-restriction, which are probably of little actual
significance, there should be different ways to specifically enforce these
economic policies without applying any form of discrimination, for instance,
by respective formulations of government contracts or by trade-union
agreements. Consequently, the argument of a lack of consensus on U.S.
economic politics is no proper justification.
4. General Protection Against Alien Control
Often a discrimination against alien corporations is allegedly founded
upon a general protection against alien control. For instance, several state
restrictions of land ownership by foreign or alien corporations are motivated
by these considerations,373 particularly the so-called family farm legislation
in the states of the Upper Midwest Great Plains, simply strive to keep out
foreigners.374
375 the Supreme Court refused to
Already in Graham v. Richardson,
acknowledge the special public interest of preferable treatment of state citizens
in allocating rare resources proffered for state discriminations against alien
natural persons. The special public interest doctrine was held inapplicable due
to the demise of the right-privilege distinction because of the close entanglement of both categories in modem legislation.376 Also, fiscal considerations
do not count as a compelling state interest.377 However, this decision was
made applying strict scrutiny, so that a compelling state interest was necessary.
Recently, the Supreme Court stated even under the rational basis test that
an openly declared state policy to discriminate by the incriminated regulations
against alien persons, particularly corporations, can never alone be a

ECONOMIC

LAW-SEVENTEEN

NATIONAL

REPORTS

FOR

AN

INTERNATIONAL

SYMPOSION] 11, at 12 (1971). Compare also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45

(1905).
373. See infra part IX.B.1; See generally Joshua Weisman, Restrictions on the
Acquisition of Land by Aliens, 28 AM. J. COMp. L. 39 (1980), for techniques of alien
land ownership restrictions.
374. See Morrison, supra note 230, at 636-37; e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.1(4)
in connection with § 567.2 and § 567.3(1) (1993).
375. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
376. Graham,403 U.S. at 374. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410, 420-21 (1948), refused to acknowledge the special public interest doctrine in
connection with discriminations against aliens. For the right-privilege distinction see
supra part III.A.2.
377. Graham,403 U.S. at 374-75. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
633 (1969).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

79

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 2

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

reasonable justification for differentiated treatment." Under the proposed
intermediate scrutiny standard these situations lack an admissible goal of
differentiation. It is simply not enough to offer the criterion of differentiation
itself as the goal of differentiation. A differentiation simply and plainly
because of alien nationality is unconstitutional. In the connotation of
corporate nationality the general protection of domestic business actors against
alien control is already comprised. This is the prototype of a suspect
classification," 9 which Sunstein correctly calls a "naked preference.""38
5. Protection of the Local Economy
Sometimes, protection of domestic economy as the counterpart of
protection against alien control is put forward as justification for restrictions
on alien corporate persons. In part, it is also suggested that only these
" ' The argument of
restrictions can meet the interests of local consumers.38
protecting the local economy is advanced with added weight in the context of
soil, mineral and natural resources usage. 82
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, a Supreme Court majority
held, however, that the clamor for improvement of the local economy at the

378. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 876-79 (1985); Williams
v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 23-24 (1985). See also ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, supra note 32, at 337-39; for an extensive elaboration on this principle in the
various constitutional provisions protecting against discriminations see Sunstein, supra

note 220, at 1689.
379. This is probably also alluded to by Tussman & tenBroeck, supra note 32,
at 375. See also Note, Taxing, supra note 250, at 897-98, which requests a fair and
substantial relation between the regulation and the intended legislative goal in cases of
protection against alien control.
380. Sunstein, supra note 220, at 1689.
381. See, e.g., the dissent in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869,
891-98 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
382. Cf the interesting comparison of the respective constitutional law ofthe U.S.
and the EC [European Community] in Peter von Wilmowsky, Zugang zu den Bodenund sonstigen Naturschdtzen anderer Mitgliedstaaten: EWG- Vertrag und USVerfassung im Vergleich [Access to Mineral and Other Natural Resources of Other
Member States: Comparing the EEC Treaty and the US Constitution], 54 RABELSZEITSCHRIFr [RABELSZ] 692 (1990). This justification is also sometimes used in the

German law of restrictions and control of investment. Particularly the German Foreign
Trade Law [AuBenwirtschaftsgesetz, AWG] authorizes the enactment of executive
directives for the protection of the economic territory against alien competition,
although no such directives are in effect currently; see ECKART PUTZIER, DIE
ERMACHTIGUNGEN DES AUBENWIRTSCHAFTSGESETZES

GERMAN FOREIGN TRADE LAW] 115-17 (1987).
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expense of foreign corporations alone does not serve as a legitimate state
interest under the rational basis test.383 On the contrary, the Supreme Court
pointed out that a differentiation motivated by this presents the very parochial
discrimination the Equal Protection Clause attempts to prevent.384 In this
area, the Equal Protection Clause is granted more bite than usual despite
application of the weak rational basis test, because precisely the goal of
discriminative state legislation predominantly used is prohibited.385
However, it is doubtful, whether the Supreme Court will transfer this line of
argument to alien corporations or whether this will be confined to foreign
corporations, because there might be a particularly close relationship between
the sister states.
This Article, however, proposes a uniform standard of review for
discrimination against both foreign and alien corporations, 386 particularly
v.
because of the development insinuated in Kentucky Finance Corp. 388
387 Similarly Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias
ParamountAuto Exchange.
in the context of discriminations under the Commerce Clause and its interplay
with the Twenty-first Amendment, which lays out state power for the law of
alcoholic beverages, coined the phrase: "State laws that constitute mere
economic protectionism are . . . not entitled to the same deference as laws
3 89
enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor.
The decision declared state regulations unconstitutional that solely presented
economic protectionism. Congress may permit the individual state regulation
of interstate commerce, otherwise precluded by the Commerce Clause.390

383. Metropolitan Life, 470 U.S. at 876-79. See also 2 ROTUNDA ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 337-38; Laycock, supranote 226, at 269.
384. MetropolitanLife, 470 U.S. at 878; Laycock, supra note 226, at 269. Justice

Powell in a dissent in Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 244-45 (1981) (Powell, J.,
dissenting), had requested a fair and substantial relation between the differentiation and
the pursued legislative goal as an intensification of the traditional view; see also Note,
Taxing, supra note 250, at 897-98.
385. See also Laycock, supra note 226, at 269.
386. See suprapart IV.C.6.
387. 262 U.S. 544 (1923). See supra part IV.A.4.
388. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
389. Id. at 276. See also William Cohen, Federalismin Equality Clothing: A
Comment on MetropolitanLife Insurance Company v. Ward, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15

(1986).
390. See, e.g., Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451
U.S. 648, 652-53 (1981). In this case Congress was held to have explicitly set aside
all restrictions of the Commerce Clause for the states in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Id.See also Laycock, supra note 226, at 269.
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Congress, however, may not permit a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
by the individual state? 9

According to this author's intermediate equal protection scrutiny, the
justification of protection of domestic economy as well as its counterpart of
protection against alien foreign control3" has to be considered a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, since it is the prototype of a naked preference
and equates the goal of differentiation with the connotation of the criterion of
differentiation itself.
Furthermore, the protective argument is also
unproportional in this generality.
6. Protection of Domestic Legal Relations
At first sight the justification of the protection of domestic legal relations
or domestic (contracting or third) parties seems to be closely related. Some
restrictive regulations of alien corporations do not completely exclude them
from a specific activity, but instead lay down additional obligations compared
with domestic corporations that are designed for the protection of domestic
legal transactions. These protective regulations are aimed to serve the interests
of contracting or third parties. Examples are provisions for certain form
requirements of firm letterheads393 or stricter registration requirements for
domestic branches of alien corporations. 94
These regulations do not simply serve to protect against alien control
motivated by protectionist ideas. Under a strict standard of equal protection
review they will be upheld, because they protect an important state interest,
that is third parties in the economic life, particularly consumers, which due to
their weak position require special protection by the state. On the second
level the regulations have also to fulfill the qualitative requirements of the

391. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651-52 (1966); Laycock, supra
note 226, at 269.
392. See supra part IX.A.4.
393. E.g., § 15(b) Para. 2 Gewerbeordnung [Industrial Code, GewO] requires
alien corporations to use a firm letterhead containing the address of their office abroad
and naming the persons acting with agency for the corporation when sending letters
from an in-state branch. The statute aims at protection of in-state creditors and is
particularly supposed to make clear that an alien corporation is dealt with which is
organized under another law.
394. According to German Commercial Code §§ 13 et seq. [Handelsgesetzbuch,
HGB] all branches of a corporation have to be registered with the commercial register.
Due to German Commercial Code § 13d, domestic branches of alien corporations are
insofar treated as domestic main offices. Consequently, these branches encounter a
wider range of facts to be reported and a wider standard of review of the registrating
court. See also Dankwart Ensslin, Taxation of Business Investment in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 36 CAN. TAX J. 176, 179 (1988).
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relation of the criterion of differentiation to the goal of differentiation, i.e., to
stand in a proper relation to each other and to not violate the principle of
proportionality, which in particular requires a narrow range of application.
7. Protection of Certain Key Industries
Sometimes without precise arguments it is claimed that in specific
industrial sectors alien persons' activities generally present potential danger for
domestic interests, so that an unequal treatment of alien persons would be
As an example the manufacture of military weapons is
justified.
suggested. 9s In this area, not only are restrictions on alien corporations
held permitted, but restrictions of activities of domestic corporations with alien
participation are also seen allowed. 96
The fact alone that in specific industries additional or heightened

restrictions for alien corporations exist, does not already violate constitutional
equal protection. Under intensified equal protection scrutiny it is precisely
acknowledged that justifications and the qualitative substantial requirements
for justifications are to be closely tailored to the specific subject-matter.
Therefore, a particularly accident-prone industrial sector or one needing
intense protection of third parties may in principle require specific permits,
participatory obligations or control powers. But these have to be closely
tailored to the specific case asking whether the individual sector with its
specific risks requires such a differentiating restriction. The mechanical
argument that precisely this industry or this key sector needs a protection
against alien control or, respectively, a special protection of domestic
corporations at the expense of foreign and alien ones will usually present an
unconstitutional goal of differentiation.
a. Example: Banking Industry
In Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors,397 for example, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the justification of protecting domestic banks
and financial institutions against the acquisition of all shares or a controlling
interest by foreign corporations against the preferred treatment of corporations

395. See, e.g., WALTER WIELAND SCHMIDT, GRUNDRECHTE UND NATIONALITAT
JURISTISCHER PERSONEN-EINE UNTERSUCHUNG OBER DEN GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ
INLANDISCHER UND AUSLANDISCHER JURISTISCHER PERSONEN IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
OF JURIDICAL
RIGHTS AND NATIONALITY
[FUNDAMENTAL
DEUTSCHLAND
PERSONS-AN EXAMINATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION FOR DOMESTIC
AND ALIEN JURIDICAL PERSONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] 168 (1966).
396. See, e.g., SCHMIDT, supra note 395, at 168.
397. 472 U.S. 159 (1985).
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of certain states, respectively under rational basis equal protection review. In
this case the state regulation was seen to pursue goals other than simply
discrimination against foreign competition, i.e., the interest of the state in
controlling the local banking industry.398
This, however, raises the question of what makes the banking industry
special as compared to other industries or economic sectors and consequently
should permit a sort of protectionistic thinking. As opposed to the contrary
decisions mentioned supra Part I.X.A.5, which denied the notion of general
protection of domestic commerce its status as justification due to its "naked
preference" character already under rational basis review, this decision might
perhaps be explained by the Supreme Court's concept recognizing certain
sensitive economic sectors, such as the banking sector, in which restrictions
may be justified by a protective state interest under alleviated conditions.
However, such a concept of creating sectors should be opposed under the
intermediate scrutiny standard insofar, as mere considerations of protecting
commerce and no other rationales, such as national security or specific
technical dangers, play a role. Why should a per se discrimination against
foreign and alien competition be regarded as a justification in certain sectors
and not in others?
Nevertheless, behind the epitaph of protecting domestic banking business
yet another, possibly recognizable goal could linger. The decision mentions
that by the special lay-out of the challenged bank regulation the close
relationship between the community of those who need a loan and those who
want to give a loan was supposed to be strengthened. 99 Indeed,
Massachusetts and Connecticut regulations awarded preferential treatment to
banks of New England neighbor states. This reasoning might include the
justification of protecting domestic legal transactions acknowledged,4"'
which assumes special weight in the area of banking law. This is shown
already by the fact that in every country the regulation of supervision of banks

plays an important role.'

However, inthis case the concrete design of the

regulation must be actually necessary and appropriate, particularly not
excessively restrictive disproportionate, for the protection of domestic business
transactions.

398. Id.at 177-78. See also ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supranote
32, at 339.
399. Northeast Bancorp, 472 U.S. at 178.

400. Supra part IX.A.6.
401. See, e.g., MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER, REGULATION OF FOREIGN
BANKS-UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL (1991 & 1993 Cum. Supp.).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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b. Example: Radio Communications

In 1981 the unequal treatment of excluding aliens from responsible
activity in the radio communications sector"02 was challenged. 3 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit used the rational basis test under the
Equal Protection Clause and held the restriction for alien corporations justified
by the federal power to regulate immigration and naturalization law."' The

problem whether the federal government could regulate and control the public
media by a franchising system for radio frequencies to protect national
interests was not discussed. It is clear, however, that the decision merely

looks to alien natural persons, because only there the comprehensive federal
power to regulate immigration and naturalization exists." 5 Therefore, for
a similar challenge by an alien juridical person a different argument would
have to be relied on, but in the current state of doctrine the outcome should
predictably be the same, due to the reliance on the weak rational basis test.
According to the intensified standard of review pursued in this article,
neither a per se discrimination on grounds of alien nationality nor a

402. The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1993), grants the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) discretion to
decide upon the exclusion of alien participation in the field of radio communications.
§ 310(b) ofthe Communications Acts prohibits granting radio licenses for broadcasting
of radio programs, for common carriers, for aeronautical en route radio and for aeronautical fixed radio to alien corporations, id. § 310(b)(2), and enables, furthermore, the
exclusion of alien control of U.S. corporations in granting respective licenses, if the
FCC considers a refusal or revocation of the license to serve the public interest, id §
310(b)(4).
Similarly, alien persons may not own more than 20 per cent of the shares of

Communications Satellite Corporation, 47 U.S.C. § 734(d) (West 1991 & 1993 Supp.).
For a comprehensive overview of the restrictions on the sector of media and
communications see David Morris Phillips & John C. Jost, Foreign Investment in
UnitedStates Communications,in MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNrrED
STATES 396 (Eugene Marans ed., 1984 & 1991 Supp.); Seitzinger, supranote 239, at

20.
403. 47 U.S.C. § 303(1) in its then valid version was on the stand. Today's
version of 47 U.S.C. § 303(1) (West 1991 & 1993 Supp.) was defused in this respect.
However, the current provision of 47 U.S.C. §310(b) (West 1991 & 1993 Supp.)
reflects parallels to the old version of § 303().
404. Campos v. FCC, 650 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1981).
405. The apparent deduction of substantive justification from a powers clause is

somewhat irritating. Oddly enough, the precise reasonable objective proffered for the
differentiation between national and alien natural persons is the national interest of the
Federation to establish an incentive for aliens to apply for naturalization (or,

respectively, putting the President into a bargaining position for the conclusion of
international treaties); Campos, 650 F.2d at 894.
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discrimination in order to protect national interests4" is admissible. One
could merely consider whether the protection of national security could justify
a different treatment. The restrictions in the sector of radio communications
according to their legislative history were designed to prevent alien activities
against the U.S. in war times.407 But in this context, it seems questionable
whether the current situation of international security, particularly from the
perspective of the U.S. in their relations with most countries, is not so far
from a situation of war that maintaining the restriction would seem premature
and over-reaching. 8 When observing proportionality, a general exclusion
is probably not admissible, but only milder means such as the reservation of
certain frequencies, control powers of the government, or short revocation
time-limits towards alien persons. Solely to this extent the sector of radio
communications may be viewed as a special or an especially sensitive sector.

c. Example: InsuranceIndustry
In no other business branch are foreign corporations subjected to more
0 9 In
detailed and restrictive regulations than foreign insurance companies.
principle, this is once again an area in which the protection of domestic legal
transactions permit special control regulation and restrictions.
The Supreme Court first held that insurance business does not establish
commerce in the understanding of the Commerce Clause." ° In United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n4 " in 1944, the earlier holding
was overruled and insurance was declared to be "commerce" in the sense of
the Commerce Clause. In direct reaction Congress passed the McCarranFerguson Act, according to which the silence of Congress is not construed to
prevent state regulation of insurance industry.4" 2 This new state power to
regulate and tax the insurance industry was confirmed by the Supreme

406. See supra part IX.A.1.
407. Data Transmission Co., 52 F.C.C.2d 439 (1975). The same view is taken
in Noe v. FCC, 260 F.2d 739, 741-42 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See also ROTH, supra note
292, at 180-81, using the legislative materials to explain that the legislation was
inspired by considerations of national security.
408. See supra part IX.A.1.
409. See also BEALE, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, supranote 167, at 181.
410. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869) (Field, J.) ("Issuing
a policy of insurance is not a transaction in commerce."). See also Note,
CongressionalConsent to DiscriminatoryState Legislation, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 927,
927-29 (1945) [hereinafter Note, CongressionalConsent].
411. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
412. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (West 1976 & 1993 Supp.).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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Court." 3 At the same time, the Court pointed out that the McCarran-Ferguson Act merely takes away competence restrictions of the Commerce Clause,
but leaves untouched restrictions established by other constitutional
prohibitions of discrimination, particularly by the Equal Protection Clause.414
Consequently, the insurance industry, from an equal protection perspective, is
not considered a special key sector allowing a weaker equal protection
standard, not even under the influence of the Commerce Clause.
8. "Bounty" Theory
To justify discriminatory restrictions sometimes the so-called bountytheory is advanced. According to this theory, the government is considered
allowed to freely differentiate when providing public services and benefits.4" 5 A closer look reveals that the bounty theory is used in two different
constellations: First, in the context of providing government services from
government financial resources such as subsidies; and second, for the more
extensive notion of benefits, particularly those granting state permits,
concessions, or licenses. In this second category, however, the necessity of
granting a benefit, in its wider understanding, is created in the first place by
the logically prior establishment of a prohibition with the reservation on
granting of permission. Consequently, a restriction may very often be
rephrased as the denial of granting benefits. Particularly, when departing from
the perspective that before qualification in the state of its doing business a
foreign corporation is considered to be without rights,4" 6 every unconditioned or conditional granting of rights can be simply called the partial
granting of a "bounty." For this reason, a distinction of bounty-cases and
tregular"
restriction-cases seems problematic.

413. In Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648,
652-55 (1981) the Court held that the wording clarifies the legislator's intent to
renounce the power lent by the commerce clause in regard to insurance industry. See
comprehensivelyLee R. Russ, Annotation, Construction,Application, and Operation
of State "Retaliatory"Statutes Imposing Special Taxes or Fees on Foreign Insurers
Doing Business Within the State, 30 A.L.R. 4th 873 (1984); Note, Congressional
Consent, supra note 410, at 930-41.
414. Western & S. Life Ins., 451 U.S. at 656-57.

415. As to the bounty theory see Vagts, supra note 6, at 1521-22.
416. See supra parts IV.A.5, IV.C.3.a-b.
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9. Requirement of Reciprocity
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,417 the Supreme Court indirectly
acknowledged the argument of reciprocity, when it considered the
governmental goal to exclude aliens from certain rights in order to retain the
U.S. government's power to bargain for equal conditions for U.S. citizens
abroad in international treaties with foreign nations, thereby using the pressure
of the reciprocity requirement, as a principally valid justification under the
Equal Protection Clause. 8 In the special context of foreign corporations
in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander,419 on the contrary, under the rational
basis test a state regulation was held to violate the Equal Protection Clause
that sought to establish a system of reciprocity for state tax legislation
patterns. 4 ° However, in this case the criterion of reciprocity itself was
probably not refused, but merely its function or feasibility in the differentiation used was doubted. This is particularly elucidated by the fact that no other
state responded to the taxation system of Ohio challenged in this case.421 '
A restriction based on reciprocity probably will rank very low on a
graph of intensity of discriminatory restrictions for alien corporations. For in
this constellation at least the alien government has the potential of positively
influencing the restriction, even if the individual alien person concerned
cannot. Thus, this presents a less intensive restriction than an unconditional
exclusion of alien persons from a certain benefit or potential activity and,
particularly, less restrictive than an absolute discriminative burden. Still, the
requirement of reciprocity cannot be acknowledged as a justification for
unequal treatment generally. According to some, the reciprocity requirement
is founded upon an understanding of state sovereignty which is no longer
accurate and up-to-date due to the actual transnational interpenetration.
Today, the minimum standard for aliens in customary international law already
grants legal positions by itself which formerly were granted by reciprocity
agreements. 4z It is certainly true that the minimum standard for aliens
guaranteed in customary international law4 3 may no longer be reformulated

417. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
418. Id at 102-04, 116.
419. 337 U.S. 562 (1949).
420. Id. at 572-74.
421. Id. at 574.
422. See, e.g., Hans-Uwe Erichsen, H6chstrichterliche Rechtsprechung zum
Verwaltungsrecht I, 62 VERWALTUNGSARCHIV [VerwArch] 181, 188 (1971).
423. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 711 reporters'
note 1 (1986); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 598-600

(4th ed. 1990); see comprehensively Richard B. Lillich, Duties ofStates Regardingthe
Civil Rights of Aliens, 161 REC. DES. COURS. 329 (1978-III).
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and equipped with certain conditions in the national legislation. However,
under the international law perspective, rights and guarantees beyond this

standard are still within the disposition of the national state.
Establishing a reciprocity restriction probably has to be classified not as
a denial of rights with a potential exemption, but as a conditional granting of
rights. It is motivated by accomplishing optimal protection for the state's own
national persons abroad. Even if on first glance a certain affinity to
protectionism seems to shine through, which has been denied justification
status in this Article,424 the reciprocity criterion probably has to be recognized as an important governmental goal under an intensified standard of equal
protection review. On the one hand, the protection of national persons in
another country is at stake, and, on the other hand, ultimately the realization
of a liberal world economy, either directly by rights guaranteed to alien
persons in national law unrestrictedly or on a reciprocity basis, or indirectly
in concluding respective bi- or multinational international treaties. However,
in these instances, the proportionality standard must be closely observed. For
instance, attempting to force another country to establish a regulatory system
corresponding to one's own regulatory structure and connecting factors in a
certain area of law, e.g., corporate income tax law, by use of the reciprocity
scheme is not permitted.42 Furthermore, the introduction of a reciprocity
reservation is not permitted, if the pawn used does not stand in fit, necessary
and appropriate, i.e., proportional relation to the specific right of the alien
state striven for.426 It is, for instance, disproportionate to exclude alien
persons from all or a large part of economically relevant rights, only in order
to achieve for one's own nationals rights, so specific as mining rights on the
continental shelf of the respective country. Furthermore, certainly a strict
connexity between the right retained by the reciprocity reservation and the
right striven for in the other country must exist.
This evidences that restrictions for alien corporations which are
conditioned upon reciprocity, narrowly tailored, and consequently satisfy the
proportionality standard, cannot be overcome even by the intensified equal
protection standard of review developed in this Article, but depend on nondiscrimination clauses in international or supranational treaties.427

424. See supra parts IX.A.5, IX.A.4.

425. See the constellation in Wheeling Steel, 337 U.S. at 562.
426. See, e.g., the constellation of the decision of the German Federal
Constitutional Court [Bundesverfassungsgericht] of March 20, 1979, 51
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [Official Collection

of the German Federal Constitutional Court's Decisions; BVerfGE] 1.
427. A comprehensive treatment of these clauses applicable for German and U.S.
corporations is provided in HARTWIN BUNGERT, ALIEN CORPORATIONs, supranote 23,
chapters 13 and 14.
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10. Formal Disclosure, Report and Permit Requirements
Recently, duties of disclosure and reporting have increased considerably.
One has only to mention, for instance, the obligations under the Foreign Bank
Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 (FBSEA) for foreign banks,428 the
obligations in the context of intercompany transfer pricing,429 or regulations
in filling out I.R.C. §§ 6038A and 6038C.430 At first, one might be inclined

428. Pub. Law No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2286-2305 (1991) [Title II, Subtitle A of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991], considerably
intensifying the supervisory powers of the Federal Reserve Board and the subsequent
obligations of foreign banks. See GRUSON & REISNER, supranote 401; Daniel B. Gail
et al., The Foreign Bank Supervision Act of 1991: Expanding the Umbrella of
"SupervisoryReregulation",26 INT'L LAW. 993 (1992); Michael Gruson, Foreign
Banks Are No Longer Welcome in the UnitedStates, 10 BANKING POL'Y REP. 5 (Dec.
1991 No. 23); Robert E. Hand, How ForeignBanks in the UnitedStates Are Dealing
with the ChangingLegal and SupervisoryEnvironment, 26 INT'L LAW. 1015 (1992);
Michael L. Whitener, New FederalReserve Board Regulations Regarding Foreign
Banks in the United States, 26 INT'L LAW. 1007 (1992).
429. Intercompany Transfer Pricing and Cost Sharing Regulations Under Section
482, 57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (January 30, 1992). See Richard G. Minor, The New US
Transfer Pricing Developments, 3 EUROPAISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS- UND
STEUERRECHT [EUROPEAN BUSINESS AND TAX LAW, EWS] 14 (1992);
Richard G. Minor, Der Richtlinienentwurf der US-Finanzverwaltung zu
Verrechnungspreisen[TheProposedIRS RegulationsforTransferPricing],3 EWS 174
(1992).
Up to now the IRS accepted transactions between related enterprises conveying
intangible property, if they corresponded to the agreements that independent enterprises
would have formed under the same circumstances. Now considerable modifications
are made. For intangible property in particular three new pricing methods are
introduced: matching transactions method, comparable adjustable transaction method,
and comparable profit method. Characteristic is the introduction of a so-called
comparable profit interval. Accordingly, a transfer price will be corrected if it lies
outside the profit interval, which is established by attributing the enterprise to the
respective branch. Furthermore, the acknowledgement of the arm's length principle
now requires maintaining a business form that independent third parties would have
chosen under the same circumstances, thereby impairing the autonomy of the

entrepreneur's decision.
430. 26 U.S.C. § 6038A and § 6038C (West 1989 & 1993 Supp.). See also
Minor, supranote 429, at 15-23 (1992); Angelo A. Paparelli et al., The QuasarCase:
Hidden Problems of Employment, Immigration, and Tax Law, 26 INT'L LAW. 1037,
1072-73 (1992). These regulations established reporting duties for U.S. corporations
controlled by alien shareholders (a so-called reporting corporation is assumed, if25 per
cent or more shares are in the hands of alien shareholders) and for alien corporations
with U.S. subsidiaries. From now on these are subject to comprehensive and detailed
obligations of reporting, maintaining and furnishing records to the IRS the nonhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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to dismiss merely formal requirements as negligible forms of unequal
treatment which do not run up to the degree of intensity of a discrimination.
However, the increased administrative work and paper load going hand-inhand with the obligations may lead to considerable additional costs. Also, the
disclosure duties may entail a softening-up of the protection of business
secrets. Due to these corollaries, formal requirements merely imposed on
alien corporations may also present potential forbidden discriminations.
Therefore, in each individual case, one has to examine whether according to
the intensified qualifications of a justification under the intermediate standard
of equal protection review the formal requirements presenting a different
treatment of domestic and alien corporations attempt to achieve important
governmental goals closely tailored to the specific subject-matter in principle,
and whether in the individual case the extent and expenditure evoked by the
formal control requirements are fit, necessary and appropriate for the
achievement of the goal.
On the other hand, establishing a differentiating general permit
requirement, i.e., only applying to alien corporations not motivated by specific
dangers closely tailored to the individual subject-matter or important state
interests, particularly one where granting the permit stands in the unspecified
discretion of an administrative agency, seems to be unconstitutional, since it
lacks both a recognizable justification and, due to its over-inclusiveness, a
proportionate relation between means and end.

B. Review of Exemplary Statutory Provisions RestrictingAlien or
Foreign Corporations
After having examined some prototype justifications commonly thought
to support statutory unequal treatment of alien or foreign corporations, finally,
some exemplary statutory discriminatory provisions shall be considered both
under the traditional standard of review and the new standard developed in
this Article.

1. Restrictions on Land Transfer
In a 1923 decision, the Supreme Court decided that a state statute

excluding certain resident aliens from ownership of agricultural land was
constitutional absent international treaty obligations, because the state has a
special public interest in regulating the use of state territory.4 3'

This

decision, however, was rendered long before the vole-face in Graham v.

compliance of which results in severe fines.
431. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923). See also Shames v. Nebraska,
323 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Neb. 1971).
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Richardson in 1971.432 Nowadays, similar statutes will probably be
reviewed under strict scrutiny for state discrimination of alien natural persons
initiated in that decision, and it seems rather improbable that these state
regulations are justified by a compelling fundamental state interest and are
necessary for the realization of that interest. 33
According to the development of the Supreme Court's equal protection
doctrine as to natural alien persons, today it seems to be established that state
alien land ownership restrictions434 concerning resident aliens violate the
Equal Protection Clause, because, first, under the perspective of the fundamental rights branch of equal protection doctrine land ownership is the basis
for making a living for resident aliens and, second, alien persons with
permanent residence in the U.S. are equivalent to U.S. citizens in this respect
so that a suspect classification is at stake.435 For nonresident aliens, on the
other hand, land ownership restrictions are not considered to violate the Equal
Protection Clause. A suspect classification is not assumed, because
nonresident aliens are not viewed as an isolated minority, since they are

432. See supra part III.A.2.
433. See also BERGER & MCCONNELL, supra note 133, at 8-9. In Graham itself

not only Terrace,but also several other older decisions concerning restrictions on alien
land ownership are expressly called in question. Graham, 403 U.S. at 373-75.

434. Several states prohibit or restrict land acquisition by corporations that are
owned by aliens, are controlled by aliens or are organized under alien law. Three
different types dominate: (1) complete prohibition of acquisition of agricultural land,
e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.1(4) in connection with § 567.2 and § 567.3(1) (1991);
(2) restrictions on the total amount of acres which can be owned by alien persons, e.g.,
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-13-10, -30, -40 (1991); (3) complete prohibition of land
ownership of any kind by alien persons, e.g., 60 OKLA.STAT. §§ 121-127 (1991) and
OKLA. CONST. art. XXII § 1 (1991). For foreign and alien corporations, however,
OKLA. CONST. art. XXII § 2 (1991) allows at least acquisition of land necessary for
office or business premises. See generally Lester M. Bliwise, Legal Aspects of U.S.
Real EstateDevelopment and Construction, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT INTHE UNITED
STATES-LAw, TAXATION, FINANCE 517, 518 (Marc M. Levey ed., 1989); Hugh A.
Brodkey, Restrictions on Foreign Investment in Real Property, in MANUAL OF

500, 501-05 and the list at 508-36
(Eugene J. Marans ed., 1984 & 1991 Supp.); Morrison, supra note 230, at 634-36;
Louie B. Barnes, III, Comment, Corporate Aliens, supra note 310; Note, State
Regulation of ForeignInvestment, 9 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 82, 86-87 (1975).
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

435. See Morrison, supra note 230, at 642. Similarly Oyama v. California, 332

U.S. 633 (1948), where, however, the criterion of differentiation on grounds of
national origin plays an important role, see also Tussman & tenBroeck, supranote 32,
at 359 and 374-75. Furthermore, the legislative power of the states is drawn into
doubt, because the Federation has the legislative power in the field of foreign relations
and foreign commerce, at least after it has exerted it or preempted the field. See Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70 (1941); Morrison, supra note 230, at 646-56.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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granted diplomatic protection by their home country. Under the applicable
rational basis test, the state interest in excluding aliens from economic control
within the state is presumed to stand in a rational relation to the land
ownership restriction for aliens.436 In the few existing treatments in
literature, alien corporations are put into the same category of weakly
protected nonresident aliens without any arguments.437
When applying the intermediate standard of review proposed in this
article to land ownership restrictions for alien corporations, these restrictions
can only be justified, if they serve an important governmental goal of
differentiation, and if a proportionate relation between the differentiation used
and the goal of differentiation exists. Consequently, a differentiated approach
seems to be called for. An ownership restriction in order to prevent land
speculation, to preserve agricultural land, or to protect certain military or
strategic zones certainly is in principle permissible, although, additionally, the
proportionality of the respective regulatory framework has to be examined.

An ownership restriction merely motivated by preventing each and every

economic influence of alien corporations,"3 on the other hand, violates the
qualitative requirements of the goal of differentiation. A comprehensive
prohibition of land ownership appears to be always disproportionate and overreaching, since alien corporations have to be at least permitted to acquire
office or business premises, because otherwise the land ownership restrictions
practically amount to an exclusion of alien corporations from interstate
business activities, particularly if the ownership prohibition is additionally
extended to domestic corporations controlled by alien shareholders. Thus, for
instance the Constitution of Oklahoma 439 a state in principle especially
restrictive towards land acquisition by aliens and alien corporations, permits
foreign and alien corporations at least the acquisition of land required for
conducting their business."

436. See Morrison, supra note 230, at 643.
437. Morrison, supranote 230, at 644.
438. See the argument made by Morrison, supra note 230, at 643.
439. OKLA. CONST. art. XXII, § 2 (1991).
440. For a comprehensive treatment of the respective Oklahoma law see
Comment, CorporateAliens, supra note 310. Furthermore, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held in State ex rel. Cartwright v. Hillcrest Inv. Ltd., 630 P.2d 1253 (Okla.
1981), that an alien corporation that fulfilled the preconditions of domestication (see
infra part X.B.5) is considered a resident of the state and consequently no longer
subject to the restrictions of OKLA. CONST. art. XXII § 1 and § 2 (1991), i.e., could
unrestrictedly acquire land.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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2. Qualification Statutes

a. Commerce Clause
For examining the constitutionality of a state foreign corporation law or
qualification, statute"' under the Commerce Clause, Walker applies the
balance of interests test used in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona.442 He
argues that the national interest in an optimal development of trade and
commerce, which is strongly impaired by the costs incurred by a foreign
corporation in fulfilling the formal requirements of qualification, clearly
outweighs the purpose of the foreign corporation laws to provide a forum for
suits against foreign corporations, which due to the modem developments of
the notion of court's jurisdiction is provided in another way. Thus, according
to Walker, the foreign corporation laws violate the Commerce Clause.443
However, this argument should only work out for foreign corporations, and
not for alien ones. As to them, there is probably no predominant interest in
an optimal development of alien trade, although that might have positive
influences on U.S. trade.

According to the Supreme Court, a qualification statute violates the
interstate Commerce Clause and is unconstitutional as a restriction of interstate
commerce, if it seeks to be applied to foreign corporations that do not
regularly have business activities within the state, but the intrastate business
activities of which are merely "fleeting events" in an interstate business transaction.4' Since the Commerce Clause is in principle also applied in favor
of alien corporations," 5 this line of argument, in my view, could
analogously also be used for alien corporations.

b. Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause is hardly discussed with regard to
qualification statutes. On the one hand, this is because, according to
traditional doctrine, only the weak rational basis test would be applied to this

441. These statutes are defined and discussed supra part IV.C.3.a.
442. 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945).
443. Walker, supra note 290, at 755-57 and 759-70. For the compliance of
qualification statutes or their definition of doing business, respectively, with the
Commerce Clause see also Stenger & Gwyn, supra note 292, at 717-20.
444. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974). See also Stenger &
Gwyn, supra note 292, at 717-18, and comprehensively Harold W. Horowitz, The
Commerce Clause as aLimitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine,84 HARV. L. REv.
806, 819-20 (1971).
445. See supratext accompanying note 206 et seq.
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type of economic regulation." 6 On the other hand, the question is anyhow
only discussed with foreign corporations in view, so that the Commerce
Clause seems to lie closer and, above all, to be stricter.
Under the intermediate scrutiny standard suggested in this article the
goal of differentiation to protect domestic legal relations, particularly to
provide an in-state forum to sue, in principle meets the qualitative standards
for a justification. A conclusive evaluation as to the necessity under the
perspective of the strict proportionality review, however, is hard to make at
present. The necessity of qualification statutes should be lacking, if those
voices gain field which see the purpose of qualification statutes in establishing
in-state jurisdiction overtaken by the modem long arm statutes 7 and which
hold the notion of doing business overruled by the Supreme Court's
holdings" 8 to the minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process
Clause." 9
3. State Pseudo-Foreign Corporations Statutes

a. Commerce Clause
State pseudo-foreign corporation statutes,45 which declare applicable

446. See also Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalizationof the
InternalAffairs Doctrine in CorporationLaw, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29, 41 (1987).
447. See LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 11, at 717-18; Stenger & Gwyn, supra note
292, at 717; Walker, supra note 290, at 738-41; Note, Defining State Control,supra
note 290, at 1137-41.

448. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Cf SCOLES &
HAY, supra note 11, at 294-308 and 327-49. See also Helicopteros Nacionales de

Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
449. See, e.g., Stenger & Gwyn, supra note 292, at 717. Cf Comment, Federal
JurisdictionOver Foreign Corporationsand the Erie Doctrine, 64 COLUM. L. REV.

685 (1964), suggesting a uniform federal standard for minimum contacts necessary for
establishing doing business.
450. These statutes are sometimes also called "outreach statutes," see, e.g.,
LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 11, at 708; P. John Kozyris, CorporateWars and Choice
of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 66-69.
For extensive discussions see LEFLAR Er AL., supranote 11, at 707-09; Deborah
A. DeMott, Perspectiveson Choice of Lawfor CorporateInternalAffairs, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 166 (1985); Kaplan, supra note 195, at 442-81; Elvin R. Latty,
Pseudo-ForeignCorporation,65 YALE L.J. 137, 144-45 and 150-55 (1956); Louis
Loss, The Conflict of Laws and the Blue Sky Laws, 71 HARV. L. REV. 209, 216-41
(1958); J. Thomas Oldham, California Regulates Pseudo-Foreign
Corporations-TramplingUpon the Tramp?, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 85, 98-110
(1977); John H. Newman, Note, The Pseudo-ForeignCorporation in California, 28
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

95

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 2

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

the laws of the state of predominant business activities to the internal affairs
of the foreign corporation, particularly the California provision of Cal. Corp.
Code § 2115," 5' are considered by some to violate the interstate Commerce
Clause.
When applying the direct/indirect onerous (undue) burden
analysis,452 some argue that there is a preponderance of the burdens as to the
local benefits due to the inherent extraterritorial corollaries and due to the high
costs for the corporations provoked by the collision of the regime of the
incorporation state and the state of doing business.453 On the other hand,
Henn & Alexander deny a violation of the Commerce Clause by outreach
statutes. As far as the law of the incorporation state and the law of the state
of doing business are identical in substance, there is no conflict. If the
statutes differ, there is also no burden, it is argued, because California law
follows the incorporation rule, so that there will be no cumulation of differing
laws.454 Similarly, the California Court of Appeals, in the well-known
Wilson v. Louisiana Pacific-Resources,Inc.455 decision, denied a violation
of the Commerce Clause by the Californian provision.456 It could be

HASTINGS L.J. 119 (1976); Andrew J. Collins, Comment, Choice of Corporate
Domicile: Californiaor Delaware?, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 103 (1979).
451. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1993).
452. For this analysis under the commerce clause see Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 57, at 274-88. In these cases, the court used a
balancing test between the State interests and the benefit of national unity.
453. See DeMott, supra note 450, at 183-90; Stephen R. Ginger, Regulation of
Quasi-ForeignCorporationsin California:Reflections on Section 2115 After Wilson
v. Louisiana-PacificResourcesInc., 14 Sw. U. L. REV. 665, 672-83 (1984); Comment,
California'sStatutory Attempt, supra note 228, at 952-65. As to the comprehensive
field see Oldham, supranote 450, at 207-32, who in balancing burdens versus benefits
considers application of pseudo-foreign corporation laws in the individual case

unconstitutional for a transitional period. He, however, denies a violation of the
Commerce Clause for that point of time at which pseudo-foreign corporation laws will
be established as an exemption from the internal affairs doctrine, because due to the
acceptance and the subsequent adaptation of the corporation to the provisions, a
significant burden will no longer be present. The provisions do not intend a
preferential treatment of local commerce, but want to prevent distortions of
competition and misuse, id. at 220.
454. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 10, at 223. For an evaluation under
constitutional law see also Beveridge, supra note 254, at 709-19.
455. 138 Cal.App. 3d 216 (1982).
456. Id., at 858-61. A violation of the Commerce Clause is also strongly doubted
by Oldham, supra note 450, at 121-23, whose interest balancing results are the
opposite of those stated above. See also Kozyris, supra note 450, at 57-60. In the
unpublished decision of Louart v. Arden Mayfair, No. C-192-091 (Sup.Ct. of Los
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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necessary in any case to consider that the laws protecting shareholders
declared applicable do not only intend to protect instate (Californian)
shareholders, but all shareholders of the corporation and that the legislative
power of the state as to an ultimately out-of-state corporation could be
doubtful.
Currently, a general insecurity predominates as to which consequences
to draw from the anti-takeover statute decision, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America,"' with its emphasis on the incorporation rule for constitutional
review of pseudo-foreign corporations statutes under the Commerce
Clause." 8 It could be necessary to distinguish between quasi-foreign
corporation statutes and pseudo-foreign corporation statutes." 9 The concrete
design of the individual regulation seems to play an important role.
b. Full Faith and Credit Clause
Some deny a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause by a state, if
it, as the state of doing business, compulsory applies its laws to the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation, as long as there are substantial contacts to the

state of doing business.46 In this case, the interest of the state in applying
its local laws, it is argued, cannot be denied, because just this is made the
"
' In Wilson v. LouisianaPacific-Resources,
requirement within the statutes.46

Angeles County, May 1, 1978), cited according to Kozyris, supra note 450, at 58,
however, § 2115 was held to violate the Commerce Clause and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.
457. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). See also immediatelysupra part IX.B.3.a.
458. Persuasively opting for constitutionality, particularly as far as there are
predominant contacts with the state for doing business, e.g., Beveridge, supra note 254,
at 713-14; see also SCOLES & HAY, supra note 11, at 925 (hesitating, but at the same
time differentiating). In more detail the different constellations and constitutional
problems are treated, e.g., by Buxbaum, supra note 446 and Paul N. Cox, The
Constitutional"Dynamics"of the Internal Affairs Rule, 13 J. CORP. L. 317 (1988).
459. This might be what also SCOLES & HAY, supra note 11, at 925, want to
suggest. A pseudo-foreign corporation is defined as doing practically all its business
in one state while being merely incorporated in another state. A quasi-foreign
corporation does business in several states, but also is simply incorporated in its home
state without doing any business there. See Kaplan, supra note 195, at 438-39.
460. Kaplan, supra note 195, at 446-49. See also DeMott, supra note 450, at
190-97; Oldham, supra note 450, at 192-206; William L.M. Reese & Edmund M.

Kaufman, The Law GoverningCorporateAffairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of
Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1129-44 (1958).
461. See Latty, supra note 450, at 164-65. See also THOMAS LUCHSINGER, DIE
NIEDERLASSUNGSFREIHEIT DER KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN IN DER EG, DEN USA UND

DER SCHWEIZ 244-45 (1992), who at least for the Californian case, Western Airlines,
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Inc., a violation of the Full Faith and Credit clause by the Californian statute
was denied. 62
c. Equal Protection Clause
Some hold the California pseudo-foreign corporation statute Cal. Corp.
Code § 2115463 to violate the Equal Protection Clause." 4 Under the
rational basis standard, the violation is seen, first, in the lack of a pertinent
reason for treating corporations with substantial interstate business activities
and shareholders spread out in the whole country the same as so-called tramp
corporations that conduct all their business activities in California though
incorporated elsewhere.465 Furthermore, a violation is seen in § 2115(e),
according to which corporations admitted to recognized national stock
exchanges do not have to perform all the protections for shareholders as §
2115(b) provides for the group of foreign corporations in the sense of §
2115(a). Within the class of foreign corporations, therefore, a specific
exemption class is seen to be created, which is grounded on criteria of
differentiation that do not possess a rational relationship to the legislative
goals of shareholder and creditor protection in § 2115.'66
Henn & Alexander, by contrast, see no violation of the Equal Protection
Clause in outreach statutes, particularly the California one. According to the
state, they argue, foreign corporations are not treated differently from domestic
corporations. On the contrary, an inequality previously existing at the cost of
the foreign corporation is compensated. 6
Also, Wilson v. Louisiana
Pacific-Resources,Inc.,468 denied a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
by the California Statute in emphasizing the applicability of the weak rational
basis test, although the court limited its opinion to the question of the nonapplicability of the California outreach statute to foreign corporations admitted
to recognized national stock exchanges. 69 As far as I can see, there is as

Inc. v. Sobieski, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961), sees a violation of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause in interplay with the Commerce Clause, according to the
standards set up by the Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE, 451 U.S. 624 (1982), and
CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 262.
462. 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 856-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
463. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1993).
464. Comment, California'sStatutory Attempt, supra note 228, at 961-63.
465. Id. at 962-63.
466. Id. at 961-62.
467. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 10, at 224. See also Latty, supra note
450, at 163 (appearing to deny a violation).
468. 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
469. Id. at 862-63.
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yet no Supreme Court opinion on a state outreach statute for pseudo-foreign
or quasi-foreign corporations.
Due to its restricted scope, this article cannot provide the required
extensive debate of the constitutional problems of outreach statutes and, in
particular, attend to the guidelines of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, especially because the design details of the individual concrete
statutes are decisive. In any case, it must be paid attention to the additional
difficulty comprised in an equal protection challenge of a conflict of laws
statute as opposed to the laws of substantial rules discussed so far.
4. Domestication Statutes
Is seems doubtful whether facultative domestication statutes, 470 per se,
can technically be labelled discrimination. Regularly, this proceeding is laid
out merely as an additional option for alien corporations doing business in the
state, apart from qualification, and therefore creates an additional possibility
in the sense of a "theory of offerings." A domiciled alien corporation is
treated like a domestic corporation in the state corporate law, and, in order to
observe the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Clause, only in regard
to its intrastate activities.47 Thus, facultative domestication is structured as
a means to establish equal treatment or at least to come closer to it. The alien
corporation is granted the possibility to acquire a (at least predominantly) nondiscriminatory status by a mere procedural act.472 Thus, in State ex rel.
Cartwright v. Hillcrest Investments Ltd.473 an alien corporation after
domestication was considered a state resident and consequently excluded from
state land ownership restrictions for alien corporations.
A different evaluation might be required for compulsive domestication.
Compulsive domestication is treated somewhat in the literature. But since, as

470. See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §§ 388, 389, DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 388,
389 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-20,122 - 21-20,124 (1991); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 4161 - 4162 (Supp. 1994). The domestication provisions of UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 16-10-51.5 - 16-10-51.7 (1991) were repealed by L. 1992 ch. 277, effective
July 1, 1992 when the REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (1984) was adopted in Utah.

471. See also Kozyris, supra note 450, at 61-62.
472. Also, domestication does not withdraw diversity of citizenship for purposes
of federal jurisdiction from the domiciled alien corporation, see, e.g., LEFLAR ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 719-20 and 30; RABEL, supranote 5, at 185-86; ROTH, supra note
292, at 57; 19 C.J.S. Corporations§ 887 (1990).
473. State ex rel. Cartwright v. Hillcrest Inv. Ltd., 630 P.2d 1253 (Okla. 1981).
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far as I can see, it is not in force in any state as of today,474 it will not be
examined here.
5. State Taxation of Foreign Corporations
Some states enacted specific differentiating tax regulations, particularly
so-called "retaliatory statutes" in the area of taxation. These statutes substitute
the tax legislation of the state of the corporation's doing business by a specific
compensating tax rate, if the taxation of the home state burdens the corporation more heavily than the taxation of the state of doing business. Thereby,
it is sought to take away the incentive to do business in another state in order
to avoid the tax laws of the state of incorporation.475
a. Equal Protection Clause
Independently from the review under the Dormant Commerce
Clause,476 the Equal Protection Clause becomes applicable for the review of
these state retaliatory statutes or taxation of foreign and alien corporations in
general according to traditional jurisprudence merely after the foreign
corporation has been admitted to do business in the state.477 Cases point out
the applicability of the rational basis test, that is, a taxation must stand in a
rational relation to a legitimate state interest as the goal striven for.478 The
Equal Protection Clause does not require, as it is sometimes also phrased, that
foreign and domestic corporations are subjected to identical taxation or an

474. So far, illustrations of this concept were Mississippi and Oklahoma. MISS.
CODE ANN. § 79-1-19 (1973), however, was repealed in 1987, when the Rev. Model
Bus. Corp. Act was adopted in Mississippi with few changes. OKLA. STAT. ANN. §
18-1199(a) (1971) was repealed in 1986. Obscurely enough, modem treatises (see,
e.g., LEFLAR ET AL., supranote 11, at 719 n.30) still cite as examples cases from the
beginning of the century applying statutes which no longer exist.
475. See Russ, supranote 413; citations in 17A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. §§ 8461,
8802 (1987).
476. See generally Jerome R. Hellerstein, State Taxation under the Commerce
Clause: An HistoricalPerspective, 29 VAND. L. REv. 335 (1976) (addressing the

constitutionality of state tax statutes under the Commerce Clause without special
consideration of foreign corporations).
477. See Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648
(1981); WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968); see also 18A FLETCHER CYC,
CORP. § 8850 (1987); Congressional Research Service supranote 30, at 1716-17. See
also supra part IV.A.3-5.
478. Western & S. Life Ins., 451 U.S. at 668.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2

100

1994]

Bungert: Bungert: Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations

FOREIGNAND ALIEN CORPORATIONS

identical tax rate in every case. 479 In Western & Southern Life Insurance
Co. v. State Board of Equalization48 -while using rational basis
review-the interest attempted to be achieved by the state in setting up a
differentiating taxation was not seen in obtaining tax income from noncitizens,
but in favoring interstate commerce of domestic corporations by deterring
other states from enacting excessive or discriminatory taxes.48' This was
considered a legitimate goal, thereby upholding a California retaliatory tax
regulation.482
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward,483 the Supreme Court
held by a five to four majority that discriminatory taxation of out-of-state
insurance companies presents a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Both
justifications put forward for the discrimination, that is, the incentive to found
new insurance companies in the legislating state, Alabama, and the incentive
for foreign insurance companies to invest capital in assets on Alabama
territory, were refused by the Court already under the rational basis test.
Favoring domestic industry by imposing (tax) burdens on foreign companies
was considered to present, in the formulation of Justice Powell, the very type
of parochial discrimination the Equal Protection Clause sought to avoid.484
On the other hand, it is acknowledged that a state may subsidize local
companies without making the benefits available to foreign companies in the
same manner,485 whereby the bounty theory mentioned previously486 plays
an important role.487 Admission fees for doing business in the state, whether
or not characterized as a tax, according to traditional doctrine cannot violate

479. Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 157 (1918); Baltic Mining
Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 88 (1913). For an extensive treatment of the older
cases compare Sholley, supra note 184, at 567.
480. 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
481. Id. at 668-70.
482. Id. at 671.
483. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
484. Id. at 878-79. Previously, Justice Powell, dissenting in Schweiker v. Wilson,
450 U.S. 221, 244-45 (1981), called for a fair and substantial relation between the
differentiation and the desired legislative goal as an intensification of the traditional
view; see also Note, Taxing, supra note 250, at 897-98. See also the comments by
Cohen, supranote 389, at 9-15. Similarly in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S.
263, 276 (1984), state tax laws solely motivated by economic protectionism had been
held to violate equal protection.
485. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (line of argument merely under
the Commerce Clause); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976);
Cohen, supra note 389, at 21-22.
486. Supra part X.A.8.
487. One could raise the objection that subsidies ultimately are nothing else but
a side-inverted tax.
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the Equal Protection Clause, because the alien or foreign corporation is not
considered to be able to invoke its protection before being admitted to do
business in the state.488
As one of the important results it has to be emphasized that already
under the rational basis test according to current jurisprudence the protection
of local economic interests (also state protectionism) cannot serve as the only
reason for a discriminatory taxation, particularly higher taxation, between
domestic and out-of-state as well as out-of-country corporations, insofar as the
regulation ties the disadvantages (taxes) to an identical set of facts.489 The
same result has been reached under the intermediate scrutiny standard
proposed in this article.49
For state retaliatory statutes, in principle, a discriminatory situation will

be lacking. These statutes serve precisely to prevent a discrimination of
nationals or residents. It is the goal of differentiation of these statutes to
avoid disadvantages for domestic corporations, which stem from a lax
legislation in the home state (state of incorporation) of the foreign corporations,491 so that the latter achieves an advantageous competitive position.
Nevertheless, the retaliatory legislation may not cause the foreign corporation
all in all is more heavily taxed for the identical activity than the domestic
corporation.
b. Due Process Clause
According to the Due Process Clause, the legislative jurisdiction of the
state may not reach over its territorial boundaries and subject income of
corporations to its taxation that originates in activities outside the state
boundaries. This doctrine of "minimum contacts," i.e., the requirement of
minimum contacts between the state and the regulative object here the object

488. 18A FLETCHER Cyc. CORP. § 8851 (1987); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v.
Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888); State v. Int'l Harvester Co., 25 N.E.2d 242 (Ind. 1940).
489. See ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supranote 32, at 801-02, as
well as Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) and Williams v. Vermont,
472 U.S. 14 (1985).
490. See supra part IX.A.4-5.

491. See 17A FLETCHER

CYC. CORP.

§ 8802 (1987).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2

102

19941

Bungert: Bungert: Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations

FOREIGNAND ALIEN CORPORATIONS

of taxation,492 under the Due Process Clause refers to domestic and foreign
corporations the same way.4 "

c. Commerce Clause
Under Commerce Clause doctrine, state taxation of foreign corporations
and alien corporations has to meet the following criteria: (1) The state tax
statute may include a non-discriminatory, appropriately assessed corporate
income tax for those corporations that do exclusively interstate commerce, if
the tax stands in relation to the local activities of the corporation and can be
viewed as a fair and reasonable consideration for them;494 (2) under the
Commerce Clause interest balancing approach a tax will be unconstitutional,
if it burdens commerce in an unfair manner by absorbing more than a just
share from the interstate activity;495 (3) a state has the power to raise
regular property taxes from the assets with in-state situs, even if those are used
in interstate commerce;496 (4) the mere fact that a foreign corporation is
doing business in interstate commerce does not relieve it from local tax
burdens as to the interstate commerce;497 (5) a state tax on the privilege of
doing business within the state is not per se unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause, even if it relates to an activity that is part of interstate
commerce. It must merely be certain that the tax bears a sufficient nexus to
the taxing state, that it is fairly connected to the advantages granted by the
state to the corporation taxed, that it does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and that it is fairly assessed for local activities.498 Additionally,

492. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 112 S.Ct. 1904 (1992);
Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954); 18A FLETCHER CYC.
CORP. § 8849 (1987). For a comprehensive treatment of the minimum contacts
doctrine see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); ScOLES &
HAY, supra note 11, at 294-308 and 327-49.
493. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); Alpha
Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); 18A FLETCHER CYc.

CORP. § 8849 (1987).
494. SeeparticularlyComplete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977);
Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975); General Motors Corp. v.
Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
495. Department of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington
Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
496. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968);
International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U.S. 249 (1929); Atlantic & Pac. Tel. Co. v.
Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160 (1903).
497. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Colonial
Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
498. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex reL Heitkamp, 112 S.Ct. 1904 (1992);
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if the state taxation is applied to foreign, as distinguished from interstate
commerce or, more often, to foreign corporations meaning "alien" in the

context of the Foreign and Interstate Commerce Clause, (6)the tax, despite its
appropriateness, may not create a substantial risk of international multiple
taxation, and (7) may not prevent the government to speak with one voice
when shaping its economic relations with foreign countries.4"
It becomes obvious at this point that as to discriminatory state legislation
in the field of interstate commerce, 5 in practice the Commerce Clause takes
on a role presiding over the Equal Protection Clause. This might particularly
be so, because due to traditional doctrine the Equal Protection Clause, on the
conflict of constitutional laws level, was not applicable to foreign corporations
before qualification. Nevertheless, the Equal Protection Clause is relevant
after admission for discriminating regulation, particularly taxation, in intrastate
commerce.
X. CONCLUSION
A. Standardof Review
1. Under traditional doctrine, different standards are applied to
differentiated treatment of alien natural persons and U.S. citizens under the
Equal Protection Clause. Discriminating state legislation is reviewed under
strict scrutiny. Consequently, it has to be necessary for the realization of a
compelling state interest, i.e., be the less restrictive means to achieve the state
interest. However, if the regulations concern political functions in the states
or restrictions for illegal or nonimmigrant aliens, a weaker standard of review,
probably rational basis review, is used. Consequently, the classification
merely has to be rational in relation to the goal striven for, which provides the
legislator with ample discretion. All federal differentiations, on the other
hand, are only subject to the feeble rational basis test, particularly due to the
wide federal power in this area of law.
It appears persuasive to follow the suggestion of some authors and apply
intermediate scrutiny to all classifications on grounds of nationality, i.e.
alienage. This would establish consistency between the several lines of cases

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); 18A FLETCHER CYC.
CORP.

§ 8838 (1987). See generallyROTUNDA

ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

supra

note 32, at 721-39, 767-83; Congressional Research Service, supranote 30, at 221-26;
Stenger & Gwyn, supra note 292, at 721-22.
499. Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986); 18A
FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 8838 (1987).
500. See also ROTUNDA

ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

supra note 32, at 770-72,

offering extensive citations of Supreme Court cases.
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and, furthermore, besides a greater practicability and clarity, live up to the
significance of "nationality" as criterion of differentiation. Under intermediate
scrutiny, which is generally used for quasi-suspect classifications and for
impairment of quasi-fundamental rights, a differentiation is justified, if it (1)
serves an important governmental objective and (2) stands in an essential
relation to realization of this goal.
2. Unequal treatment of alien or foreign corporations is rarely discussed
by courts or commentators and is traditionally reviewed merely under the
rational basis test. However, in the recent decision of Metropolitan Life
InsuranceCo. v. Ward, this standard of review received somewhat more bite,
because protecting the local economy is no longer accepted as a justification
under the rational basis test, so that a discrimination for the discrimination's
sake is prohibited.
3. This Article argued for extending equal protection doctrine used for
alien natural persons to foreign and alien corporations analogously. The
criterion of differentiation of foreign or alien corporate nationality fulfills
several of the factors developed for defining a suspect criterion, which triggers
strict scrutiny, in differing intensities. Furthermore, strong parallels to the
criterion of differentiation of alienage in the case of natural persons come to
mind. Therefore, the criterion of differentiation of corporate nationality is at

least to be characterized as quasi-suspect. At the same time trans-border
economic activities of foreign or alien corporations at least touch upon a
fundamental right up to now recognized by the Supreme Court in a different
context, that is, the right to interstate migration, which with respect to the
fundamental right branch of the Equal Protection Clause according to
traditional doctrine, may also provoke strict scrutiny review. Consequently,
for a differentiation on account of corporate nationality the factors are fulfilled
that ask for at least intermediate level scrutiny. Argumentatively, you could
probably even consider applying strict scrutiny.
Under intermediate
scrutiny, a state or federal unequal treatment can only survive if it (1) serves
an important governmental goal and (2) stands in an essential relation to the
achievement of this goal. This standard of review should apply both to
discriminations against alien corporations and foreign corporations. According
to a modem concept, particularly due to the concept of subjection and a
modem view of the "within its jurisdiction" formula of the Equal Protection
Clause, it is also irrelevant whether the alien or foreign corporation fulfilled
or even had to fulfill the requirements of qualification. Intermediate scrutiny,
finally, has to be applied evenly to state and Federal unequal treatment of
foreign corporations, in the case of traditional discrimination as well as in the
constellation of reverse discrimination. State constitutional general equal
protection provisions have not been treated in depth in this article, but in
general they should not establish a stricter standard of review. State special
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equal protection clauses for corporations, in addition, are mostly phrased or
drafted in a protectionistic manner and prevent solely reverse discrimination,
i.e., discrimination of nationals.
4. Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause which protects solely
"fundamental activities," also a heightened standard of review is applied, even
if its characterization as intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny is debated.
This constitutional clause, however, according to the perspective of conflict
of constitutional laws is neither applicable for foreign nor for alien corporations. The Impairment of Obligations of Contract Clause, on the one hand,
is applicable for alien and foreign corporations only after qualification in the
state. On the other hand, despite its phrasing, it does not possess absolute
character according to the traditional view of the courts, but rather it allows
a justification under a standard of review similar to equal protection strict
scrutiny.
5. The Dormant Commerce Clause kicks in, if state regulations touch
upon foreign or interstate commerce. State restrictions of interstate commerce
violate the Commerce Clause, on the one hand, by directly discriminating
against persons of other states or in interstate commerce. On the other hand,
the Commerce Clause prohibits indirect discrimination as far as it excessively
burdens interstate commerce and is not justified by local benefits. State
restrictions on foreign commerce are only accepted, if on top of the requirements already mentioned, they do not impair national unity or, in the special
constellation of tax legislation, do not enlarge the risk of multiple taxation.
Under a comparative perspective within the Constitution itself,5"'
consequently, unequal treatment is reviewed under the Commerce Clause by
a sort of strict scrutiny. But the range of application of the Commerce Clause
is in substance restricted to state discriminations against or, within foreign
commerce and interstate commerce. Thus, federal discriminations and state
discriminations in intrastate commerce are left out. As a consequence, the
Equal Protection Clause becomes particularly relevant for state measures
regulating intrastate commerce, furthermore for federal actions, which
'however, have not been a big topic in Supreme Court cases so far. This is
perhaps precisely because of the Supreme Court's concept of the feeble
rational basis test. Besides, for many of the areas of law economically
relevant for foreign and alien corporations the legislative power lies (also)
with the states.
6. Consequently, an intensified standard of review, at least matching
equal protection intermediate scrutiny, is uniform under the similar constitu-

'501. "Internally comparative." See definition in note 303, supra.
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tional safeguards in fact, or, due to their structure, potentially protecting alien
or foreign corporations or generally transborder commerce, that is, under the
Impairment of Obligations of Contract Clause, the Commerce Clause and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. This supports, as a systematic argument,
the correctness of the application of intermediate scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause for differentiations on grounds of foreign or alien corporate
nationality suggested in this article.
B. PracticalApplication of the Standardof Review
1. By declaring a discrimination against foreign or alien corporations
unconstitutional under the proposed intensified standard of equal protection
review precisely because of their foreign or alien nationality, or their lack of
"citizenship," an important stage seems to have been reached already: The
criterion of differentiation, corporate nationality, and the goal of differentiation
may not be congruent. In addition, in my view, only those reasons that are
not already fused with the wider notion of corporate nationality may be used
as a justification of the differentiation: In each case an independent goal of
differentiation is necessary, that under the proposed intensified review standard
of intermediate scrutiny, serves an important governmental objective and
stands in an essential, i.e., proportional (fit, necessary and appropriate) relation
to the achievement of this goal.
The qualitative requirements of the justification are not met by the goals
of differentiation of general protection of local economy, general protection
against alien control, unspecified reference to a key industry or a specific
sector of business with its specific needs, protection of national interests, the
alleged lacking consent to U.S. economic policy or the protection of domestic
employees against unemployment. Establishing a discriminatory general
permit requirement not motivated by specific dangers of the subject matter or
important governmental interests, particularly such requirements where the
permit is subject to unspecified discretion of the (administrative) agency,
violate the Equal Protection Clause. On the other hand, the protection of
national security, of third parties, of domestic legal relations, particularly
consumers, provide valid justification. In certain economic sectors to be
examined in the individual concrete cases, specific differentiating regulations
for alien or foreign corporations will withstand scrutiny, if they are not
motivated by the protection of the domestic enterprises of the specific sector,
but if they enforce certain supervisory control powers or tasks to protect the
greater public, the consumer or the domestic legal relations (third parties) such
as, for instance, in the sectors of bank supervision, production of nuclear

energy, or supervision of aviation.
2. For the latter justifications, which are basically permissive, it is
decisive to maintain proportionality in the relation of goal of differentiation
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and criterion of differentiation in the individual case. Proportionality is in
particular to be observed in the context of the reciprocity criterion, a criterion
of differentiation in principle acknowledgeable, for which, in the first place,
connexity of the right retained as a pawn and the right striven for abroad has
to be considered closely and, in the second place, in a particularly strict
manner the fitness, necessity and especially appropriateness (proportionality)
of the relation of goal of differentiation and alien corporate nationality. The
so-called bounty theory, according to which the government may freely
differentiate when providing public services and benefits, is problematic,
insofar as at least the definition of a public benefit has to be narrowly tailored
to avoid the possibility of reformulating each and every restriction as simply
the refusal of benefits. Also, the imposition of discriminatory formal

requirements, such as disclosure or reporting obligations, reaches the threshold
of a potentially unconstitutional discrimination, i.e., threshold of relevance,
and may solely be upheld, if in the individual constellation important
governmental objectives closely tailored to the specific subject matter are
pursued and the extent and the expense of the formal requirements are fit,
necessary, and appropriate for achieving the goal of control.
Thus, one has to point out with certain regrets, that it becomes obvious
that economic restrictions for foreign corporations equipped with a reciprocity
requirement, narrowly tailored and consequently satisfying the proportionality
principle cannot be overcome even by using the intensified standard of equal
protection review developed in this article, but are left dependent on
international and supranational non-discrimination clauses. Alternatively, the
overall level of protection rises when other countries drop discriminations of
alien corporations in their statutory law on their own, thereby decreasing the
range of actual applicability of restrictions based on reciprocity. In this
regard, the intensified standard of review, however, initiated a stronger
connexity and strict proportionality between the "pawn" and the protection
desired for the nationals in alien law.
3. Land ownership restrictions must meet strict requirements.
Ownership restrictions based simply on the intention to prevent any economic
influence by alien corporations violate the qualitative requirements for the goal
of differentiation. A complete prohibition to acquire land appears disproportionate in any case, because the lack of an exemption for necessary office or
business premises amounts, particularly when additionally applying the control
theory, to an exclusion of alien corporations from instate business activities.

Specific and proportionate restrictions motivated by the prevention of land
speculation, by conserving agricultural land or by the protection of certain
military and strategic zones are permitted.
State qualification statutes could gain the status of unconstitutionality
under the intensified equal protection standard of review due to lack of
necessity to protect instate legal relations by creating an instate forum to sue,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/2
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if the modem conception will gain force that the statutes' function is taken
over by the modem long arm statutes and that the notion of doing business
has been out dated by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the requirement
of minimum contacts under the Due Process Clause. Facultative domestication
statutes do already not amount to a technical discrimination, since by a mere
procedural act they precisely intend to establish equal treatment for alien
corporation in -regard to their intrastate activities with domestic
corporations-at least in the field of corporate law.
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